Korean Journal of Cognitive Science (인지과학)

The Korean Society for Cognitive Science (한국인지과학회)
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The Effect of Incidental Semantic Activation on Hypothesis Generation: Exclusive vs Compatible Hypotheses

우연적 의미 활성화가 가설 생성에 미치는 영향: 가설 유형에 따른 차이

  • Lee, Younha (Interdisciplinary Program in Cognitive Science, Psychology, Seoul National University) ;
  • Park, Jooyong (Interdisciplinary Program in Cognitive Science, Psychology, Seoul National University)
  • 이윤하 (서울대학교 인지과학 협동과정, 심리학과) ;
  • 박주용 (서울대학교 인지과학 협동과정, 심리학과)
  • Received : 2015.02.23
  • Accepted : 2015.06.22
  • Published : 2015.06.30
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Abstract

Previous studies on the effect of incidental semantic priming on judgment, have focused mainly on mutually exclusive hypotheses. However, the present study explored whether incidental semantic activation affects diagnostic inference depending on the type of the hypothesis: mutually exclusive hypotheses vs compatible hypotheses. In Experiment 1, in case of mutually exclusive hypotheses, the final hypothesis was selected according to the incidental semantic priming, but there was no difference in the number of generated hypothesis in comparison with the control. However, for compatible hypotheses (i.e., both hypotheses can be true), the semantic priming affected the number of generated hypotheses, but not the selection of the final hypothesis. The same pattern of results was observed even when the cognitive load was increased. In Experiment 2, we found a boundary condition of incidental semantic activation on diagnostic inference. When cues related to each of the hypotheses were presented simultaneously, the incidental semantic effect disappeared. These results suggest that people consider all possible cues when making diagnostic inference in daily life. In light of these findings, further research on hypothesis generation/evaluation should take the type of hypothesis into account.

우연적 의미 활성화가 가설의 생성과 평가에 주는 영향에 대한 연구는 많다. 그러나 진단추론 상황에서 우연적 의미 활성화의 영향을 다루었던 연구는 거의 없으며, 특히 가설 유형에 따른 차이를 알아보는 연구를 찾아보기 힘들다. 본 연구는 진단 추론에서 우연적 의미 활성화가 가설의 유형에 따라 어떤 차이를 보이는 지를 알아보기 위해 수행되었다. 첫 번째 실험에서 우연적 의미 활성화는, 배타가설의 경우 최종 가설 생성 패턴에 영향을 미쳤지만, 가설의 생성 수에는 영향을 미치지 않음을 발견하였다. 반면 양립 가능한 가설의 경우, 활성화는 생성된 가설의 수에 영향을 미쳤지만, 최종 가설 생성 패턴에는 영향을 미치지 못했다. 이러한 결과는 인지적 노력을 가중시켰을 때조차 반복검증 되었다. 실험 2에서 우연적 의미 활성화와 더불어 추론에 필요한 단서의 개수를 조작하였다. 각 가설을 지지하는 단서들이 동시에 제시되면 우연적 의미 활성화의 영향은 사라졌고, 단서들의 개수가 증가함에 따라 배타가설의 추론 확신은 증가하였다. 본 연구는 진단 추론 시 관련된 단서를 최대한 활용할 필요성과, 가설생성/가설 평가에 관한 연구에서 가설 유형에 따른 차이를 고려해야 함을 시사한다.

Keywords

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