Journal of the Korea Convergence Society (한국융합학회논문지)

Korea Convergence Society (한국융합학회)
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Managerial Stock Ownership and Debt Maturity: Evidence from Chinese Firms

중국 상장기업의 경영자지분율과 부채만기

  • Choi, Young-Mok (College of Business Administration and Economics, Cheongju University)
  • 최영목 (청주대학교 경상대학 경영학과)
  • Received : 2014.10.12
  • Accepted : 2015.02.20
  • Published : 2015.02.28
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Abstract

Using a sample of publicly-traded Chinese firms, this study examines a relationship between managerial ownership and corporate debt maturity decisions. China has transformed dramatically into a market capitalist economy over the past decades. However, so far, little attention has been paid to the role of professional managers. In this situation, this study explores the effect of stock grants to managers as incentive system by providing evidence that managerial ownership affects corporate debt maturity decisions. The findings are as follows: First, I find that like US firms, managerial ownership is negatively related to the proportion of long-term debt. Second, I divide the entire sample into two subsamples of state-owned and privately owned firms. For the privately owned firms, I find that there is a negative relationship between managerial ownership and the proportion of long-term debt. In contrast, for the state-owned firms, the relationship is positive and insignificant.

본 연구는 중국 상장기업을 대상으로 경영자지분율과 부채만기 사이에 음(-)의 상관관계가 존재하는가를 분석한다. 중국은 자본주의의 경험이 짧아 전문경영자의 역할을 분석한 연구는 아직 미진한 상황이다. 이러한 상황에서 본 연구는 미국과 같은 선진국에서와 마찬가지로 경영자지분율이 부채만기에 미치는 영향을 분석함으로써 인센티브시스템으로서 경영자에 대한 주식부여의 효과를 검증한다는 데 의의가 있다. 본 연구의 실증분석 결과를 요약하면 다음과 같다. 첫째, 중국 기업의 경우에도 미국기업과 같이 경영자지분율과 장기부채비중 사이에 통계적으로 유의한 음(-)의 상관관계가 존재하는 것으로 나타났다. 둘째, 전체 표본을 정부지배기업과 민간지배기업으로 나누어 분석한 결과에서는 정부지배기업은 경영자지분율과 장기부채비중 사이에 유의하지 않은 양(+)의 상관관계가 존재하는 반면에 민간지배기업은 경영자지분율과 장기부채비중 사이에 통계적으로 유의한 음(-)의 상관관계가 존재하는 것으로 나타났다.

Keywords

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