논리연구 (Korean Journal of Logic)

한국논리학회 (Korean Association for Logic)
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규칙 따르기에 관한 크립키와 비트겐슈타인의 상반된 견해와 맥락주의적 의미론

Kripke vs. Wittgenstein on the Notion of Rule-Following and Semantic Contextualism

  • 오은영 (서강대학교 철학연구소)
  • Oh, Onyoung (Sogang University (Research Institute for Philosophy))
  • 투고 : 2015.09.01
  • 심사 : 2016.02.12
  • 발행 : 2016.02.28
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초록

크립키는 비트겐슈타인의 회의론적 역설을 다룸에 있어서 규칙 따르기에 대한 어떤 특정한 개념을 처음부터 전제하고 시작한다. 그런데 문제는 크립키가 자신이 이런 전제를 가정한다는 것을 전혀 명시적으로 밝히지 않고 있으며 더 나아가 크립키가 전제하는 규칙따르기에 대한 개념은 후기 비트겐슈타인이 옹호하고자 하는 규칙 따르기의 개념과 완전히 반대되는 개념이라는 것이다. 크립키가 전제하는 개념은 전기 비트겐슈타인이 옹호하는 비맥락주의적 의미론에 근거하는 '무한적이고 결정지어진' 규칙 따르기 개념이다. 비트겐슈타인의 회의론적 역설은 바로 이런 전기 비트겐슈타인적인 의미론과 규칙 따르기 개념으로부터 발생한다고 볼 수 있다. 따라서 크립키가 비트겐슈타인의 역설은 직접적인 해결이 아닌 회의론적 해결만이 가능하다고 주장한 것은 그가 여전히 전기 비트겐슈타인적인 의미개념과 규칙 따르기 개념을 받아들이기 때문이라고 볼 수 있다. 즉, 크립키는 후기 비트겐슈타인과는 달리 여전히 한 발을 트락타투스적 의미론에 담근 채 비트겐슈타인의 역설을 논하고 있기 때문에 회의론적 해결에 머문다는 것이다. 필자는 이를 크립키가 암묵적으로 가정하는 또 하나의 전제인 진리 대응론에 연결시킴으로써 크립키와 후기 비트겐슈타인의 차이점을 분명히 하고자 한다.

In this paper, I argue that it is Kripke's Tractarian notion of rule-following that prevents him from giving a non-skeptical (straight) solution to Wittgenstein's paradox. I characterize the Tractarian notion of rule-following as the 'determinate/infinistic' notion of rule-following. The later Wittgenstein, however, advocates an opposite notion of rule-following: the 'indeterminate/finistic' notion. Considering the later Wittgenstein's context-sensitive, pragmatics-oriented approach to meaning and rule-following, the later Wittgenstein could not have endorsed the determinate/infinistic notion of rule-following. To the contrary, a motive behind Wittgenstein's skeptical paradox was to blame the Tractarian notion of rule-following as the major culprit giving rise to the paradox. At the end, I argue that Kripke's adherence to the Tractarian-correspondence theory of truth also contributes to his failure to offer a non-skeptical solution to the paradox. If Kripke had noticed that the later Wittgenstein was a deflationist about truth, he could have avoided his skeptical conclusion.

키워드

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