

Gray Zone Strategy in Maritime Arena : Theories and Practices

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I . Introduction

The so-called gray zone strategies have attracted substantial attention from various areas such as academic and policy circles in recent years. Although countries like China, Russia and others have appeared to rely on the strategy to challenge and revise existing systems and orders, academic and policy communities still struggle to clarify the concept of the strategy and to develop effective counter measures against the strategy. Recent events in Ukraine, Syria, Iraq, and the South China Sea have continued to indicate the practices of the gray zone strategy that is of grave concern not only for the region but also for the whole world.

The gray zone strategy in the hands of ambitious regional powers are posing a growing challenges to the security of the region and the world as well. In fact, many tools and techniques in the strategy have been employed for centuries. But, those approaches have renewed their relevance in the context of current security situations, both because some new technologies used in the strategy have made them more effective than ever and because several major powers are taking advantages in making extensive of gray zone campaigns.

This paper is designed to explore theories and practices of the gray zone strategies. To the end, it begins with the definition and causes of gray zone aggression along with its unique characteristics compared to its counterpart concepts, reasons China and Russia use the gray zone strategy and end with some implications for the Korean maritime security as de facto conclusion of this paper. It is with the author's hope that this paper will be of interest to audiences throughout the Korean military and wider security & defense communities.

II . Definition of Gray Zone Strategy

The concept of the gray zone strategy currently reflects three major trends in the world politics. The first one is the limited but nonetheless transformative intentions of revisionists such as China and Russia. Second one is the revisionist's reliance on incremental approaches to revise elements of the existing international system one bite at a time. Last one is to employ nontraditional tools of statecraft to achieve gradual but decisive results in the no-man's-land between peace and war. The result of those trends is found to be a pattern of state rivalry believed to be able to substitute for traditional military aggression, posing serious challenges to both the region's security and the world's security as a whole ultimately.

However, the strategy featuring those trends also has powerful constraints due to which those approaches of the strategy can easily become counterproductive. As much as the gray zone strategies attempt to escape significant retaliation by staying under key threshold to escape significant retaliation, they do not always succeed. Evidences reveal that China and Russia, as examples, have prompted serious blow-backs as results of conducting the strategy. This is a dilemma of the strategy in that the strategies can either avoid meaningful opponent's response or achieve significant and timely results, but they have difficulty getting the both through conducting the strategies.

As explained above, the gray zone strategy can be regarded as an effort or series of efforts different from steady-state deterrence and assurance that attempt to achieve one's security objectives without resort to direct and sizable use of force. In engaging in the gray zone strategy, an actor or revisionist seek to avoid crossing a threshold that result in war. Such definition of the strategy implies that there is a need to apply judgement with regard to intention and tools when thinking about the strategy. The gray zone strategy can use a variety of means

that could approach the threshold for what constitutes direct and sizable military action. Those means include use of proxies, covert military operations, and paramilitary activities. These tools can also be used in any domain of conflict from land, air, sea, cyber, and space to economics, legal maneuvers, and influence activities. Some experts have also referred to gray zone strategies as hybrid strategies. But, those two concepts are different from each other, but they are related ones while the two are not synonymous.

As noted, hybrid strategies combine military tactics across traditional nuclear, conventional, and/or unconventional divisions. But, gray zone approaches do not resort to direct and sizable use of force. Only a subset of hybrid tactics may be employed in the gray zone approach, and it almost certainly never use nuclear means and significant direct conventional means. Thus it can be said that the gray zone strategy is a subset of hybrid strategy, not vice versa.

Regarding the definition of the gray zone strategy, it needs to be noted that the strategy has existed for millennial and was prominent especially during the Cold War. in 1955, Henry Kissinger wrote that Soviet gray zone tactics were neutralizing the United States “at much less risk by gradually eroding the peripheral area, which will imperceptibly shift the balance of power... without ever presenting us with a clear-cut challenge.”¹⁾ As President Kennedy warned in 1962, “This is another type of war, new in its intensity, ancient in its origin.”²⁾ For this reason, General Joseph Votel argues that “the Cold War was a 45-years-long gray zone struggle.”³⁾ The Soviet Union was not only the country that employed the gray zone strategy during the Cold War era. The United States also adopted the

1) Henry A. Kissinger, “Military Policy and Defense of the ‘Gray Areas,’” *Foreign Affairs* 33, no. 3 (1995), pp.416-428.

2) John F Kennedy, “Remarks at West Point to the Graduating Class of the U.S. Military Academy” (West Point, NY, June 6, 1962).

3) Joseph L. Votel et al., “Unconventional Warfare in the Gray Zone,” *Joint Force Quarterly* 80 (First Quarter 2016), pp.101-109.

same strategy in Afghanistan and elsewhere as ways of eroding the Soviet power. That's why it may be said that gray zone challenges are not new. And, as stated before, other types similar to the gray zone strategy, such as irregular warfare, low-intensity conflict, asymmetric warfare, military operations other than war and small wars have occurred so far, being able to be sources from which an idea of gray zone strategy could be conceptualized. Indeed, Adam Elkus has argued that the term "gray zone" is simply a reconceptualization of ideas that have existed in international relations for decades.⁴⁾

In recent years, Chinese and Russia activities have renewed interests of analysts concerned in regard to the concept of the gray zone strategy. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review called attention to conflicts above peace and below war in noting the existence of an "ambiguous gray area," which is neither fully war nor fully peace.⁵⁾ The gray zone in Japan represents the state between peacetime and an emergency situation. And some experts suggest that gray zone should be defined as a state of security competition between peace and war.⁶⁾

Considering all these descriptions of the gray zone approaches, the gray zone strategy can be said to include uses of military forces that fall short of actual war but which do not qualify as peace, and that the gray zone exists between peaceful interstate political competition and open war. The concept of the gray zone strategy implies that there is no empty space between war and peace, and also does that the space in between the two extremes is a landscape churning with political, economic, and security competitions requiring our constant attention.

4) Adam Elkus, "50 Shades of Gray: Why the Gray Wars Concept Lacks Strategic Sense," *War on the Rocks*, December 15, 2015.

5) U.S. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Arlington, VA: DOD, 2010), p.73.

6) Amy Chang, Ben Fitzgerald, and Van Jackson, *Shades of Gray: Technology, Strategic Competition, and Stability in Maritime Asia* (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, 2015), p.3.

In summary, gray zone conflicts can be said to occur below the threshold for war with an implication that they are somehow constrained. The gray zone strategy seek to attain aims without escalating to overt warfare, and without crossing established red lines, and without exposing the practitioner to the penalties and risks that such escalation might bring. In order to avoid crossing the established threshold, “Schelling points” deserve here our attention. The Shelling points are “finite steps in the enlargement of a war or a change in participation. They are conventional stooping places or dividing lines. They have some quality that makes them recognizable, and they are somewhat arbitrary.”⁷⁾ Escalation to the points is intended to force the other side to stop escalating at a certain point that is advantageous to the conflict initiator. Making the points by initiator needs skillful diplomacy in ways the initiator arranges things so that his or her opponent is embarrassed by having the last clear chance to avert disaster. Accordingly, the gray zone coercion can be said to involve intense competition and often a long-term campaign plan, but need not involve outright military conflict.

III. Causes of Gray Zone Strategy

The gray zone conflict is not a new phenomenon. But, an interesting thing is that the gray zone conflict has still attracted much attention in recent years. In particular, many researchers now begin to focus on a gray zone coercion China has adopted to challenge the status quo in Asia. Regarding the reasons the gray zone strategy is applied, states are most likely to use the strategy when two conditions are met. First, a challenger typically seeks to alter some element of status quo. Second,

7) Thomas C. Shelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1976), p.135.

this dissatisfied challenger usually perceives its opponent as having an advantage at higher levels of escalation. The first condition establishes conflicting interests and the challenger's desire to alter some element of the status quo. The second condition establishes the challenger's desire to avoid escalation thresholds. The result is that stability at higher level of conflict incentivizes challenges as a lower level of conflict. This is known as the stability-instability paradox. A further elaboration on the causes of the strategy needs to be made more for enhancing readers' understanding on this issue.

1. An ambitious challenger dissatisfied with current status quo

A country dissatisfied with some element of the existing system tends to accept risk to revise the status quo. In fact, an international system is most stable when a system's distribution of power and distribution of benefits are well aligned. In this system, all countries regard the expected costs of changing the status quo as being higher than the expected rewards. The reason the system is stable is because the dominant power or power do not have an incentive to alter the status quo and weaker powers do not have the capability to alter the status quo. However, when one country grows faster than other countries, the existing distribution of benefits no longer reflects the distribution of power, thus giving the rising country an incentive to challenge the status quo. The rising country, in this case, called a revisionist that often rise even after the existing international order was fully established and the benefits were already allocated.

Rising power is not the only country that challenge the status quo. Misperception can cause dissatisfaction among national leaders. Some leaders may perceive their power to be greater than it is even though the distribution of power is balanced. Due to this type of misperception, leaders may be convinced to have an incentive to alter the status quo.

Changing the status quo is most likely to occur if leaders perceive their state as more powerful than it is in reality, or if they believe that the status quo has recently shifted against them. An example of this case is that Russia recently thought that the West had been moving into its backyard and threatening its core strategic interests. This is a point Putin made emphatically and repeatedly.⁸⁾

Rising powers and aggrieved powers are both more likely to be dissatisfied than other states and to view the existing order as inherently unfair. China and Russia are just cases in point. They both often characterize the status quo as fundamentally disadvantageous to them. China, as a rising power, has both the incentive and capability to alter the status quo. Russia, as an aggrieved power, has more limited capabilities, but is still committed to adjusting the existing order. The perception of a gap in the distribution of power and benefits are related to actively seeking changes to the distribution of territory and the norms of behavior. China has constructed new land in the South China Sea while Russia has invaded Ukraine. And both countries have complained about what they view as an unfair set of norms that advantage the United States and its allies and partners. The legality of close-in reconnaissance flights along foreign coasts is an example of such unfair set of norms.

2. Presence of a capable dominant power

The presence of dissatisfied challengers is not a sufficient condition to trigger gray zone coercion. If the challenger is strong enough to prevail in a symmetric conflict with the dominant power, the challenger simply seeks to overturn the status quo through war rather than to make minor revisions through gray zone coercion. But, if the challenger perceives its

8) John J. Mearsheimer, "Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West's Fault: The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin," *Foreign Affairs* 93, no. 5 (September-October 2014), pp.1-12.

opponents as having an asymmetric capability advantage at higher levels of escalation, then the challenger may well seek more limited changes to the status quo. It may thus be said that the military strength of dominant power such as U.S. has channeled dissatisfied states into the gray zone.

A dominant power is a country that has been able to use its geopolitical influence to reshape the international system in ways its favorable position can be prolonged and enhanced. It can play a leading role in forming most major international institutions such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and the United Nations. The international institutions created mainly by a dominant country generally locks existing power structure in for interests of not only itself but also its allies and partners. The dominant power also retains a strong network of allies and partners around the globe, many of which can adapt to meet challenges from rising powers. Moreover, the dominant state retains a large, well-equipped, technologically advanced, and highly proficient military evaluated to be a most capable one in the world.

It is not surprising that existing international order tends to be resistant to change that potential and actual competitors want to revise. This is one of reasons states lacking the capability to gain their goals with conventional means favor ways to erode the international order through ambiguously aggressive actions known as gray zone coercion or campaign. Particularly in the period following the Persian Gulf War, conventional military challenges to the existing order by dissatisfied states has been recommended to use not outright conventional warfare but gray zone coercion. Moreover, a dominant power like U.S. has shown that it is less effective in low-level conflict, which has been a reason to limit its public willingness to engage in such campaigns and to increase the attractiveness of such campaigns to its adversaries.⁹⁾

9) Michael Green, Kathleen Hicks, Zack Cooper, John Schaus, Jake Douglas, *Countering Coercion in Maritime Asia: The Theory and Practice of Gray Zone Deterrence* (Washington,

3. Presence of the stability–instability paradox

If a country judges that its adversary has escalation dominance in a certain level or domain, it is quite natural for it to attempt to avoid escalation to that level or domain. In theory, an escalation dominance in a form of military dominance or nuclear dominance encourages competitors to seek more limited changes to the status quo rather than direct military challenges to it. This phenomenon is called the stability–instability paradox where stability at higher levels of conflict incentivizes opportunism at lower levels. As observed by Liddell Hart in 1954, to the extent that the hydrogen bomb reduces the likelihood of full-scale war, it increases the possibility of a limited war that is favored by widespread local aggression.¹⁰⁾ The same argument is suggested by Robert Jervis that to the extent that the military balance is stable at the level of all-out nuclear war, it will become less stable at lower levels of violence.¹¹⁾ Along these lines, the result of the stability–instability paradox can be said to be that dissatisfied states are likely to contest limited elements of regional orders by adopting the gray zone strategies.

Russia and China have applied the gray zone campaigns by taking advantages of the stability–instability paradox. The two countries know that U.S. has a superior capability to escalate. But, nevertheless, the two countries have pursued and will pursue gray zone strategies if they judge U.S. interests as insufficient to trigger a major escalation. As argued above, this creates stability at the conventional and nuclear levels of warfare, but incentivizes and encourages the two countries to adopt gray zone strategies as a way of advancing their goals just below that threshold.

DC: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2017), p.28.

10) B. H. Liddell Hart, *Deterrent or Defense* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1960) p.31.

11) Robert Jervis, *The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1981), p.31.

The belligerent wants to contain the conflict locally and deter external intervention when it has no global escalation dominance. It can be therefore said that gray zone coercion is most likely when a potential challenger is dissatisfied but the dominant power retains escalation dominance. But, if either of the two conditions is not met, then potential challenger are not likely to engage in gray zone provocation.¹²⁾ Of course, there will be differences depending on which parts of the status quo a challenger likes to revise. It has been known to us that Russia seeks to challenge the U.S.-led system both regionally and globally while China primarily aims to reassert its regional status and simultaneously has strong interests in maintaining much of the existing international system.

IV. Characteristics of Gray Zone Strategy

In this context, gray zone strategy might be understood as having a number of characteristics. It could be considered as a form of strategy that: pursues political objectives through cohesive, integrated campaigns; employs mostly nonmilitary or nonkinetic tools; strives to remain under key escalatory or red line thresholds to avoid outright, conventional conflict; moves gradually toward its objectives rather than seeking conclusive results in a specific period of time.¹³⁾

An important distinction regarding such means of strategy is whether states actively and consciously choose gray zone strategy as an alternative to other forms of seeking their political objectives. In some

12) For the cases, see Richard Bessel, *Germany after the First World War* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993); Wilhelm Deist et al., eds., *Germany and the Second World War: Volume I ; The Build-up of German Aggression*, trans. P. S. Falla, Dean S. McMurry, and Ewald Osers (New York: Clarendon Press, 1991), p.41.

13) Michael J. Mazarr, *Mastering the Gray Zone: Understanding a Changing Era of Conflict* (Carlisle, PA: United States Army War College Press, 2015), p.58.

cases, states are experimenting with gray zone techniques in order to develop really variations on ways of conducting traditional styles of combat such as asymmetric war involving open fighting in irregular way or limited war involving outright combat pursued with mutually-agreed constraints.¹⁴⁾ In other words, the gray zone strategy is one of variations on the theme of traditional combats. On the other hand, gray zone strategies or campaigns are regarded as a prelude to potential warfare, rather than an alternative to it.


For relatively weak states, the gray zone tools and techniques may not their unique and coherent strategic concept, but may be an only option they have to choose due to the absence of other choices. Of course, there are some evidences that states have indeed adopted the gray zone strategies as a distinct and specific form of conflict. But, those evidences still remain inconclusive.

Figure 1 below indicates a range of tools and techniques that can be used to assemble gray zone campaigns.¹⁵⁾ But, this figure is not comprehensive but suggestive or illustrative of the kinds of actions available to revisionists like China. These tools are ones that, in one way or another, tend to fit well into gray zone strategies. None of those are necessarily designed to achieve a rapid victory in the sense of the classic use of military force.

14) Andr as R acz, *Russia's Hybrid War in Ukraine*, Report No. 43 (Helsinki, Finland: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2015), pp.19-42. The report discusses various of the concepts at issue here-hybrid, asymmetric, nonlinear, and so on-and the distinction clearly emerges.

15) Michael J. Mazarr, *op. cit.*, p.60.

〈Figure 1〉 A Spectrum of Gray Zone Techniques



The above picture seems to give us an idea that the gray zone strategy is characterized by the employment of strategic gradualism. The gray zone strategy is designed to unfold over time rather than to gain decisive results all at once. Thus countries that always feel comfortable and effective for their foreign policy by posing decisive threats against their opponents need new habits of using all aspects of gray zone strategies.

Military strategy has often been conceived as a set of interconnected actions designed to achieve rapid and decisive results. Just one case in point is the ejection of Saddam Hussein from Kuwait by the United States in 1990. In the case, U.S. coordinated diplomatic, economic, and military campaigns to achieve that goal in decisive manner within a specified time period.¹⁶⁾ If someone proposes to develop a strategy for using force to achieve a goal, the immediate impression conveyed is one of short-term focus. That is called the conclusive strategy which is contrary to the gray zone strategy. In other words, the conclusive strategy tries to integrate all ranges of steps to achieve a decisive objective in a

16) Mark Galeotti, "Hybrid War' and 'Little Green Men': How It Works and How It Doesn't," *E-IR*, April 16, 2015, p.2.

relatively brief period of time. The conclusive strategy has been served as military operational doctrine for most of countries that are oriented toward winning traditional phases of major combat operations.

But, quite contrary to the conclusive strategy, the gray zone approach gives another way to pursue the national security objectives through a long set of interconnected actions calculated to make gradual progress. The reason an initiator conducts the gray zone strategy may be due to the less significance of his or her interests at stake, or a greater risk of escalation, or severely constrained tools available, or some combination of all of those factors. However, whatever the reason, an initiator of the gray zone strategy will find a way to pursue his or her long-term ends without conclusive leap. Instead he or she will take a series of modest actions to achieve those long-term goals. The main reason for the gradual approach is to avoid the sort of fundamental clash that characterizes conclusive strategies.

The gray zone strategy uses some elements common to both “Salami slicing” and “*faits accompli*” designed to sum up to decisive effect.¹⁷⁾ These approaches may also be attractive to countries like China and Iran, because their strategic cultures recommend indirection and avoiding unnecessarily decisive fights where possible. As noted, in the strategic culture of these countries, the best wisdom is not to fight a decisive and costly battle. Those countries try to avoid a decisive battle in the first place while still achieving one’s strategic goals. Step-by-step gray zone campaigns just represent such an approach.

V. Gray Zone Strategies in Place : China and Russia

In order to evaluate whether a certain country consciously employs the gray zone strategy, one needs to examine the five questions: would

17) Robert Haddick, “Salami Slicing in the South China Sea,” *Foreign Policy*, August 3, 2012.

their overall national posture and security strategies embrace such approaches?; do they have identified objectives that require a shift in the rules-based order?; have they developed, in official or quasi-official places, theories or concepts that support such strategies?; have any official sources endorsed the idea?; do we see behavior that correlates with gray zone strategies?¹⁸⁾

There may be a positive answer to all the five questions. But, it does not necessarily mean that a country has chosen a gray zone strategy as its default approach. However, it has been argued frequently that there is sufficient evidence in the five questions to suggest a pattern of the gray zone strategy in Chinese and Russian statecraft. That's why the two countries deserve an analysis on how much the two adopt the gray zone strategy.

1. Chinese case

China's pursuit of gray zone strategy in the South China Sea is a leading example of such an approach. China clearly desires regional hegemony to gain control of specific resources in the region and counterbalance, and eventually replace U.S. geopolitical preeminence in Asia.¹⁹⁾ But, China's aggression seems to be strictly bounded. It has no desire to collapse global economic institutions or create spiraling new regional instability. It has been more than willing to take patient, decades-long approaches to even vital claims in the name of preserving a global system amenable to economic growth and prosperity.

It also seems well aware of the advantages of recognition as a responsible global actor. This may be one of good reasons China has determined to

18) Michael J. Mazarr, *op. cit.*, p.79.

19) See, for example, Nayan Chanda, "China's Long-Range Salami Tactics in East Asia," *Huffington Post*, January 27, 2014; and John Chen, "Get Comfortable Being Uncomfortable: Uncertainty, Brinkmanship, and Salami-Slicing in East Asia," *Georgetown Security Studies Review*, February 1, 2015.

change aspects of the current system without overturning it. It may thus be said that China's national strategic posture indeed appears to call for something like gray zone strategy to pursue its national goals but do so while managing risk and preserving stability.²⁰⁾

In fact, there are good reasons to believe that Chinese conceptions of strategy are inherently related to gray zone approaches. If one looks at Chinese official and unofficial statements, it can be easily led to believe that Chinese strategy emphasizes the holistic, multi-domain aspects of even military confrontations, tightly integrating political, diplomatic, informational, and economic elements. This observation evidences the fact that China tends to favor patient, indirect approaches if at all possible, a preference grounded in classic Chinese strategic thought.

Chinese scholars recently have issued a number of theoretical works emphasizing the value of gray zone strategies.²¹⁾ Of course, the publication of such concepts does not necessarily indicate that governments have adopted them. But, a number of factors suggest that these theories are at least suggestive of state intent. The publications on the gray zone strategy have been authored mainly by current or former military officers, and they have reflected at least some degree of official thinking.

In connection with the gray zone strategy, one needs to look at the Chinese military report entitled "Unrestricted Warfare" written by two Chinese colonels.²²⁾ The report constitutes a vision of future conflict that breaks down the dividing lines between civilian and military affairs

20) Debate continues, of course, over just how limited its aspirations are, or will remain. Jonathan Holslag has argued that, to fulfill them, "China must become the most powerful country in Asia by far, and attain the power to deter other protagonists by force." He lays out four specific goals of Chinese foreign policy: Control of key frontier lands like Tibet; sustain Party rule through economic growth and stability; win respect for Chinese sovereignty; and to "recover so-called 'lost territory,'" from Taiwan to South China Sea islands to areas of the East China Sea and areas of the Himalayas contested with India. Michael J. Mazarr, *op. cit.*, p.97.

21) Robert Haddick, "America Has No Answer," War on the Rocks, February 2014.

22) Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, *Unrestricted Warfare* (Beijing, China: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, 1999).

and between peace and war, in a persistent campaign for relative advantage. Actually the title seems to imply lack of limits on use of range of tools to achieve power, not on warfare of extreme violence. It is contended that no-military tools are, in the title, are becoming equally prominent and useful for the achievement of previously military objectives. This type of warfare is a future of warfare that is composed of cyber-attacks, financial weapons, information attacks, and etc. All of these taken together imply that the very essence of the Chinese type of unrestricted warfare is that the battlefield is everywhere.

The document is suggestive rather than analytical without providing solid empirical examples or operational details. It is not as clear as it could be about the line between “unrestricted” and classic warfare, or whether the unrestricted variety is truly a substitute for major war or only an adjunct. At times, it seems to jumble up long-range kinetic strikes with cyber operations and financial punishments. The techniques emphasized in the document are hardly new and represents the full range of the unrestricted warfare toolkit over the millennia. Nevertheless, the report remains one of the best portraits of a different way of conceiving conflict in the Chinese gray zone.

The Chinese behavior in the South China Sea appears to be consonant with a state employing a gray zone strategy for revisionist intent.²³⁾ China has taken a long series of actions that have built up a persistent claim to regional hegemony in the sea, appearing to add up to a coherent gray zone campaign for competitive advantage. China has employed a wide range of tools and techniques as part of this campaign. It has published detailed political claims to territory within its “nine-dashed line.”²⁴⁾ It has generated historical narratives and documentation in

23) An excellent source of data on the range of Chinese gray zone activities is Christopher Yung and Patrick McNulty, “China’s Tailored Coercion,” Report 5, *Maritime Strategy Series*, Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, January 26, 2015.

24) Mohan Malik, “Historical Fiction: China’s South China Sea Claims,” *World Affairs*, May-June, 2013, available from www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/historical-fiction-

support of its claims and stated a determination to resolve disputes to its satisfaction.

China has deployed a staggering variety and number of civil law enforcement and civilian commercial vessels and aircraft in swarming and presence missions throughout the region. It, indeed, brought together five distinct civilian maritime agencies into a unified Coast Guard in 2013 to enhance the mutual collaboration in these forces.²⁵⁾ It has also employed the China National Offshore Oil Corporation for regional coercion, deploying an oil rig near the Paracel Islands in 2014. It has integrated a range of economic, diplomatic, and informational steps into a coherent campaign of influence.

Through a long series of coercive actions using the above tools and techniques, China, in 2012, established a settlement on Woody Island in the Paracels, and ratcheted up pressure on Scarborough Reef in the same year, eventually forcing the Philippine forces to pull back. The Air Defense Interdiction Zone (IDIZ) declared for the East China Sea in November 2013 is just a part of the coercive actions. Chinese employment of state-owned institutions like the National Offshore Oil Corporation in the South China Sea makes us think that it has administrative control of those resources. China also deliberately provoked close-run military engagements with other powers, especially the United States and Japan in the region.

All these approaches taken by China especially with focus on non-military force in the region can be termed 'slow-intensity conflict' to make difference with 'low-intensity conflict'. The slow-intensity conflict is a strategy of moves that tries to lull the other claimants into believing that no conflict exists. States employing the gray zone strategy tend to challenge the status quo in ways that are deniable, and to pursue

[china%E2%80%99s-south-china-sea-claims](#).

25) James Kraska, "How China Exploits a Loophole in International Law in Pursuit of Hegemony in East Asia," FPRI E-Notes, January 2015.

types of coercion in ways that make attribution difficult and blur the distinction between aggressor and defender. Chinese pattern of assertiveness over territorial claims in the South China Sea is just the case in point. It has relied on traditional actors and non-traditional means such as fishing vessels, the Coast Guard, water cannons, construction crews that build artificial islands in disputed areas, intrusive but unarmed reconnaissance drones, and sonic devices that induce nausea in their targets.

The gray zone strategy has an important criterion to be distinguished from standard great power competition persistent but uncoordinated. It is some degree of intention and design. In order for the strategy to have some meaningful coherence and standing, it needs to have specific lines of effort and identified objectives. In other words, the gray zone strategy must be deliberately chosen as an alternative to traditional military operations. An example of Chinese gray zone strategy with the intention and design is the 'cabbage strategy'. This strategy is designed to gain influence by wrapping targeted islands with concentric layers of Chinese fishing boats, fishing administration ships, maritime enforcement ships, and warships. It coordinates various aspects of its non-military approaches to achieve holistic effect. The strategy even calibrates the degree of belligerence to keep it under thresholds of its opponent response. And China adopting the cabbage strategy scales back for a year or more at a time when regional reactions become too intense.

However, the restrained seemingly non-military moves by China, the so-called gradualism of the gray zone strategy, is a little bit problematic. The reason the strategy creates a problem for a defender is due to its salami-slicing characteristics. The strategy is salami slicing its way to the achievement of its objectives, and at no point does it create a sufficient balancing dynamic to effectively check its activities. Due to the step-by-step approach, the strategy may be undermining the utility of regional strategies that assume or rely upon conclusive approaches

such as the concept of Air Sea Battle planned for large-scale conflict. The Air Sea Battle concept may be of little use in counteracting China's gray zone gradualism.

2. Russian case

A second leading example of a gray zone strategy can be found in Russia's unfolding campaign to dominate Russia's near abroad and drive wedges between U.S.-led alliances. Russian application of the gray zone strategy has been in evidence not only in Ukraine but also in earlier aggressive moves against Georgia and Estonia. Even Russia's energy diplomacy with Eastern Europe reveals another variant of gray zone strategy. The Russian actions in those cases represent something more than classic great power politics. Those are designed to avoid the costs and risks of outright conflict.

Of course, those actions done by Russia can be viewed to be more straightforward and frankly aggressive than gray zone strategies. Russian ways in the occasions are preemptive military fait accompli that relies heavily on conventional military forces, sometimes deployed in clandestine and deniable ways. Recent battles in Ukraine have certainly involved force-on-force fire-fights consistent with major combat operations, and have produced casualties numbering in the thousands. Nevertheless, there is significant evidence that Russia consciously has undertaken the gray zone approaches.²⁶⁾

As in the case of China, there is an evidence of quasi-official publications that lay a theoretical foundation for such campaigns even in Russia. The so-called 'a future war' has been discussed as a future

26) See Will Cathcart and Joseph Epstein, "Why Putin's Phony Wars Work Better than 'Real' Ones," *The Daily Beast*, August 8, 2015. Molly McKew and Gregory Maniatis argue that Russia has developed a version of "pop-up war-nimble and covert that is likely to be the design of the future." See "Playing By Putin's Tactics," *Washington Post*, March 9, 2014, available from https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/playing-by-putins-tactics/2014/03/09/b5233b90-a558-11e3-a5fa-55f0c77bf39c_story.html.

type of warfare. This type of future war is a nonlinear war and involves everybody and everything, meaning the inclusion of all aspects of life, while still remaining elusive in its main contours.²⁷⁾ In this mode of future war, the role of military force remains important, but its the focus is on the indirect use of military power to achieve decisive ends in which the role of information and other non-kinetic components becomes more decisive.

Another essay titled “The Nature and Content of a New Generation War”²⁸⁾ was issued with wide scope for including all manner of national tools that can contribute to a comprehensive campaign. Asymmetry and indirection take their ultimate forms in the type of war designed to undermine an adversary’s power using all mechanisms available. The essay also emphasizes a more gradual and ambiguous approach that reduces costs and risks while discarding the direct and decisive mindset of conventional military operations.

Based on the two concepts of future types of war, Chief of the Russian General Staff Valery Gerasimov made ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ where the first line concludes that there has been a tendency toward blurring the lines between the states of war and peace in the 21st century.²⁹⁾ The doctrine also says that, today, wars are no longer declared and proceed according to an unfamiliar template once started. Gerasimov describes a future in which a wide range of tools can bring a society to its knees in a matter of days or weeks.

One may say that military men cannot acquire lessons from the “Arab Spring” that were not war. But, the opposite is true in that the event precisely presents typical type of warfare in the 21st century. In terms of

27) See the discussion in Andr as R acz, *Russia’s Hybrid War in Ukraine*, Report No. 43 (Helsinki, Finland: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2015), pp.34-42.

28) S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, “The Nature and Content of a New Generation War,” *Military Thought*, October-December 2013, available from www.eastviewpress.com/Files/MT_FROM%20THE%20CURRENT%20ISSUE_No.4_2013.pdf.

29) Michael J. Mazarr, *op. cit.*, p.90.

the scale of the casualties and destruction, the catastrophic social, economic, and political consequences, such new-type conflicts are comparable with the consequences of any real war. Throughout the occasion, one could sense that the very 'rules of war' have changed, and the role of non-military means of achieving political and strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, it has exceeded the power of force of weapons in their effectiveness.

Military forces in the Gerasimov doctrine is described as merely supplementing the gray zone strategy. He further stress in the doctrine document that frontal engagements of large formations of forces at the strategic and operational level are gradually becoming a thing of the past while long-distance and contactless actions against the enemy are becoming the main means of achieving combat and operational goals. But, campaigns he outlines in the doctrine sound more like a conventional bombing campaign conducted to bring about the end of its opponent's regime or surrender on some key issues. Gray zone campaign in this case is described as being able to be used for such objectives. The doctrine also mentions that gray zone campaigns could be employed for much more limited ends such as gaining leverage on a specific territorial dispute.

The doctrine was renamed as "New Generation Warfare."³⁰⁾ A research was done to find out the nature of tactics Russia had used in Ukraine. The result of the research reveals that, in Ukraine, there was an application of the gray zone strategy, being an indication of the New Generation Warfare in place by Russia in Ukraine. There were substantial tank battles, massive artillery duels, and the movement of Russian conventional forces across the border. Thus, based on these evidences, it may be better to say that the term 'real war' was there in describing situation going on there. But, the New Generation Warfare is defined in primarily non-military terms. The New Generation Warfare


30) *Ibid.*

encourages the use of political subversion, proxy sanctuary, intervention (but mostly in the form of maneuvering around the border and limited cross-border firing), coercive deterrence, and negotiated manipulation.

As in the Chinese case, Russian objectives clearly have a revisionist cast while desiring to avoid outright conflict. Russia has national interests or goals that would suggest the need for gray zone revisionism. President Vladimir Putin seeks to renew Russian dominance of the near abroad, undermine the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and reduce U.S. influence in the region. He has been trying to coerce its neighboring countries such as Georgia and Ukraine not to be allied with the West. The Russian coercion was to deny their rights to throw their lot with the West.

The gray zone strategies Russia has adopted in the West and in its neighboring countries seem to include coercive diplomacy, economic assistance, threats of energy sanctions, propaganda and information operations, cyber-attacks, sponsorship of local militias and guerrilla organizations, support for pro-Moscow political movements, military maneuvers, and implied nuclear threats. Further evidence of Russia's explicit adoption of gray zone strategies can be found in the significant investments in the tools and capabilities to engage in gray zone campaigns in the areas. Russia has built up various components of its special operating forces to provide the capacity for unattributed infiltration as occurred in Ukraine. It has also invested in its intelligence assets as a way of providing deep situational awareness for such campaigns. Even the RT television channel and social media outlets have been utilized as a way of expanding its propaganda tools. All of this adds up to a significant investment in the gray zone.

〈Figure 2〉 Chinese and Russian Gray Zone Strategies Compared



As indicated above,³¹⁾ China and Russia do not seem to employ the gray zone strategy distinctively. There are enough similarities between the two countries. But, there are also significant differences between the two which once again illustrate the challenges of categorizing strategies. Russia's approach to Georgia and Ukraine is far more aggressive and militarized than anything China has yet attempted in the South China Sea. Russian approaches strain the non-military criteria for gray zone campaigns, and could perhaps be just as easily categorized as paramilitary invasions designed to achieve a *fait accompli*. Nonetheless, Russia's actions meet the basic definitions of gray zone strategies. This is very important in that Russia appears to view its approach as one restrained enough to avoid triggering key thresholds.

The figure above roughly plots the scope of gray zone activities China and Russia have adopted as a strategy to achieve their national goals. In each case, the full range of activities extends to the left and right of the colored boxes. In particular, the Russian campaign encompasses the

31) *Ibid.*, p.81.

political narrative-building on the lower-intensity side of the scale. Moreover, China's use of swarming civilian maritime agencies overlaps to some degree with Russia's use of paramilitary incursions. This figure reflects the idea that, while emphasizing different places on the spectrum, both fall into the broad concept of gray zone strategies.

VI. Implications for the Korean Maritime Security

As noted through this paper thus far, gray zone war or conflict are known to have historically been the norm while conventional war is known to have been something of a fiction, which is to mean that the former is more likely to happen than the latter in these days. Nevertheless, many experts now even in Korea seem to think that concepts on gray zone activities are something new. This lack of historical awareness also contributes to our lack of conceptual preparedness for the gray zone challenges. In the context of Korean national security in general and maritime security in particular, the simple ignorance of the concept of gray zone strategy may be an invitation of an aggressive gray zone strategy by its neighboring countries familiar with the strategy, leading inevitably to damaging its security interests.

As revealed in this paper, China has been pursuing what is known as salami slicing strategy, a variant of the gray zone strategy, to occupy bit by bit the East Sea. The strategy began in 1974 when it first grabbed Vietnam's Hong Sa (Paracel) archipelago. The reason for the Chinese adoption of the strategy was for geostrategic and economic interests in the region. In Korean context, the possibility cannot be excluded that China may apply the salami slicing strategy to the Ieodo, ultimately making the Ieodo under its control.

China owns and runs a fleet of maritime militia evaluated to be the best means of gray zone strategy. Maritime militia in China serves as an

assistant and backup force of the PLA. It is classified as a reserve force, but it should not be confused with the actual reserves of the PLA services. China builds the militia and the PLA reserves simultaneously as two separate components of its reserve force system. The Chinese militia, essentially as a reserve force, plays a parallel and supporting role to the PLA.

But, an important thing encouraging us to exercise cautions regarding the maritime militia is that it is almost impossible to distinguish the maritime militia from normal fishing crews in peace time. It has, in fact, a military structure and regular exercises to serve as frontline irregular forces that can be mobilized swiftly when needed in monitoring, approaching, engaging with foreign sea actors, and even in landing and making faits accomplis of the ownership of islands, rocks, and cays China has claimed for.

As already noted, Korea has Jeodo that falls in the overlap of the Chinese and Korean EEZ, meaning that it is up to the states to delineate the actual maritime boundary. Yet, it is almost unthinkable that China will occupy the Jeodo by the traditional phases of major combat operations, because the outright aggression constitutes a war, as defined by the UN Charter, and the costs of the large-scale aggression will be severe while the potential benefits will decline. But, considering causes and characteristics of the gray zone conflicts and strategies, Korea needs to make some preparations in ways the Jeodo cannot be left to be vulnerable to the possible gray zone coercion by China.

As one of Korea's neighboring countries, Japan is also a country that may apply the gray zone strategy in landing and seizing the Dokdo island using its ultrarightists with lightning speed of clandestine operations. Ultrarightist can be mobilized as de facto militia in disguise of fishermen in the gray zone attack by Japan against the Dokdo island. This scenario may be unthinkable not only from Korean perspective but also from Japanese perspective considering current maritime security

situations surrounding the Korean peninsula. But, strategy to defend our maritime sovereignty should be better if it is proactive rather than reactive in nature. In other words, this is to mean that a defense strategy deserves the best if it can deal with something unthinkable rather than something anyone can anticipate.

The seas around the Jeodo and Dokdo island seem to very calm and peaceful in these days. In other words, some sorts of deterrence countering the gray zone campaigns may be said to have been in place in those seas. But, this judgement may be wrong considering the fact that there have been no specific deterrent measures to prevent any possible gray zone attacks by the two countries on the two objects in the seas. There are just contingency plans to make response to armed attacks by the two countries on the two maritime objects respectively. But, as noted so far in this paper, the countering strategies against outright military campaigns are not pertinent to the gray zone threats.

International relations literature currently recognizes four types deterrence. First type is direct deterrence which refers to deterring an attack against oneself. Second type is extended deterrence which refers to deterring an attack against a friend or ally. Third type is general deterrence which refers to deterring a potential threat. Fourth type is immediate deterrence which refers to deterring an imminent attack. In practice, these types of deterrence usually overlap in some way.

Much of today's strategic literature underscores how difficult it can be to assess whether a strategy of deterrence working. It is not always possible to know whether the absence of a rival's action was because of deterrence, or of its internal reasons other than the deterrence. We may have some policies as deterrent measures to prevent the gray zone strategies China and Japan may apply to Jeodo and the Dokdo island respectively. But, as said before, it is difficult to assess whether the existing deterrence policy is the best possible policy or just barely effective one.

Regarding the type of deterrence for Korea to deal with its neighbor's gray zone challenges, few kinds of deterrence deserve to be examined as policy recommendations. First, deterrence by denial is to be preferred to the deterrence by punishment in countering our neighbor's aggressive gray zone strategies. If Korea chooses deterrence by punishment, it has to have substantial power to coerce China or Japan without going to war by using economic sanctions, arms and technology embargoes, exploitation of energy supplies, maritime intercepts, support for their opponents, and offensive cyber operations. But, political power resides in two distinct elements. One is capabilities that can affect object values by application of a power base. The other is the opponent's perception of the intent to use these capabilities. Accordingly, threats to use the above-said capabilities may be less credible because it is usually costly to the deterrer, being the reason that it becomes difficult for the deterrer to prevent the adversary from achieving its objective. The same thing can be said even for Korea, because China and Japan will deny that Korea will punish them using the above-said leverages.

It is not easy for the two countries to assess the intention of Korea to punish against them. But, Korea's capability to deny is likely to be easier for the two countries to assess than the intention to punish. Opponent's capability is much easier to be evaluated than opponent's intent, meaning that capability is more credible than intention in the eyes of opponents. In other words, the threat of denial action is likely to be appraised by the aggressor in terms of the deterrer's capabilities. Therefore, for Korea to deter the two countries from waging gray zone challenges, deterrence by denial is viewed to be more credible and convincing threat than deterrence by punishment.

Second, for commitments to be credible, they must be costly. If a commitment is not costly, then it does not provide any information about a state's capabilities or intentions, being unable to change an adversary's calculations. One way of making credible commitments is to

sink costs by taking actions such as mobilizing means that are financially costly. The most obvious way to send a costly message is for the deterrer to put its forces at risk. To accept a cost can serve as a credible signal to opponents. But, verbal threats to use force are neither costly nor do they improve one's chance of victory should gray zone campaign begin. Namely this is to mean that posturing of forces is more credible than mere assertions. Therefore, Korea has to deploy appropriate assets to seas around Jeodo and Dokdo island to play a sunk cost role to deter China and Japan from waging gray zone challenges against Jeodo and Dokdo island respectively.

Third, having decided on the type of deterrent commitment, a state has to stipulate the ambiguity or specificity of its commitment. Ambiguity here is about either the deterrer's red lines or likely responses. There are pros and cons for the use of ambiguity in defending opponent's gray zone challenges. Proponents of ambiguity argue that ambiguous commitments may be advantageous in generally deterring a challenge from an adversary, and ambiguity may also deter an opponent from proving actions by avoiding provision of information about where red lines exist.

Ambiguity may not be needed in general deterrence situations. But, failures of general deterrence can result in immediate challenges. When immediate deterrence works, it means that the defender thought he had a defensible position and the challenger thought he could get his way by force or coercion. Therefore, when a general deterrence threat fails, an immediate deterrence crisis can be triggered. But, in this situations, being ambiguous may invite opponent's coercion or prompt opponent's miscalculation because an opponent may not easily expect that the defender will follow through on its commitment. If Korea has fuzzier commitments in deterring China and Japan from initiating the gray zone coercions against Jeodo and Dokdo island respectively, those objects may be more appealing targets for opportunism. Therefore, when

Korea does choose to apply deterrence and is willing to deny should deterrence fail, its deterrent waning must be loud and clear in ways its opponents can not misread. In Korean context, deterrence should be ambiguous only if it needs to be a bluff.

Lastly, attempts to avoid escalation at any cost may weaken deterrence. Total avoidance of risk is what Schelling might call a threat that leaves nothing to chance. The more risks the defender is willing to accept, the more credible its commitment can be to an adversary. Korea needs to demonstrate its willingness to accept risk by making costly commitments. Efforts to deter without accepting risk in preventing gray zone coercions by China and Japan are form of ambivalent deterrence which is a dangerous practice. This practice is to project provocation and weakness at the same time. For Korea, accepting risk is a prerequisite for effective deterrence. But levels of risk acceptance varies depending on policy makers, thus being one of reasons that gray zone deterrence is very difficult. Policy makers are recommended to choose the circumstances carefully.

VII. Conclusion

Through this paper, something like the gray zone is revealed to be real. Revisionist states such as China and Russia are found to be constrained by risks of escalation and economic interdependence, and therefore to seek subtle ways to achieve their objectives. The most important finding through this paper is that gray zone is symptomatic of bigger trends in international relations. Gray zone campaign is a carefully planned campaign operating in the space between traditional diplomacy and overt military aggression. Gray zone challenger has usually grand geopolitical ambitions and is very anxious to achieve its goals with means short of major conflict due to its dependence on global trade and

markets along with fear of escalation. That's why, in general, the gray zone strategy is regarded as more gradual, less violent, and less obvious in nature.

In Korea, gray zone concept has been regarded as something new to most security experts and analysts. But, the concept has been adopted by many countries throughout history to advance their interests in a competitive international system. In Korea, an ignorance of the significance of gray zone strategy has been one of reasons that no coherent, comprehensive and consistent countering strategy has been existing as ways of dealing with gray zone challenges that may be initiated by its neighboring countries. It has been generally believed that the gray zone coercion or strategy are not exclusive assets only socialist states can use. But, as mentioned in this study, even democratic country like Japan can apply the gray zone strategy against its neighbors such as Korea. Anything in dispute in interstate relations can be an object for gray zone strategy or coercion. Such maritime issues as maritime delimitation, ownership over islands between Korea and its neighbors are objects its neighbors can easily apply the gray zone strategy to. Unfortunately, Korea is not fully prepared fully for the possible gray zone strategy by its surrounding countries.

As for the types of deterrent strategy to cope with the gray zone challenge, Korea, above all, has to adopt deterrence by denial rather than the deterrence by punishment. If Korea chooses deterrence by punishment, it has to have substantial power to coerce China or Japan without going to war by using economic sanctions, arms and technology embargoes, exploitation of energy supplies, and offensive cyber operations that are not available to itself as opposed to its neighbors. Second, Korea has to deploy appropriate assets to seas around Ieodo and Dokdo island to paly a sunk cost role to deter China and Japan from waging gray zone challenges against Ieodo and Dokdo island respectively. Third, deterrent warning Korea issues must be loud and clear so the its

opponents can not mislead when deterrence of the gray zone campaigns fails. Lastly, attempts to avoid escalation at any cost may weaken deterrence, meaning that more risks the defender is willing to accept, the more credible its commitment can be to an adversary. Therefore, Korea needs to demonstrate its willingness to accept risk by making costly commitments. For Korea, responding to gray zone aggression along the lines suggested here is as good a place to start as any.

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Abstract

해양에서의 회색지대전략의 이론과 실제

정삼만*

평화를 전쟁의 부재라고 정의할 때 현재 전쟁이 없다면 지금 이 시간은 안전하고 평화로워야 한다. 그러나 지금 현 세상은 비록 공식적으로 선포된 전쟁은 없다고는 하지만 그래도 결코 평화롭다고 할 수 없을 것이다. 흑해의 크림반도가 노골적인 군사적 침략이 없었지만 결과적으로 러시아의 수중에 떨어졌다. 남중국해의 여러 섬이나 암초들이 정규 군사 작전 없이 사실상의 중국의 소유로 기정사실화 되고 있다. 전시 군사적 침략을 통해서만이 확보 가능한 전략적 목표들이 전시도 아니고 그렇다고 평시도 아닌 어중간한 시기에 적 또는 상대의 수중에 떨어지고 있다. 즉, 전시와 평시 사이의 회색지대에서 소위 회색지대 전략이라고 부르는 공세적 전역을 통해 이러한 전략적 목표들이 달성되어 지고 있다.

소시지가 너무 커 한입에 다 먹을 수 없으면 잘게 썰어 하나씩 먹으면 결국 전체를 다 먹을 수 있듯이 소규모의 절차적 행동을 단계적으로 실행, 대규모 전투를 통해서만이 확보 가능한 거대하고 증대한 목표를 확보하는 게 회색지대전략의 한 특징이다. 이를 전략적 점진주의(strategic gradualism)라고 한다. 또한 단계적 행동은 누구나 인지할 수 있지만 그러한 점진적 행동의 결과에 대해선 쉽게 간파할 수 없기 때문에 대응자의 입장에선 대부분 특별한 대응책을 세우지 못하고 방치하고 만다는 게 이 전략의 또 다른 특성이 다. 즉, 회색지대전략은 특성상 반드시 애매모호성(ambiguity)을 띄고 있다는 것이다.

회색지대에서의 도전자의 행위는 일종의 속임수일 수도 있다. 전략의 본질은 위계, 즉 상대로 하여금 오인, 착각, 부지를 일으키도록 하여 소기의 목적을 달성하는 것이다. 그래서 회색지대전략(gray zone strategy)이라고도 한다. 양육강식의 논리가 작용되는 현실 세계에선 힘이 곧 정의이고 국익이 최고의 선이다. 국가이익은 오직 과정보다는 결과만을 놓고서 정당화된다. 이에 회색지대전략에서도 결과에 대한 유용성만 거론되지 과정상 불법성이나 비도덕성 등은 따지지 않는다. 대부분 이 전략의 애매모호성 때문에 과정 자체를 식별하기가 쉽지 않다. 그래서 대응자의 입장에서도 사전에 예방할 수 있는 선제적

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대응전략을 구사하기가 어려운 게 사실이다.

한국도 예외가 아니다. 중국이 해상민병을 이용한 회색지대전략을 구사, 이어도에 대한 도발을 감행할 수도 있다. 일본이 민간 극우파 등을 이용한 회색지대 전략을 구사, 독도에 대한 도발을 감행할 수도 있다. 평화는 거저 존재하지 않는다. 확전을 각오한 사전대비차원의 역지책이 마련되어야 상대의 회색지대전략을 단념시킬 수 있다. 그것도 신뢰성 있는 역지력만이 진정한 평화를 담보할 수 있다. 전략이 있어야 대응계획을 세울 수 있고, 상대는 이럴 때 도발을 단념하게 된다. 대응전략이 없다는 것은 대응계획이 없다는 것을 의미하고, 이러한 무계획은 늘 실패만을 계획하고 있다는 것을 명심해야 할 것이다.

핵심어 : 회색지대전략, 점진주의, 애매모호성, 크림반도, 남중국해, 중국, 러시아, 이어도, 독도

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