Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society (한국산학기술학회논문지)

The Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society (한국산학기술학회)
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Pecking Order Theory and Korean Family Firms: Effect of Ownership and Governance Characteristics

한국기업의 가족경영과 자본조달우선순위: 소유·지배구조 특성의 영향분석

  • Jung, Mingue (Department of Venture Business, Gyeongnam National University of Science and Technology) ;
  • Kim, Dongwook (Research and Analysis Team, Busan Economic Promotion Agency) ;
  • Kim, Byounggon (Department of Business Administration, Changwon National University)
  • 정민규 (경남과학기술대학교 벤처경영학과) ;
  • 김동욱 (부산경제진흥원 경제동향분석센터) ;
  • 김병곤 (창원대학교 경영학과)
  • Received : 2016.11.07
  • Accepted : 2017.03.10
  • Published : 2017.03.31
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Abstract

This study analyzed the impact of family firms and their characteristics on how they use debts to analyze the decision-making process of Korean family firms. For analysis, we classified the characteristics of family firms into three categories, through the influence of the relationship between the lack of funds and net debt issuance, which was confirmed as the 'packing order theory' of family firms. There was a total of 4,503 enterprises in the Korean Exchange (KRX). The period of analysis was 10 years, between 2004 and 2014. To summarize, Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) validated the packing order theory by presenting a model of family businesses that showed greater applicable to higher packing order theory than a model of non-family businesses. Moreover, the results also confirmed the application of the packing order theory by the family stronger corporate governance and ownership structure. The ownership and governance characteristics of the ruling family has also shown the applicability of higher packing order theory.

본 연구는 한국 가족기업의 자본조달 의사결정을 분석하기 위해 가족기업 특성이 자본조달순위이론의 순응여부에 미치는 영향을 분석하였다. 이러한 분석을 위해 표본을 가족기업(Family)과 비가족기업(Non Family)으로 분류하고, 자금부족과 순부채발행의 영향관계를 통해 가족기업의 자본조달순위이론 순응여부를 확인하였다. 분석기간은 2004년부터 2014년까지 총 11개년이고, 표본기업은 한국거래소 유가증권시장에 상장되어 있는 비금융업종 기업 총 4,503개를 사용하였다. 실증분석 결과를 요약하면 다음과 같다. 첫째, Shyam-Sunder and Myers(1999)가 제시한 모형을 이용한 자본조달순위이론의 검증에서 가족기업은 비가족기업에 비해 모든 분석에서 자본조달순위이론의 순응도가 높게 나타났다. 이러한 결과는 가족기업에서 자본조달순위이론의 순응은 정보비대칭에 의한 역선택 비용 이외에 기업위험과 의결권 희석의 회피가 주요 요인이 될 수 있는 것으로 이해되었다. 둘째, 가족기업에서 지배가족의 소유가 증가하거나 지배특성이 강할수록 자본조달순위이론의 순응도가 높아진다는 것을 알 수 있었다. 지배가족이 기업을 소유 지배하는 가족기업은 대리인문제가 완화되어, Jensen(1986)이 제시한 부채의 통제효과의 필요성이 낮아지기 때문에 부채 증가 유인이 감소할 것을 예상한 추론과 상반된 결과였다. 이러한 결과는 가족기업의 특성이 증가할수록 지배가족은 의결권 희석을 염려하여 부족자금을 부채를 통해 조달하는 결과로 이해할 수 있었다.

Keywords

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