Journal of Digital Convergence (디지털융복합연구)

The Society of Digital Policy and Management (한국디지털정책학회)
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The Strategic Financial Reporting: Evidence from Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance

전략적 재무보고: 임원배상책임보험제도를 이용한 연구

  • 최정미 (청주대학교 경상대학 회계학과)
  • Received : 2016.04.26
  • Accepted : 2017.01.20
  • Published : 2017.01.28
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Abstract

This study investigates the association between financial reporting strategy and the directors' and officers' liability insurance. Since D&O insurance protects officers and directors against the risks of shareholder litigation, it is possible that, because of moral hazard, managers will be more willing to participate in opportunistic financial reporting such as earnings manipulation when they are covered by a generous D&O insurance policy. This paper examines the association between D&O insurance and financial reporting, specifically whether the purchase of D&O insurance affects earnings manipulation. On the other side, the firms engage earnings management are willing to purchase D&O insurance, this study tests whether earnings manipulation affects D&O purchases using listed firms in Korean stock market from 2006 to 2008. This paper finds that firms with higher discretionary accruals are less likely to purchase D&O insurance implies that managers who are participating in earnings manipulation are not willing to purchase D&O insurance. The relation between discretionary accruals and D&O is significantly negative which indicate D&O insurance purchase does not trigger earnings manipulation rather it alleviates opportunistic reporting behavior.

본 연구는 임원배상책임보험제도와 전략적 재무보고간의 관계를 분석하였다. 임원배상책임보험제도는 경영자들을 소송위험으로부터 보호하기 때문에, 경영자들로 하여금 도덕적 해이를 발생시켜 재무보고에 있어서 이익조정과 같은 기회주의적인 행동을 유발시킬 가능성이 존재한다. 이에 본 연구는 2006년부터 2008년까지 상장기업을 대상으로 임원배상책임보험과 재무보고의 관계를 분석하였다. 구체적으로 임원배상책임보험 가입여부가 이익조정에 영향을 미치는지, 반대로 이익조정을 많이 하는 기업이 소송위험을 완화하기 위해 임원배상책임보험에 가입하는지를 살펴보았다. 연구결과 재량적발생액이 높은 기업일수록 임원배상책임보험제도를 구매하지 않는 것으로 나타났다. 이는 이익조정에 참여한 경영자 또는 기업일수록 임원배상책임보험제도에 가입하지 않는 것을 의미한다. 임원배상책임보험제도 가입 기업의 이익조정행태를 분석한 결과 유의한 음의 결과를 보였는데, 이는 임원배상책임보험가입제도가 이익조정을 유발시키지 않고, 오히려 기회주의적인 재무보고 활동을 제한하는 것으로 해석된다.

Keywords

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