Journal of Digital Convergence (디지털융복합연구)

The Society of Digital Policy and Management (한국디지털정책학회)
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Analysis of Management Performance Change of Korean Agricultural Co-operatives around CEO turnover

국내농협 경영성과 변화와 최고경영자 교체에 대한 분석

  • 이현창 (농협 세종교육원) ;
  • 박성택 (충북대학교 경영정보학과) ;
  • 송교직 (성균관대학교 글로벌경영학과)
  • Received : 2017.09.28
  • Accepted : 2017.11.20
  • Published : 2017.11.28
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Abstract

This paper aims to determine whether the changes in management performance of domestic agricultural cooperatives had an effect on the election results of Korean Agricultural Cooperatives in 2015. Financial performance data (2012-2015) prior to the Nation-wide Cooperatives elections in 2015 were reviewed to determine the impact of the election outcome on the election results. 2SLS Probit regression analysis shows that the significant parameters for incumbent president turnover in the 2015 election were the candidates' age, net profit decrease in 2014, and ROA comparison to similar asset-size group. These results support the conclusion that the union members of KAC consider whether the age of president is over 60, whether the net profits of the cooperatives are worse than the previous year, and compare the results of similar groups' managerial performance (ROA).

이 논문은 지역농협의 경영성과 변화가 2015년에 실시된 전국조합장선거 결과에 유의한 영향을 미쳤는지에 대해 알아보려 한다. 2015년 최초로 실시된 전국 조합장 선거 이전의 경영성과 데이터 (2012년에서 2015년까지)와 선거결과를 기반으로 2SLS Probit 회귀분석한 결과에 따르면 2015년 재임 중인 조합장 교체에 미치는 유의한 변수들은 후보자 나이, 전년도의 순이익감소 그리고 유사규모의 자산을 가진 그룹의 평균 ROA등 이었다. 국내농협의 조합원들이 조합장의 나이가 60세 이상인지, 순이익 규모가 전년대비 감소하였는지를 비교하면서, 유사한 자산규모를 가진 그룹의 평균 ROA가 높을수록 교체 가능성을 높이는 것으로 보인다.

Keywords

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