

## Understanding Contemporary Interstate Rivalries: Consensus Rivalries and Rivalry Termination

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## I . Introduction: How Do Rivalries End?

Rivalry denotes the most conflict-prone interstate relationship in international politics. The two states involved in a rivalry relationship often resort to war or use military options to resolve conflict between them over a considerable period of time. Such rivalry states are Israel and Egypt, India and Pakistan, Greece and Turkey, and the two Koreas. In the past such were Britain and France, France and Germany, Germany and Russia during the previous two centuries and, the United States and Soviet Union during the Cold War period. Recent studies in international relations and particularly in international conflicts incline to de-emphasize conflicts between states and put more emphasis on conflicts within states. This reflects the larger trends of armed conflicts in world politics in the post-WWII period and especially in the post-Cold War period.<sup>1)</sup> Ever since the end of WWII, we have not seen major wars among the once highly war-prone great powers.<sup>2)</sup> Moreover, since the 1980s, there has been a disproportionate increase in the intrastate conflicts, namely civil wars, over interstate ones (Harbom and Wallensteen 2010). Not surprisingly, Mueller (1990) notes that interstate war is apparently becoming obsolete, at least in the developed world.

Yet, this overall trend in international conflicts does not mean that there has been wide spread peace between and among states, or obsolescence of rivalries. The two Koreas fought severely in the Korean War during early 1950s and still do. Israel and Egypt had to fight four wars before they finally agreed upon the peace treaty in 1979, which has only maintained cold peace until today. India and Pakistan had four wars in addition to a number of militarized disputes, and currently their nuclear power status gravely threatens the world peace beyond their rivalry. In the

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1) See Levy and Thompson (2010, 11-14) for the discussion of the changing nature of warfare.

2) Bremer (1992) identifies one of the key conditions for a dangerous dyad is a major power status.

following decades of this new century, it is highly unlikely that serious armed conflicts will occur between non-rivalry states. In the era of “obsolescence of major war (Mueller 1990),” existing rivalries are the most likely candidates to bring conventional wars to the real world. While joint democracies reflect the most peaceful dyads of states, rivalries largely sit outside of the zone of peace. As such, having a rivalry relationship could undermine the strength of democratic peace proposition. To this end, in this paper, I ask how rivalries endure and how do they end.

The paper develops an analytical framework of macro/historical-process involved in the development and termination of rivalry relations. It shows how different rivalry origins lead to different rivalry dynamics, and consequently lead to different degrees of rivalry endurance. I propose that in the post-1945 contemporary historical context, how rivalries begin (i.e. rivalry origin) profoundly influences the continuation, and thus the termination process, of rivalry relations.

The paper explores the notion of consensus rivalry: what they are and to what extent examining these rivalries matters in understanding the rivalry phenomenon. Most importantly, through a descriptive analysis on these cases, the paper illustrates the key differences between the pre-1945 and post-1945 rivalries. I examine the following four key characteristics in rivalry interactions: power relations, primary issue of conflict, rivalry linkage, and war experience. In all aspects, the descriptive analysis clearly shows that the majority of post-1945 rivalries go through different origins and termination processes than those of the pre-1945 origin rivalries. The contemporary rivalries are most likely to end through non-violent means, which is somewhat different from the pre-1945 trend relying on more coercive means (i.e. war) to end rivalry. The idea of resorting to war may be the more preferred type of conflict resolution between rivals only until the end of WWII, which provides strong implications to contemporary rivalries.

## II. Rivalry Approach to International Conflict Study

### 1. Introducing Rivalry Research Program

Similar to Bremer's (1992) emphasis on the dyadic level of analysis in conflict studies (rather than the system or state levels) the rivalry research uses *rivalry* as the unit of analysis. As Bremer (1992) explores the characteristics of *dangerous war-prone dyads*, the rivalry research examines the most conflictual relationship between two states.<sup>3)</sup> If Bremer (1992) hypothetically combined the most likely conditions for two war-prone states, rivalries represent real world examples of Bremer's dangerous dyads. The development of the rivalry research program during the early 1990s largely originates in the findings from large-N statistical studies - mostly from empirical analyses exploring the Correlates of War (COW) Project.<sup>4)</sup> Not unlike the researchers in democratic peace theory, who are mostly driven by the

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3) Based on a multivariate analysis of all possible interstate dyads between 1816 and 1965, Bremer (1992) finds six key conditions for a dangerous war-prone dyad: 1) presence of contiguity, 2) absence of alliance, 3) absence of more advanced economy, 4) absence of democratic polity, 5) absence of overwhelming preponderance, and 6) presence of major power.

4) In 1990s a number of scholars have conceptualized and operationalized (interstate) rivalry. Most widely used rivalry concept has been developed by Goertz and Diehl's (1992; 1993; Diehl and Goertz 2000) conceptualization of *enduring rivalries*. Based on the development of Correlates of War Project's (COW) MID dataset, they define enduring rivalry as interstate dyads which contain six or more consecutive MIDs lasting at least twenty years. In their original 1816 to 1992 dataset, Diehl and Goertz (2000) identify 63 interstate enduring rivalries. Recent update provides 115 enduring rivalries from 1816 to 2001 (Klein, Goertz, and Diehl 2006). A major alternative rivalry conception is Thompson's (2001c) definition of *strategic rivalry*. Thompson (2001b) basically denies dispute-density approach of Diehl and Goertz (2000) and others (Bennett 1996; 1998; Maoz and Mor 2002). He defines a rivalry with combination of a competitor status, threat perception, and enemy status deriving from decision-makers' perceptions through historical interpretations. Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson (2007) discover 173 strategic rivalries in the period of 1816-2000. Even though these different conceptualizations as well as operationalizations lead to the different rivalry datasets, the core idea of rivalry remains same; conflict *begets* conflict.

empirical rareness of war between joint-democracies, the early rivalry scholars find a disproportionate number of wars and Militarized Interstate Disputes (MID, Ghosn, Palmer, and Bremer 2004) present in a group of same pair of states.<sup>5)</sup> With regards to the relationship between rivalry and war, Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson (2007, 131) note “rivalries are dangerous incubators of conflict, crisis, and war” and Vasquez (2000, 378) also notes in the context of rivalry “the repetition of crises is the real engine of war.” Dixon (1994) argues that the presence of rivalry relationship greatly dampens the pacifying effects of democracies. Based on the strong empirical support on the rivalry phenomenon, whether it is of enduring or strategic nature, the rivalry research program provides a novel avenue towards the Lakatosian notion of progress in the study of international conflicts.

The primary contributions of the rivalry research program are twofold: a direct incorporation of temporal linkage between conflicts and a further development of a dyadic-level analysis in conflict studies.<sup>6)</sup> Diehl and Goertz (2000) compare the rivalry approach with the traditional cause-of-war approach in the study of international conflict. According to Diehl and Goertz (2000), the traditional studies in international conflicts mainly attempt to examine “what causes war.” The main focus and the unit of analysis within this approach is *war* (or MIDs); thus within this approach, a war is examined either independently or aggregated in a cross-sectional way. On the contrary, military disputes and wars occurring within a rivalry relationship are not independent of each other, because they belong to the same relationship. Therefore, the rivalry approach adds a temporal dimension to the traditional conflict study. The phenomenon to explain in the rivalry approach becomes no longer a war but a rivalry, a pair of states which conflict each other repeatedly.

Moreover, within the rivalry approach not only the temporal and

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5) See Goertz and Diehl (1992; 1993) for the empirical and theoretical importance of enduring rivalries.

6) See Diehl's (1998) introduction chapter discussing the importance of a rivalry approach to studying war and peace.

spatial dimensions can be analyzed together, but also the interactions between conflict and conflict management can be examined within the same framework. As noted, another important contribution of the rivalry research program comes from discovering the key dyadic-level conditions causing rivalry. Russett, Starr, and Kinsella (2010, 18) define dyadic relations (or relational level of analysis) as “interactions between states that cannot be explained by the characteristics of each state individually (its society, government, or leaders).” Goertz and Diehl (1993) also stress that the enduring rivalry concept allows the researcher to “factor in the history or the expected future of the relationship between the protagonists and not rely solely on national and systemic attributes.” The rivalry approach to understanding conflict suggests that the characteristics of a conflictual relationship, which has been often regarded as a mere background context to date, need to be directly incorporated into the theory. Somewhat analogous to the democratic peace phenomenon, rivalry is primarily a dyadic phenomenon; thus it is crucial to examine characteristics of the relationship and changes in them beyond the individual features of each state.

## 2.2 Why Rivalry Termination?

This paper aims to provide a better and more thorough understanding of rivalry termination. I view rivalry termination as the most important aspect in the entire rivalry phenomenon, yet it is also the most understudied and, thereby, still the least understood feature in rivalry research.<sup>7)</sup> There are some obvious reasons for this. In essence, termination of a rivalry is very difficult to operationalize. How can we realize whether a rivalry has ended or not? The ultimate condition for rivalry termination should be the absence of actual fighting (i.e. no militarized disputes

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7) The most recent studies on the issue of rivalry termination are Cox (2006), Prins and Daxecker (2007), Kupchan (2010), Diehl and Goertz (2010), and Morey (2011).

between the two sides), but for how long? Conventionally, but at the same time highly arbitrarily, rivalry scholars code 10–15 years without MIDs as an indication of rivalry termination (e.g. see Klein, Goertz, and Diehl 2006). However, what if there is a dispute right after this arbitrarily defined dispute – free period? Does it indicate a new rivalry relationship, assuming that the previous one has already terminated, or merely a continuation of the existing rivalry?<sup>8)</sup> Observing a rivalry termination tends to be highly retrospective; thus even though we do not observe any militarized disputes between (former) rivals, it is difficult to declare that the rivalry has terminated.<sup>9)</sup>

Despite the difficulties of measuring rivalry termination and thus the relative inattention in the literature compared to studies of rivalry origins (what causes rivalry) and rivalry dynamics (the process of rivalry), the examination of rivalry termination offers important motivations for achieving integrative cumulation in rivalry studies. Both rivalry origins and dynamics capture important portions of the rivalry phenomenon, yet it is the study of rivalry termination that provides the holistic picture of the rivalry phenomenon. This is because in order to examine the end of a rivalry it is necessary to first understand its formation as well as the development process that has led to its termination. Therefore understanding rivalry termination offers a comprehensive framework for interpreting the rivalry phenomenon.

## 2. 3 Normative Motivation: How Can We End Rivalry?

One of the central objectives in studying rivalry termination comes

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8) Diehl and Goertz (2010), and also Rudkevich, Travlos, and Diehl (2010), name this kind as "interrupted rivalries." Rudkevich et al. (2010) examine the conditions of conclusions of original rivalries to explain why some rivalries recur while others remain terminated.

9) Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2008) attempt to identify the conditions that examines whether (former) rivals are still in a rivalry relationship or not.

from a normative motivation to end contemporary ongoing rivalries. As briefly noted in the introduction, the presence of rivalries is not only a grave threat to each party's national security, but also a danger to the world peace. In the process of "obsolescence of major wars," the two strong candidates for the next major (conventional) war are India-Pakistan and North-South Korean rivalries, both with the possibilities of causing a nuclear war. With the decreasing number of conventional wars, it is highly unlikely that non-rivalries (those states without a history of conflicts) will go to war. The existing rivalries are the last remnant of the past century's interstate conflicts; thus, understanding the process of rivalry termination offers important insights for enhancing peace among states. It is possible that the perpetual peace may come from a complete termination of existing rivalries together with a spread of democratic governments. Therefore, studying rivalry termination provides important implications for expanding the zone of peace in the twenty-first century.

In sum, I claim that rivalry termination matters in the study of international conflicts and that it has strong practical implications for the policy world. In this rather novel approach to studies in international conflict, examination of rivalry termination stands at the center of rivalry research programs. It paints a comprehensive and holistic picture of the rivalry phenomenon. Examining rivalry termination also requires investigating both conflictual and non-conflictual aspects in a single framework. International relations study must not delink itself from the real world problems. Moreover, understanding dynamic processes of contemporary rivalry termination offers further insights to bring a more peaceful world.



### III. Macro-level Holistic Understanding of Contemporary Rivalry Termination

#### 1. Historical Contexts and Rivalry Dynamics

Statistical studies tend to dismiss the incorporation of historical contexts into the analysis. Yet, in order to assess the termination process of the contemporary rivalries, it is critical to comprehend the historical context of post-1945 international environment.<sup>10)</sup> The contemporary historical contexts impact rivalry dynamics in two fundamental ways; the formation and the continuation of rivalry. A brief descriptive analysis of the sixteen contemporary rivalry cases reveals that onsets of these rivalries match with Diehl and Goertz's (2000) contemporary political shock periods: the World War II (1939-45) aftermath and the post-war decolonization/independence (1956-62) period. Considering the non-major power status of these rivalries, it is not difficult to find a strong correlation between state creation/building issues and rivalry formation. The India-Pakistan and North-South Korean rivalries are standard cases that demonstrate the pattern of independence, separation, war, and the onset of rivalry. In these rivalries, regardless of the theoretical link between the beginning and the end of rivalry, it is obvious that the termination of rivalry must tackle issues related to the origin of rivalry, such as independence and separation of states.

Another important historical context analyzed in this study is the influence of the democratization process during the development period of the contemporary rivalries.<sup>11)</sup> It is also known as "the third wave,"

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10) Discussing how rivalries are sustained, Diehl and Goertz (2010, 15) note "rivalry maintenance is influenced less by single events and more by entire history of the rivalry to date."

11) A number of scholars (Bennett 1997a; Conrad and Souva 2011; Dixon 1994; Hensel, Goertz, and Diehl 2000; Prins and Daxecker 2008) examined the relationship between rivalries and regime types, especially the effect of joint-democracy in rivalry termination. Mani

Huntington's (1991) now well-known thesis. Huntington (1991) examines the transition of some thirty countries, primarily in Latin America and Asia, from 1970s towards 1990s. In this, he first identifies the 1943 - 1962 period as a short second wave followed by the reverse of the second wave during the 1958-1975 period. He then defines "the third wave" democratization process from 1974 and onwards. The third wave period corresponds to the period of contemporary rivalry development. A number of contemporary rivalry states can be identified as the third wave democratization countries.<sup>12)</sup> Obviously, simply being a third wave country does not indicate that the state has achieved democratic consolidation. For example, both India and Pakistan are in this category. Yet, it is difficult to say that the current political status of Pakistan is a consolidated democracy. Nevertheless, as both the Chile-Argentina (1985) and Ecuador-Peru (1998) rivalry termination cases demonstrate, I hypothesize that the third wave of democratization produced a favorable condition for rivalry termination when both rivals are part of the process. In terms of political systems and rivalry relationship, Hensel (2001, 183) notes, "to understand rivalry, we should attempt to understand how two states' political systems can produce decisions leading to a longstanding competitive relationship between states that features frequent militarized confrontations." Bennett (1997a; 1998) also finds a significant relationship between polity change and rivalry termination, especially when that change leads to joint-democracy among the rivals. Following the development of massive literature on the democratic peace theory (e.g. Russett 1993), Bennett (1997a) notes that "the presence of two democracies in a rivalry helps lead to its termination...as states become more democratic, as democratic norms develop and come into play, there can be a favorable shift towards conflict resolution and rivalry termination."

Lastly, the post-1945 period requires examination of the impact of the

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(2004) examines the democratization of rivalries in South America.

12) According to Huntington (1991), the contemporary rivalry states who were part of the third wave are Chile, Argentina, Greece, Israel, Ecuador, India, South Korea, Pakistan, Peru, and Turkey.

Cold War context and the superpower rivalry between the United States and Soviet Union. In other words, to what extent did the US–Soviet rivalry and overall Cold War context influence the origin, continuation, and thereby termination of the contemporary rivalry? The North–South Korean rivalry is an exemplary case. The inter–Korean rivalry originates from the occupations of the Soviets in the North and the United States in the South as part of the decolonization from Japan. The separation of the nation eventually led to the Korean War in 1950–53. Therefore, the origin and continuation of this rivalry is critically related to the development of the Cold War context since the end of WWII. Many non–major powers during this period were involved in various forms of proxy wars on behalf of the two superpowers' conflicting interests, which possibly contributed to the continuation of those minor power rivalries.

However, somewhat contrary to the political shocks explanation of rivalry termination, the end of the Cold War appears to be less associated with the terminations of the contemporary rivalries than previous shocks are. Apparently, the two Koreas resisted to following the path of the US–Soviet rivalry. Moreover, terminated cases, such as the Israel–Egypt and Chile–Argentina rivalries, do not show any explicit link between the end of Cold War and the end of rivalry. Individual rivalry cases may have been influenced by strong third party involvements (either by the United States or the Soviets, or even others) in various phases of their rivalry development, yet at the macro/historical level there seems to be no generalizable connection between the end of Cold War and the end of contemporary rivalries.

*Proposition<sup>13)</sup> 1: The Historical contexts of post–WWII decolonization and independence, the third–wave democratization process, and the*

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13) In this paper, I purposefully use the term “proposition” rather than “hypothesis” because the primary goal is to develop (rather than to test) a typological theory of a contemporary rivalry termination. The proposition 1 is partially examined in the next section with rivalry (war) origin, power relations, and rivalry linkage. The proposition is examined more thoroughly in the original dissertation with the micro–level analysis.

*superpower rivalry during the Cold War period influenced the formation and continuation of contemporary rivalries, and thereby the termination process. Yet, the end of Cold War itself appears to have no explicit effect on the termination process of the contemporary rivalries.*

## 2. Rivalry Origins and Continuation: War, Territorial Disputes, and State-Building

The macro-level holistic approach to rivalry termination seeks to answer what led to the rivalry in the first place. Previous works on rivalry termination, though, pay less attention to discovering the explicit linkage between the origin and termination of a rivalry.<sup>14)</sup> The primary question then, is how do different rivalry origins (i.e. the formation of rivalries) matter in terms of the continuation, and, consequently, the termination process. As noted, rivalry termination is a complex phenomenon involving various inducers, facilitators, and suppressors as illustrated in Russett's (2003) analogy of analyzing diseases. According to Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson (2007, 277), one way to evade the problem of understanding how various suppressors and facilitators interfere with each other to cause a phenomenon (i.e. rivalry termination) is to "examine root causes or inducers of conflict [i.e. rivalry origin] in conjunction with suppressors and facilitators." In applying an evolutionary framework to assess rivalry termination process, Thompson (2001a, 6) also notes "which trajectory or path evolution takes is presumably sensitive to *initial conditions and alternatives*" (emphasis added). Following the discussion of the historical context of the post-WWII aftermath with the ensuing decolonization/independence period, it is necessary to ask

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14) Diehl and Goertz (2000) view the process of enduring rivalry as a "lock-in" process, that is, as two adversaries are locked into a conflictual relationship at the beginning. Thereby, they explain that the following process is rather a static one, each rivalry maintaining a certain degree of Basic Rivalry Level (BRL).

“what are the initial conditions of rivalry and how do they contribute to the formation of contemporary rivalries?”

One of the crucial elements in rivalry formation is an occurrence of war. By examining the entire population of rivalry, Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006; also see Diehl and Goertz 2010) find that the vast majority of rivalry wars take place at or near the beginning of rivalry. Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006, 342), then, emphasize an important linkage between a war and a rivalry origin: “wars may provide a ‘pull of the past’ mechanism for motivating future disputes and a thread that links the disputes together.” It appears that the war-origin contemporary rivalries follow similar patterns of rivalry formation: a mixture of decolonization and independence either followed or preceded by separations of states or other national entities. Therefore war-origin rivalries tend to accompany a number of border/territorial disputes among various ethnic and national groups. Diehl and Goertz (2000) and Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson (2007) both support the idea that national independence is highly associated with rivalry initiation. It is obvious that the question of borders and the control of territory become crucial to the newly independent states. After all, the process of creating and building a state is generally combined with various incompatibilities in ethnicity, religion, border demarcation, nationalism, and ideology. Not only the two Koreas and India-Pakistan rivalry, but also the Israel-Arab rivalries appear to generally follow this pattern.

On the other hand, the rivalries that are not initiated by wars, such as the Argentina-Chile, Ecuador-Peru, and Greece-Turkey rivalries, show an alternative pattern of rivalry formation. Most importantly, these rivalries do not follow the pattern of decolonization/independence, war, and the onset of rivalry. Unlike the war origin ones, these rivalry states are already fully independent states at the time of rivalry formation. For these states, a rivalry relationship most often originates from previously unresolved armed conflicts. It is more likely that changes in domestic and international circumstances bring in new dimensions to the old unsettled territorial disputes.

Closely related to war, another important factor in the origin and continuation of rivalry is territorial disputes. Even in the absence of war, territorial disputes seem to have a crucial relationship with the rivalry phenomenon. A number of rivalry scholars (Bennett 1996; Huth 1996; Stinnett and Diehl 2001; Tir and Diehl 2002) find that the rivalries with territorial disputes are more likely to endure than others.<sup>15)</sup> Vasquez (1996) argues the main difference between the rivalries that have gone to war and those that have not derives from their abilities to avoid crises involving territorial issues. Gibler (1997) finds that rivalries end when territorial disputes are removed from the relationship by signing territorial settlement treaties. Thies (2001b, 411) explains how the issue of territory came to be fused with national identity between Argentina and Chile as they evolved into an enduring rivalry: "the territory becomes part of the definition of the national 'self' and simultaneously by means of exclusive attachment and control it defines the 'other.'" In sum, whether a simple border dispute or an ethnic/religious dispute, having a territorial dispute significantly influences rivalry formation and continuation.<sup>16)</sup>

Hence, the central question in the examination of the macro-historical rivalry development is how different rivalry origins may lead to different paths toward rivalry termination. In conjunction with the historical-contextual influences examined in the previous section, I argue that there are different rivalry dynamics between two different origins of rivalry. At this point, it is difficult to explain the explicit causal link between origins and terminations of these two rivalry types. However, we know that the war-origin rivalries in general accompany territorial disputes and other issues closely related to the state-building. Therefore, these rivalries may experience more extreme forms of conflict (i.e. war) which could further extend the extant rivalry relationship. On the contrary, although the

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15) For more recent discussion on the relationship between territorial disputes and rivalry, see Gibler (2011) in the special issue of *Conflict Management and Peace Science* on "The Politics of Territorial Threat and Rivalry."

16) Diehl and Goertz (2010, 17-19) also discuss the important role of territorial disputes in the development of enduring rivalry.

non-war origin rivalries may still endure as they involve various territorial disputes, respective to the war-origin ones, these rivalries may experience a less severe and less enduring rivalry relationship.

***Proposition 2:** In conjunction with the historical contexts of the contemporary rivalries, war-origin rivalries tend to involve territorial disputes stemming from state-building issues as they develop into more severe and longer rivalry relationships than the non-war origin rivalries. Thus, in terms of ending a rivalry relationship, the non-war origin rivalries may experience fewer difficulties in the micro-process of rivalry termination.*




Figure 1. Macro/Historical-Process of Rivalry Formation and Development

This section explained my macro-level holistic approach to understanding rivalry phenomenon, and especially how rivalry formation and development are related to rivalry termination. The two propositions suggested summarize the argument of macro-level view on rivalry termination. By developing the notion of consensus rivalry, in the next section, I descriptively examine the propositions regarding the post-1945 rivalry termination.

## IV. Consensus Rivalries and Rivalry Termination: A Descriptive Analysis

### 1. Consensus Rivalries: What Are They?

Here I explore twenty-three consensus rivalries. The term “consensus” comes from the Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson’s (2007; hereafter Colaresi et al.) discussion of disagreement among rivalry scholars in defining rivalry and identifying rivalry cases. According to Colaresi et al. (2007, 56), among 355 dyads presented as rivalry candidates in 1816–2000 period only 23 cases (6.5 percent) satisfy the criteria of six primary rivalry datasets.<sup>17)</sup> The main purpose of this paper is not to define or identify a new set of rivalries but to understand the holistic process of rivalry termination. Investigating these consensus rivalries suits this purpose well in the way that the notion of consensus (among rivalry scholars and their definitions of rivalry) assures that these rivalries are the most critical cases in examining rivalry termination.

The consensus status equips these cases with all the essential features of relationships between rivals. Not only do they display a sufficient number (i.e. at least six consecutive disputes lasting more than twenty years according to dispute density criteria) of militarized interstate disputes (MID), but during the rivalry period these disputes are connected with a same conflict issue (Bennett 1998). In addition to the behavior aspects of the rivalry relationship (i.e. enduring rivalry), these cases also satisfy important perceptual criteria in defining rivalry relationship such as the presence of competition, threat recognition and enemy status (i.e. strategic rivalry). In order to examine the historical process and outcome of relationship transformation, as rivalry termination is conceptualized in this

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17) For additional information on consensus rivalries and how each dataset defines and identifies rivalry see Colaresi et al. (2007) chapter two.



project, it is vital to confirm that in all aspects of relationships, the cases clearly exhibit the characteristics of rivalry. This, then begs the question, how can we discuss and examine end of a rivalry if we are not certain about the presence of a rivalry relationship?

Table 1. Consensus Rivalries 1816–2006

Rivalry Types	Rivalry	Period	Rivalry Behavioral Characteristics		
			MID	MID2	Wars
Pre-1945 Rivalries	France-Germany	1830 - 1955	20	4	1870-71, 1914-18, 1939-45
	Mexico-US	1836 - 1927	24	12	1846-48
	Britain-US	1837 - 1903	12	0	None (War in 1812)
	Spain-US	1850 - 1898	13	1	1898
	Russia-Turkey	1876 - 1923	12	2	1876-78, 1914-17 (Wars in 1827-29, 1853-56)
	Italy-Turkey	1880 - 1928	14	3	1911-12, 1915-18
	Britain-Germany	1887 - 1955	10	3	1914-18, 1939-45
Pre-1945 Rivalries Continue/Renew in Post-1945 Period	Greece-Turkey	1854 - 1923	17	8	1897, 1917-18, 1919-22
	Greece-Turkey II	1958 - 2006	23	6	None
	China-Russia	1862 - 1948	33	11	1900, 1929
	China-Russia	1962 - 2004	19	9	None
	China-Japan	1873 - 1951	31	15	1894-95, 1900, 1931-33, 1937-41, 1941-45
	China-Japan II	1978 - 2006	4	0	None
	Argentina-Chile	1873 - 1910	10	2	None
	Argentina-Chile II	1952 - 1984	17	4	None
	Ecuador-Peru	1891 - 1955	21	8	None
	Ecuador-Peru II	1977 - 1998	8	6	1995
Japan-Russia	1895 - 1945	23	10	1903-05, 1938, 1939, 1945	
Japan-Russia	1953 - 2006	24	0	None	

Purely Post- 1945 Origin Rivalry	Russia(USSR)-US	1946 - 1991	50	2	None
	India-Pakistan	1947 - 2006	43	29	1947-49, 1965, 1971, 1999
	Egypt-Israel	1948 - 1979	31	18	1948-49, 1956, 1967, 1970, 1973
	Israel-Jordan	1948 - 1994	14	13	1948-49, 1967, 1973
	Israel-Syria	1948 - 2006	45	31	1948-49, 1967, 1973, 1982
	China-US	1949 - 1972	23	7	1950-53
	Afghan-Pakistan	1949 - 2006	12	8	None
	N.Korea-S.Korea	1949 - 2006	26	20	1950-53
	China-India	1950 - 1996	22	6	1962
Ethiopia-Somalia	1960 - 2006	16	11	1977-78	
<p>Note: MID ( Militarized Interstate Disputes). MID2 (or high-MID) shows the number of MIDs with the minimum severity level of 83 which indicates that “one side’s display of force matched with another side’s use of force.” This is based on Diehl and Goertz’s (2000) measurement of 0–200 scale dispute severity criteria; a war is coded with severity level 160 and above. War list from COW Inter-state War dataset (v4,0).</p>					

Table 1 identifies twenty-three consensus rivalries and their key behavioral characteristics. Even though these cases are the consensus rivalries, strong disagreement amongst scholars remains in terms of defining rivalry periods, which is the question of when the rivalry relations has begun and when it has ended (The difficulty of determining the exact termination dates of rivalry is discussed in previous chapters). Colaresi et al.’s (2007) conceptualization of rivalry is based on the presence of competition, threat and enemy status between the leadership of rival states, whereas Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006; hereafter Klein et al.) and others’ conceptualization (Bennett 1998, Maoz and Mor 2002) depend profoundly on the behavioral characteristics within the rivalry –such as militarized disputes. Therefore, even though a case is agreed upon as a rivalry there is no guarantee of consensus in the time periods of its rivalry relationship.<sup>18)</sup> In Table 1, I rely on Bennett’s (1997b; 1998) rivalry start and end years following his

detailed narratives on rivalry termination.<sup>19)</sup>

Rivalry behaviors in Table 1 reflect the number of MID2s and wars during the rivalry period. It is important to note that rivalry is defined as pair of states experiencing disproportionate number of wars compared to non-rivalry conflicts. This makes important distinction between rivalry relationship and “isolated conflicts” in Diehl and Goertz’s (2000) term. Yet not all rivalries experience war during the rivalry period. Among consensus rivalries, one third of them, including the second rivalry periods of some 19<sup>th</sup> century rivalries, never experienced war. Besides, the number of MID2s may not exactly reflect the severity of rivalry relationship, since a minor fishing dispute can be coded as a MID2 incident.<sup>20)</sup> Therefore, the MID2 (or high MID) in Table 1 shows the number of MID2s with the minimum severity level 83, which tells “one side’s display of force matched with another side’s use of force.”<sup>21)</sup>

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18) For example, Klein et al. (2006) and others see the Israel–Egypt rivalry as terminated at some point between the 1979 Peace Treaty and 1898 which was the last recorded MID between two. For Colaresi et al. (2006), according to the definition of strategic rivalry, the same Israel–Egypt rivalry is one of the ongoing rivalries in the twenty first century (see also Thompson and Dreyer 2012).

19) See Bennett (1997b) *Measuring Rivalry Termination 1816 - 1992* for the details of the coding scheme. For those rivalries that were ongoing in 1992 when the dataset ended, I recoded them according to Bennett’s (1997b) rivalry termination coding scheme using the updated MID dataset (Ghosn, Palmer, and Bremer 2004) and rivalry narratives from Klein et al. (2006; 2008) and Thompson and Dreyer (2012). The rationale for using Bennett’s (1997b) coding scheme is that Bennett’s (1997b; 1998) measurement of the rivalry period emphasizes the importance of how rivalries are ended. Adding issue linkage and issue settlement criteria to behavioral aspects of rivalry definition provide further validation to the existing dispute–density approach in identifying rivalry. Furthermore, the notion of issue linkage and settlement is parallel to my conceptualization of rivalry as a relationship, and rivalry termination as a relationship transformation.

20) For example, in Klein et al.’s (2006) rivalry dataset the US–Canada is coded as a rivalry in 1974–97 period with six MID2s which are mostly related to fishing disputes. According to Diehl and Goertz’s (2000) measurement of dispute severity, these fishing disputes are only given the severity level of 6 out of 200, which indicates “non-reciprocated verbal threats.” Further details of measuring dispute severity levels, see Diehl and Goertz (2000, 281–298) Appendix B: An Index of Dispute Severity.

21) The concept of MID2 is very similar to how Bennett (1998) differentiated normal MID2s from MID2s with “reciprocated and more than 30 days” in his rivalry narratives. In Diehl and Goertz’s (2000) 0 to 200 scale dispute severity criteria, war is coded with severity

## 2. Key Determinants of Rivalry Relationship: Power Relations, Primary Conflict Issue, and Rivalry Linkage

Table 2 shows the summary of consensus rivalries in terms of crucial features defining their relationships as rivalry (see Appendix A for the full list). As Table 1 describes, rivalry in essence is defined by its repeated conflictual interactions. Then the question is, what determines important variations within rivalry conflicts? How can we classify rivalries into different typologies? Understanding the features of rivalry power relationship, the primary issue of conflict, and rivalry linkage provide critical information regarding how rivalry relationships are formed and, thus, how these war-prone relationships may end.

Table 2. Consensus Rivalries: Power, Issue, and Rivalry Linkage

Power Relations	Primary Issue of Conflict	Rivalry Linkage
Major dyad 8 (27,6%)	Territory 18 (62,1%)	None 12 (14,4%)
Mixed dyad 6 (20,7%)	Policy 10 (34,5%)	Single 10 (34,5%)
Minor dyad 15 (51,7%)	Regime 1 (3,4%)	Multi 7 (24,1%)

**Power Relations.** Rivalry power status is often regarded as the foremost and basic component in defining rivalry relationships. Vasquez (1996) presents symmetrical power status as a key prerequisite condition for a rivalry relationship to hold.<sup>22)</sup> Colaresi et al. (2007) finds that major powers tend to involve positional conflicts while minor powers engage in more spatial conflicts. A number of other existing studies find important

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level 160 and above. In this way we can see how the number of MID2s matter in rivalry relationships, especially in the absence of war. For instance, the Afghanistan–Pakistan rivalry had not experienced any war yet, but there is high proportion of intense militarized disputes (8 MID2 out of 12 MID2s) that continues their rivalry relations.

22) However most of the rivalry scholars do not dismiss asymmetric rivalry phenomenon. For example, T.V. Paul (2006) finds that it is actually asymmetric power relations between India and Pakistan that makes difficult to end the rivalry relationship.

and distinct patterns between major and minor dyad rivalries as well as symmetrical and asymmetrical distinction. For example, Valeriano (2003) notes that major power dyads, compared to the minor ones, tend to practice more power politics by engaging alliances and arms races which lead them to intense repetition of conflicts and wars.

Beyond the conventional measurement of major and minor distinction, in a study on the social psychological approach to rivalry, Thies' (2001a) divides the relative power status of the actors within rivalries into four categories: great power, major power, minor power, and emerging power. Thies (2001a) finds distinct patterns of competition and socialization processes between the different pairs of power groups. Here I use the conventional major–minor distinction to describe the power relationship among consensus rivalries (see Bennett 1996; Geller 1993). Rivalries are categorized as major–power dyads, minor–power dyads, or mixed–power dyads. Formation of a certain types of power relationship in the beginning of rivalry can influence other key aspects of rivalry conflicts. Also, changes in original power relationship during the rivalry lifetime can critically influence the conditions for rivalry termination. Even though the conflictual issue continues without resolution, rivalry may lose rivalry status as they go through significant changes in the power relationship.

***Primary Issue of Conflict.*** Conflict issue is another important factor determining rivalry conflicts.<sup>23)</sup> Bennett (1996) importantly points out that rivalry disputes must be connected by the same conflict issue in order to be considered as a single, continuous rivalry. Therefore, Bennett (1997b) includes the settlement of primary conflict issues as a key element for rivalry termination. Among the many potential conflictual issues between two rival states; such as territory, policy, ideology, regime, and intervention, the territorial dispute stands out. Vasquez and Leskiw (2001) find that territorial

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23) For example, Mitchell and Thies (2011) emphasize the importance of issue in rivalry relationship by conceptualizing *issue rivalries*. Dreyer's (2008) dissertation using *issue conflict approach* to interstate rivalries shows how issues in rivalry relationship profoundly influence rivalry conflicts.

disputes are more likely to become enduring rivalries and thus more likely to go to war. Also minor power dyads are more likely to involve territorial disputes than major dyads. This supports Colaresi et al.'s (2007) notion that minor power dyads are more spatial rivalries and major dyads are more positional rivalries.

Similar to power relations, primary issues of conflict not only define the rivalry relations in the first place but it also consistently influences the development of the relationship itself. In the end, a resolution of long lasting border disputes can be one of the central causes of rivalry termination (Gibler 1997; 2011). Yet determining the primary conflict issue in rivalry relationships is not an easy task. The perceptual definition of strategic rivalry tends to stress the importance of positional issues while the behavioral definition of enduring rivalry focuses more on spatial issues. Moreover, various issues tend to accumulate as rivalries continue to develop, which increases difficulties in discerning the main engine of rivalry. Here I use Vasquez and Leskiw's (2001) coding rules for determining "issue dominance" in rivalry relationships.<sup>24)</sup> Twenty-three rivalries are divided into either categories of policy or territory based on their primary issue of conflict. As such, only the Korean rivalry is classified with "regime" category as the primary conflict issue (Vasquez and Leskiw 2001).

***Rivalry Linkage.*** The third determinant of the rivalry relations, in addition to the role of the power status and primary conflict issue, is rivalry linkage. The existence of rivalry linkage tells us that formation, development, and termination of a rivalry can be strongly influenced by another actor(s) based on both temporal and spatial contexts.<sup>25)</sup> In other words, even though rivalry is a fundamentally dyadic phenomenon, for

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24) See Vasquez and Leskiw (2001), for more information about how dominant issue in rivalry relations is measured.

25) Some recent works on rivalry linkages and rivalry rapprochement process include Darton (2011) and DiCicco (2009). Both see how involvement of third party can change dynamics of rivalry. Similarly Maoz et al. (2007) examines the impact of rivalry linkage through exploring relational imbalances (enemy of my enemy or allies of my enemy) in rivalry dynamics.

some rivalries it is difficult to disregard the influence from a third actor. For example, the evolution and development of the US–China rivalry during the Cold War period cannot be fully understood without the Soviet Union as an external actor. Rivalry linkage also accounts for the importance of temporal and spatial contexts in rivalry development. The pre–1945 Western Europe and the post–1945 Middle East contexts are both central to understanding how a rivalry can be easily linked to other states. Empirically, Diehl and Goertz (2000) show that close ties between enduring rivalries reinforce rivalry stability and also increase the severity level of rivalry disputes.

Therefore, the end of one linked rivalry (i.e. delinking rivalry) can positively influence the end of another rivalry relationship. On the other hand, Akcinaroglu, Radziszewski, and Diehl (2011) argue that conflict in one rivalry may lead to the warming of relations in another when a state manages multiple rivalry relationships. Valeriano and Powers (2011) find that complex rivalries (i.e. three party rivalry relationships) tend to be major power positional rivalries and thus involve more complex wars than purely dyadic wars. According to Valeriano and Powers (2011), complex rivalries are shorter in duration than purely dyadic rivalries. Here, I divide consensus rivalries into three different categories of rivalry linkage using Valeriano and Powers' (2011) complex rivalry dataset. Each consensus rivalry is categorized as no rivalry linkage, single rivalry linkage, or multiple (2–5) rivalry linkages.




Figure 2. Consensus Rivalries: Power, Issue, and Rivalry Linkage

Figure 2 summarizes the three key determinants of the rivalry relationship discussed above: power relations, primary issue of conflict, and rivalry linkage. The majority of consensus rivalries are symmetrical rivalries (79%), either minor dyads (52%) or major dyads (27%). Approximately two thirds of consensus rivalries' primary issue of conflict is territory related (62%), whereas the policy oriented rivalries (35%) only account for one third. Also, it is not too surprising that almost half of the entire consensus rivalries (48%) are closely linked to other states.

### 3. Linking Rivalry Origins to Rivalry Termination

The main objective of this paper is to understand the termination process of contemporary rivalries. I define contemporary rivalries as rivalry cases since the end of WWII (1945). With twenty-three consensus rivalries as critical rivalry cases from 1816 to 2006, here I compare the post-1945 rivalries to the pre-1945 cases. Cioffi-Revilla (1998) discusses the important variations between the sub-populations of rivalries based on cross-temporal (19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> century) and cross-structural (multipolar and bipolar)



distinctions. Cioffi–Revilla (1998) finds that the 20<sup>th</sup> century rivalries under bipolar structure are relatively unstable (i.e. hazard rates increase more rapidly) compared to the rivalries from the previous century's multipolar structure. Diehl and Goertz (2000) also find WWII (1939–45) as the most critical political shock terminating at the same time initiating enduring rivalries. The importance of 1945 as a critical temporal distinction between the contemporary and pre-1945 rivalries implies that the termination of a rivalry is critically related to the origin of rivalry. In other words, *when* rivalries end may depend on when rivalries begin. In order to understand the changes in rivalry relationship it is necessary to know the origins of rivalry relationships. My macro–historical and holistic approach explicitly links the termination of rivalry to the origin of rivalry.

Table 3 shows that the start and end years of consensus rivalry cases are clearly divided into pre-1945 and post-1945 periods. This notion of temporal distinction lessens the ambiguities and difficulties in measuring the exact year of rivalry origin and termination. In the table, the pre-1945 rivalry origin years (13 cases) are more evenly spread-out during 1830–95 period, whereas the post-1945 rivalry origins (10 cases) are narrowly concentrated between 1946 and 1950 (with the exception of Ethiopia–Somalia rivalry in 1960). This shows that the origin of contemporary rivalries is heavily influenced by the political shocks related to the end of WWII (1945), followed by the post-war decolonization processes beginning in the 1950s (Diehl and Goertz 2000). It is surprising that the table shows no beginning of consensus rivalries during 1895–1945 periods. Again, this also strongly supports the significance of the year 1945 as a qualitative breakpoint between contemporary and non-contemporary origin rivalries.

Table 3. Origins and Terminations of Consensus Rivalries: A Temporal Distinction

Rivalry Start Years				Renewed/Continued to the post-1945 period	
Pre-1945 (1830 – 1895)		Post-1945 (1946–1960)			
France–Germany	1830	Russia(USSR)–US	1946	Argentina–Chile II	1952
Mexico–US	1836	India–Pakistan	1947	Greece–Turkey II	1953
Britain–US	1837	Egypt–Israel	1948	Japan–Russia	1953
Spain–US	1850	Israel–Jordan	1948	China–Russia	1962
Greece–Turkey	1854	Israel–Syria	1948	Ecuador–Peru II	1977
China–Russia	1862	China–US	1949	China–Japan II	1978
Argentina–Chile	1873	Afghan–Pakistan	1949		
China–Japan	1873	N.Korea–S.Korea	1949		
Russia–Turkey	1876	China–India	1950		
Italy–Turkey	1880	Ethiopia–Somalia	1960		
Britain–Germany	1887				
Ecuador–Peru	1891				
Japan–Russia	1895				
Rivalry End Years				Ongoing (as of 2006)	
Pre-1945 (1898 – 1955)		Post-1945 (1972 – 2004)			
Spain–US	1898	China–US	1972	Japan–Russia	
Britain–US	1903	Egypt–Israel	1979	China–Japan II	
Argentina–Chile I	1910	Argentina–Chile II	1984	Greece–Turkey II	
Russia–Turkey	1923	Russia(USSR)–US	1991	India–Pakistan	
Greece–Turkey I	1923	Israel–Jordan	1994	Israel–Syria	
Mexico–US	1927	China–India	1996	Afghan–Pakistan	
Italy–Turkey	1928	Ecuador–Peru II	1998	N.Korea–S.Korea	
China–Japan I	1951	China–Russia	2004	Ethiopia–Somalia	
France–Germany	1955				
Britain–Germany	1955				
Ecuador–Peru I	1955				

The upper right corner cell illustrates that some pre-1945 rivalries either continued to the post-1945 period or renewed after more than twenty years of break in militarized disputes. Therefore the Argentina-Chile, Greece-Turkey, Ecuador-Peru, and China-Japan rivalries are the four cases which are considered as (once ended and then) renewed. It is noteworthy that this is not only because of the absence of MIDs for twenty or more years, but also due to the presence of agreements and treaties that settled the primary issue of conflicts of the previous rivalry relationships (e.g. the Rio Protocol in 1942 between Ecuador and Peru).

On the other hand, in the table, the Japan-Russia and China-Russia rivalries are considered as continuing to the post-1945 period since there has been no significant break in MIDs between the two periods. However, despite the persistence of the rivalry relationship, close examination of the two cases demonstrates rather distinct differences between the rivalry relationships in the two periods. In the Japan-Russia rivalry, the primary conflict issue during the pre-1945 period is more related to the competition for a great power status, whereas the post-1945 rivalry relationship became mainly about the territorial control over the islands that Russia has been occupying since the end of WWII. Behaviorally, the pre-1945 Japan-Russia rivalry experienced four severe wars, including many other high-severity level MIDs (MID2: 10/23). Meanwhile, during the post-1945 rivalry none of the MIDs (MID2: 0/24) have been considered high severity ones - that is, no MIDs were above the minimum severity level of "display of force matched by use of force." Lastly, the China-Russia rivalry also displays a similar distinction between the two periods. In addition to more than a ten-year break in MIDs (1949-61), the primary conflict issue has been shifted from control and influence over Manchuria, Mongolia, and Korea (i.e. policy) to specific border disputes in the Xinjiang province and the Amur River (i.e. territory). More aspects of these renewed and continued rivalries are examined in the following sections.

Table 3 also shows the apparent temporal distinction of rivalry termination between the two periods. Except for the two continuing cases,

which are the Japan–Russia and China–Russia, the other eleven pre–1945 rivalries ended in 1898–1955 –although four of these conflicts renewed later. The post–1945 rivalry termination years are spread out in 1972–2004 period. Currently (as of 2006), there are a total of eight contemporary rivalries that are considered ongoing.<sup>26)</sup> Based on the table, it seems that many of the pre–1945 rivalry terminations are related to the two World Wars and other wars such as the first and second Balkan wars (with regards to the three Turkey cases). In terms of the post–1945 period, there are no particular political shocks that seem to be affecting the termination of contemporary rivalries. Five rivalries have terminated since the end of Cold War, yet other than the US–Russia rivalry, these rivalries do not appear to be explicitly related to the end of Cold War. This supports the proposition in the previous section that the end of the Cold War is not explicitly related to the termination process of contemporary rivalries. Next, I examine the temporal differences of rivalry termination in more detail.

#### **4. Pre–1945 and Post–1945 Rivalry Terminations: How Different Are They?**

Figure 3 compares the pre–1945 and post–1945 rivalries in terms of power relations, primary issues of conflict, rivalry linkage, and war experience. Overall, we can see some qualitative differences in key characteristics of consensus rivalries between the two periods. While in the pre–1945 period

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26) Klein et al. (2006) sees both the US–China and US–Russia rivalries ongoing as of 2001. Thompson and Dreyer (2012) see that the first US–China rivalry has ended in 1972, but the second has begun in 1996. Also Thompson and Dreyer (2012) view that the US–USSR rivalry has ended in 1989, but a new US–Russia rivalry has begun since 2007. Valeriano and Voznyak (2009) view that in 1991–93 periods, the US–Russia rivalry relationship has changed from a geopolitical rivalry to a regional rivalry. Therefore, they argue that as of 2011, the US–Russia rivalry persists. Following Bennett (1998), here I code both rivalries as ended in 1972 (US–China) and 1991 (US–USSR).

three categories of power relationships are more equally distributed, in the post-1945 period the majority of rivalries are minor power dyads (10/16). There is only one mixed dyad, which is the China-India rivalry (1950-96). The temporal distinction becomes more apparent if we compare primary issues of contention in the conflict. The primary conflict issue has been shifted from policy (8/13) to territory (13/16) in the post-1945 period. Considering the associations between major power status and positional conflict versus that between minor power status and spatial conflict, these comparisons illustrate the shift in trend from pre-1945 positional rivalries to post-1945 spatial rivalries.




Figure 3. Consensus Rivalries: Pre-1945 and Post-1945 Trends

Compared to power relations and conflict issues, no apparent temporal shift exhibits regarding the linkages in rivalry. In both periods, the number of rivalries linked to other states is approximately same with the number of purely dyadic rivalries. Yet, if we only compare the linked rivalries between the two periods, the figure shows that there are more multi-linked rivalries in the post-1945 period compared to the pre-1945 period. Lastly, with regards to the severity of the rivalry relationship measured by the

number of war experiences, it is clear that post-1945 consensus rivalries are less war-prone. The majority of the pre-1945 rivalries (8/13) experience multiple wars whereas only four rivalries - India-Pakistan and Israel-Arab rivalries - have experienced more than one war during the post-1945 era. In sum, it is essential that these qualitative differences in the two temporal periods need to be incorporated in the examination of rivalry termination.

#### 4.1 Power Relations and Rivalry Termination

Tables 4 and 5 illustrate the relationship between different power dyads and the rivalry termination process. In Table 4, rivalries are assigned to each row based on their power relationship categories, and then each column identifies whether a rivalry is terminated or ongoing (continuing and renewed). The pre-1945 rivalries show no certain variance among power categories in that there are proportionately similar numbers of terminated and non-terminated cases. In the post-1945 situation, as the lower right corner cell indicates, minor power dyad rivalries appear to be the most enduring cases among contemporary rivalries. Two major power dyads are Japan's rivalry relationships with Russia and China. As noted in Table 1, the post-1945 rivalry relationships of these two rivalries are relatively mild compared to what they experienced during the previous period. Neither experienced wars or high severity conflicts during the latter half of the twentieth century. This finding also supports the importance of minor power dyads in the contemporary rivalry context.

Table 4. Power Relations and Rivalry Termination

Power Relations	Pre-1945 Rivalries		Post-1945 Rivalries	
	Terminated Cases	Renewed/Continued	Terminated Cases	Currently Ongoing
Major Dyad	France-Germany Britain-Germany	Japan-Russia	China-US Russia(USSR)-US China-Russia	Japan-Russia China-Japan
Mixed Dyad	Britain-US Russia-Turkey Italy Turkey	China*-Russia China*-Japan	China-India	
Minor Dyad	Spain-US Argentina-Chile Greece-Turkey Mexico-US Ecuador-Peru	Argentina-Chile Greece-Turkey Ecuador-Peru	Egypt-Israel Argentina-Chile Israel-Jordan Ecuador-Peru	Greece-Turkey India-Pakistan Israel-Syria Afghan-Pakistan N.Korea-S.Korea Ethiopia-Somalia
Note: * China is regarded as minor power during the pre-1945 period.				

Table 5 shows the direct influence of the power relationship to rivalry termination. The cells in the table differentiate rivalry termination cases involving significant changes in power status from those that ended without substantial changes in their original power relations.<sup>27)</sup> The table demonstrates a strong correlation between changes in the power relations and the pre-1945 rivalry termination. In general the majority of terminated rivalries (8/11) in this period appear to be related to changes in power relations either during the termination process or after the termination. The three cases that are not involved in any types of power changes (Argentina-Chile, Greece-Turkey, and Ecuador-Peru) are the ones that renewed their rivalry relationships later on. This doubly supports the position that changes in original power relations, either symmetric to asymmetric or vice versa, are essential to consolidate the ongoing process

27) Changes in power relations among rivalries are coded based on Geller's (1993) and Bennett's (1996) classification of rivalry power dyads.

of rivalry termination. On the contrary, the post-1945 rivalry termination process appears to be not associated with power changes. The only case that involves power relation change during post-1945 period is the US-Soviet rivalry case. All other cases, which includes all three types of power relations categories, do not involve significant changes in their power status both during the termination process and afterwards.

Table 5. Rivalry Termination with Power Changes

Power Rel.	Pre-1945 Termination		Post-1945 Termination	
Change	Spain-US	Italy-Turkey	Russia(USSR)-US	
	Britain-US	China-Japan		
	Russia-Turkey	France-Germany		
	Mexico-US	Britain-Germany		
No Change	Argentina-Chile		China-US	China-India
	Greece-Turkey		Egypt-Israel	Ecuador-Peru
	Ecuador-Peru		Argentina-Chile	China-Russia
Note: The power relations change indicates that power relations between rivals has changed from the point when they started the rivalry. See Geller (1993) and Bennett (1996) for the coding of power relations.				

## 4.2 Primary Conflict Issue and Rivalry Termination

Table 6 examines how differences in primary conflict issues, either territorial or policy, are related to the end of rivalries. It appears that there are no significant differences between the two periods with regard to conflict issue types. The two empty cells in the lower policy row seemingly show that policy-oriented rivalries are neither continued (renewed) nor ongoing in the post-1945 period. Even the Japan's rivalry relationships with China and Russia - both primarily positional rivalries during pre-1945 period - shifted to more spatial-type rivalries in the post-1945 world. In essence, all continued and renewed pre-1945 rivalries (upper second left cell) are the cases with primarily territorial disputes. Not too surprisingly, all currently ongoing



rivalries (upper left corner cell), with the only exception being the Korean rivalry, are in the same territorial issue category.

Table 6. Conflict Issue and Rivalry Termination

Conflict Issue	Pre-1945 Rivalries		Post-1945 Rivalries	
	Terminated Cases	Continued/ Renewed	Terminated Cases	Currently Ongoing
Territory	Britain-US	Argentina-Chile	Egypt-Israel	Japan-Russia
	Argentina-Chile	Greece-Turkey	Argentina-Chile	China-Japan
	Greece-Turkey	Japan-Russia*	Israel-Jordan	Greece-Turkey
	Ecuador-Peru	China-Russia	China-India	Ethiopia-Somalia
		Ecuador-Peru	Ecuador-Peru	India-Pakistan
		China-Japan*	China-Russia	Israel-Syria Afghan-Pakistan
Policy	Spain-US		China-US	
	Russia-Turkey		Russia-US	
	Mexico-US			
	Italy-Turkey			
	China-Japan			
	France-Germany			
	Britain-Germany			
Regime				N, Korea-S, Korea
Note: * indicates the primary issue of conflict shifted from policy to territory in the post-1945 period.				

This strongly supports the protracted and enduring features of territorial disputes even in the macro-historical context of rivalry development (Huth 1996; Tir and Diehl 2000; Senese and Vasquez 2008). In sum, the rivalries whose primary conflicts involve territorial disputes, rather than policy issues, tend to persist through political shocks (i.e. WWII and the end of the Cold War) and thereby become truly enduring rivalries.

### 4.3 Rivalry Linkage and Rivalry Termination

The presence of rivalry linkages examines the factors beyond a dyadic level of analysis in the study of rivalries. Figure 1 shows that almost half of all consensus rivalries are significantly linked to one or more states outside of the dyadic rivalry relationship. Valeriano and Powers (2011) define this three-party rivalry relationship as “complex rivalries.” Table 7 examines the relationship between rivalry linkage and termination. Consensus rivalries are categorized in terms of the number of existing linkages in each rivalry.

Table 7. Rivalry Linkage and Rivalry Termination

Linkage	Pre-1945 Rivalries		Post-1945 Rivalries	
	Terminated Cases	Continued /Renewed	Terminated Cases	Currently Ongoing
None	Spain-US Britain-US Argentina-Chile Greece-Turkey Mexico-US	Argentina-Chile Greece-Turkey Japan-Russia <b>China-Russia</b>	Argentina-Chile China-India Ecuador-Peru	Japan-Russia China-Japan Greece-Turkey Afghan-Pakistan Ethiopia-Somalia
Single	China-Japan France-Germany Britain-Germany Ecuador-Peru	China-Japan Ecuador-Peru	China-Russia	India-Pakistan N. Korea-S. Korea
Multi	Russia-Turkey Italy-Turkey		China-Russia China-US Egypt-Israel Russia-US Israel-Jordan	Israel-Syria

For example, “None” in the first row indicates that the rivalry has no link with other states, in other words the case is a purely dyadic rivalry. “Single” indicates one linkage (e.g. France-Germany rivalry is linked to Britain during 1904-45 periods) and “Multi” indicates more than one linkage (e.g. Russia-Turkey rivalry is linked to France, Italy, and UK during the 1897-1917 periods).<sup>28)</sup>

The table shows somewhat similar patterns of relationship between rivalry linkage and termination in both periods. The upper row (None) shows that purely dyadic rivalries are more likely to renew and continue in both temporal periods. Obviously, there are some renewed and continued cases (China–Japan and Ecuador–Peru) as well as currently ongoing cases (India–Pakistan, N.Korea–S.Korea, and Israel–Syria) which are not purely dyadic in the sense that they are significantly linked to other states. As the bottom row demonstrates, however, rivalries with multiple linkages are much less likely to persist through and endure in the contemporary international context. Among six contemporary multi-linked (two to five linkages) rivalries, only one case (Israel–Syria) remains as ongoing as of 2006. This serves as strong evidence supporting the hypothesis that more rivalry linkages provide more opportunities to end rivalry through either a “delinking” process (Diehl and Goertz 2000) or sharing common external threats (Bennett 1998).

#### 4. 4 War Experience and Rivalry Termination

The previous tables show how power relations, primary conflict issues, and rivalry linkages become important determinants in the examination of a rivalry relationship in general, and particularly of its termination. The cases in the different cell locations provide important information as to how different typologies of rivalry are related to formation, continuation, and end of rivalry. Thus, these conditions are useful to measure the “enduring” characteristics of rivalry relationships. However, they cannot explain the differences in the degree of rivalry relationship. As Tables 1 and 2 demonstrate, the severity of a rivalry relationship—i.e. how conflictual a rivalry is—is the most fundamental condition to determine a rivalry as such. The most visible indicator distinguishing rivalry behavior from non-rivalry interaction is the presence of extreme forms of repeated militarized disputes such as wars.

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28) See Valeriano and Powers (2011) for the details of coding complex rivalries.

Table 8. War Experience and Rivalry Termination

Wars	Pre-1945 Rivalries		Post-1945 Rivalries	
	Terminated Cases	Renewed/Continuing	Terminated Cases	Currently Ongoing
None	Britain-US Argentina-Chile Ecuador-Peru	Argentina-Chile Ecuador-Peru	Argentina-Chile Russia-US China-Russia	Japan-Russia China-Japan Greece-Turkey Afghan-Pakistan
Single	Spain-US Mexico-US		China-US China-India Ecuador-Peru	N. Korea-S. Korea Ethiopia-Somalia
Multi	Italy-Turkey Britain-Germany Russia-Turkey Greece-Turkey China-Japan France-Germany	Greece-Turkey Japan-Russia China-Russia China-Japan	Egypt-Israel Israel-Jordan	India-Pakistan Israel-Syria

Here I examine how the number of wars can be relevant to rivalry termination. Table 8 illustrates three categories of rivalries counting the number of wars between the two parties. Here wars include both dyadic and multiple participant wars. However, no discernible patterns appear in the table. It appears that rivalries in all three war categories are indistinguishable in terms of rivalry termination. In both periods, there is no apparent linear relationship between the number of wars and terminated (or ongoing) rivalries. This suggests that in both periods, rivalries may persist and endure, either experiencing a number of wars or without going to a single war. On one hand, rivalries continue as they consistently go to war. On the other hand, they may be merely continuing because somehow both parties are not too interested in ending the current rivalry relationship.

Table 9. Rivalry Origin with War

War	Pre-1945 Rivalry	Renewed/Continued	Post-1945 Rivalry	Ongoing
Rivalry Origin with War	Russia-Turkey		Japan-Russia India-Pakistan Israel-Jordan Israel-Syria Egypt-Israel N, Korea-S, Korea China-US	Japan-Russia India-Pakistan Israel-Syria N, Korea-S, Korea
	France-Germany	Greece-Turkey	Russia-US	Afghan-Pakistan
	Mexico-US	China-Russia	Afghan-Pakistan	Ethiopia-Somalia
	Britain-US	Argentina-Chile	China-India	China-Japan
	Spain-US	China-Japan	Argentina-Chile	Greece-Turkey
Rivalry Origin without War	Greece-Turkey	Ecuador-Peru	Greece-Turkey	
	China-Russia	Japan-Russia	Ethiopia-Somalia	
	Argentina-Chile		China-Russia	
	China-Japan		Ecuador-Peru	
	Italy-Turkey		China-Japan	
	Britain-Germany			
	Ecuador-Peru			
Japan-Russia				

Table 9 examines rivalry origins and war. Existing literature on rivalry in general focuses more on how various rivalry interactions lead to war between states. The repetition of conflicts between the same pair of states, which defines a rivalry relationship, is considered as the most favorable condition for states to go to war. Thereby rivalry scholars pay less attention to how wars may influence the rivalry relationship.<sup>29)</sup> Klein et al. (2006) find that most rivalry wars occur within the first six MIDs between the rivals. Table 9 distinguishes rivalries in terms of war origin or non-war origin. The table demonstrates that war-origin rivalry is predominantly a post-1945 rivalry phenomenon. The only war-origin case in the pre-1945 period is the Russia-Turkey (1876-1923) rivalry, in which the start year

29) With an exception, DiCicco (2006) examines how different types of war may have different effects on rivalry terminations.

matches the 2<sup>nd</sup> Russo-Turkish war (1876-78). Yet, it is difficult to say that this case is a pure war-origin rivalry because there were already two previous wars between them (the First Russo-Turkish war in 1827-29 and the Crimean War in 1853-56). Unlike pre-1945 origins, many more rivalries are initiated by wars in the post-1945 period. Among the sixteen post-1945 rivalries listed in the third column, if we set aside the six renewed and continuing rivalries from the previous period, more than half are war-origin rivalries. This is a big shift from the dearth of war origin rivalries in the previous period. The last column shows that war-origin rivalries are slightly more likely to continue than the non-war origin ones.

**Table 10.** Rivalry Termination with War

War	Pre-1945 Termination		Post-1945 Termination	
Rivalry	Spain-US	China-Japan	Egypt-Israel	
Term.	Russia-Turkey	France-Germany	Ecuador-Peru	
with	Greece-Turkey	Britain-Germany		
War	Italy-Turkey			
Rivalry	Britain-US		China-US	China-India
Term.	Argentina-Chile		Argentina-Chile	China-Russia
without	Mexico-US		Russia-US	
War	Ecuador-Peru		Israel-Jordan	

Lastly, Table 10 examines how rivalry termination is influenced by war. Similar to Table 5 explaining the relationship between changes in power and rivalry termination, Table 10 examines rivalry termination cases involving war. Again, there are some distinguishable macro-level temporal patterns between the two periods. The table's cell structure closely resembles Table 5. In essence, the majority of pre-1945 rivalry termination involves war - rivalry termination (7/11) followed by war. On the contrary, the majority of post-1945 rivalry termination (6/8) occurred in the absence of a war context. The two post-1945 termination cases involving war are the Egypt-Israel (1948-79) and Ecuador-Peru (1977-98) rivalries. However,

in comparison to the rivalry ending wars during the first half of the twentieth century, both Yom Kippur (1973) and Cenepa Valley (1995) wars are neither decisive nor conclusive in terms of their outcomes. That means it was not the actual war outcome (either victory or defeat, or stalemate) but it was the following development in the post-war period which impacted the end of rivalry.

## V. Conclusion: Understanding Contemporary Contexts of Rivalry Termination

The primary goal of this study is to understand the dynamics of the contemporary rivalry termination process through examining consensus cases of interstate rivalry. This paper provides an important descriptive understanding of rivalry termination through comparing two temporal periods of consensus rivalries. The conceptualization of rivalry termination as a “historical process and outcome of relationship transformation” requires an understanding of how the rivalry origin is connected to the rivalry termination. Under this paper’s macro-historical and holistic perspective, I examine how two groups of consensus rivalries differ in terms of power relations, primary issue type, rivalry linkage, and war experience.

The findings from the figures and tables largely support my propositions. While pre-1945 rivalries contain more major power dyads with policy issue conflicts and experiencing multiple wars, contemporary rivalries are more likely to be minor dyads with territorial disputes that experience fewer wars. This strongly backs the proposition that the contemporary rivalry terminations need to incorporate contemporary historical contexts. The origins of contemporary rivalries are strongly influenced by changes in the post-WWII international environment.

Therefore, unlike the rivalries in the previous period, a number of contemporary rivalry origins involve wars related to the independence and state-building issues. Other post-1945 rivalries are the ones that are renewing their previous rivalry conflicts or simply continuing from the previous period. These rivalries appear to have different characteristics of rivalry development and termination from purely post-1945 origin rivalries.

In terms of rivalry termination, the temporal distinction tells us that contemporary rivalry terminations are not explicitly linked to changes in power relations or wars, which was the case in the pre-1945 period. Confirming the literature on territorial conflicts, consensus rivalries with primarily territorial disputes endure longer than the ones with primarily policy disputes, regardless of their temporal origins. Through the examination of rivalry linkage we can see that purely dyadic rivalries are more likely to continue and also renew their rivalry relationship than rivalries having multiple linkages to other states. This tells us that rivalry linkage can be positively related to rivalry termination. The paper delineates some important issues related to the contemporary rivalry termination process. Yet, rivalry termination is a complicated and compound process, which requires a configurational and conjunctural understanding of different causal conditions. That means we need to consider how the individual effects of relationship determinants (i.e. power, issue, linkage) and variations in behavioral characteristics (i.e. war experience) combine together to confluence the process of rivalry termination. Hence, on the basis of the findings in this paper, the task for the future study is to examine how all these causal conditions work together in rivalry termination.

In all, the study contributes to the discipline of international relations (IR) by developing a typological understanding of contemporary rivalry termination and also by offering the novel analyses on consensus rivalries. It provides valuable additive and integrative cumulations to broader IR theory as well as to the rivalry research program.



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## Appendix A

### Consensus Rivalries: Power, Issue, and Rivalry Linkage

Rivalry	Period	Power	Issue	Rivalry Linkage
France-Germany	1830 - 1955	Major Dyad	Policy	Single
Mexico-US	1836 - 1927	Minor Dyad	Policy	None
Britain-US	1837 - 1903	Mixed Dyad	Territory	None
Spain-US	1850 - 1898	Minor Dyad	Policy	None
Greece-Turkey	1854 - 1923	Minor Dyad	Territory	None
	1958 - 2006	Minor Dyad	Territory	None
China-Russia	1862 - 1948	Mixed Dyad	Territory	Single
	1962 - 2004	Major Dyad	Territory	Multi
China-Japan	1873 - 1951	Mixed Dyad	Policy	Single
	1978 - 1999	Major Dyad	Territory	Single
Argentina-Chile	1873 - 1910	Minor Dyad	Territory	None
	1952 - 1984	Minor Dyad	Territory	None
Russia-Turkey	1876 - 1923	Mixed Dyad	Policy	Multi
Italy-Turkey	1880 - 1928	Mixed Dyad	Policy	Multi
Britain-Germany	1887 - 1955	Major Dyad	Policy	Single
Ecuador-Peru	1891 - 1955	Minor Dyad	Territory	Single
	1977 - 1998	Minor Dyad	Territory	None
Japan-Russia	1895 - 1945	Major Dyad	Policy	None
	1953 - 2006	Major Dyad	Territory	None
Russia(USSR)-US	1946 - 1991	Major Dyad	Policy	Multi
India-Pakistan	1947 - 2006	Minor Dyad	Territory	Single
Egypt-Israel	1948 - 1979	Minor Dyad	Territory	Multi
Israel-Jordan	1948 - 1994	Minor Dyad	Territory	Multi
Israel-Syria	1948 - 2001	Minor Dyad	Territory	Multi
China-US	1949 - 1972	Major Dyad	Policy	Multi
Afghan-Pakistan	1949 - 2006	Minor Dyad	Territory	None
N. Korea-S. Korea	1949 - 2006	Minor Dyad	Regime	Single
China-India	1950 - 1996	Mixed Dyad	Territory	None
Ethiopia-Somalia	1960 - 2006	Minor Dyad	Territory	None

Note: Coding Rules based on Power (Geller 1993; Bennett 1996), Issue (Vasquez and Leskiw 2001), and Rivalry Linkage (Valeriano and Powers 2011). Rivalry periods are from Bennett's (1998) narratives on rivalry termination, updated with rivalry narratives from Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006; 2008) and Thompson and Dreyer (2012).

## 요 약

## 숙적관계 국가들에 대한 연구

- 숙적관계 종식에 영향을 미치는 주요 요인들을 중심으로 -

오순근\*

서구 근대 국제관계학의 태동은 “전쟁의 원인”을 밝혀내려고 했던 유럽 지식인들의 학문적 도전에서부터 비롯되었다고 할 수 있다. 1, 2차 세계대전의 잔혹함을 겪으면서 이들은 전쟁(특히 전쟁의 원인)에 대한 좀 더 과학적인 연구를 통해 어떻게 하면 국가들 간의 전쟁을 예방할 수 있을까에 집중해 왔다. 이러한 학문적 경향을 반영한 것이 잘 알려진 미국 미시간 대학의 “전쟁 상관성 연구 프로젝트(Correlates of War Project)”이다. 이는 나폴레옹 전쟁이 끝나고 비엔나체제가 시작된 1815년 이후 국가들 간 발생한 모든 전쟁 관련 자료를 데이터베이스화하여, 국제관계학자들이 전쟁(Interstate War)이나 군사분쟁(Militarized Interstate Disputes)을 정량 또는 정성적으로 연구할 수 있도록 다양한 정보들을 제공하고 있다.

최근 Paul F. Diehl, William R. Thompson과 같은 학자들은 전쟁을 분석단위로 하는 전쟁의 원인(Causes of War)을 연구하는 학풍에서 벗어나, 국가들 간의 분쟁과 전쟁을 연구하기 위해 숙적관계(Rivalry)라는 새로운 분석의 단위를 제시하였다. 숙적관계는 국제관계에 있어서 지속적으로 분쟁 또는 전쟁을 일으키는, 즉 무력분쟁의 긴 역사를 가지고 있는, 두 국가를 일컫는다. 국가들 간의 숙적관계는 학자들에 따라 Interstate Rivalry, Enduring Rivalry, Strategic Rivalry 등 다양한 정의와 성격을 갖고 있다. 이러한 국가들의 사례로는 2차대전 이전까지 프랑스-독일 관계, 2차대전 이후 중동지역 이스라엘과 아랍국가들 간의 관계, 냉전기 미소관계, 인도-파키스탄 및 남북한 관계 등을 예로 들 수 있다. 이렇게 널리 알려진 숙적관계 외에도 남미의 칠레-아르헨티나, 에콰도르-페루와 아프리카의 소말리아-에티오피아 등 학자들에 따라 1815년 이후 약 200개의 숙적관계를 제시하고

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있다. 숙적관계에 대한 연구는 기존의 전쟁의 원인 중심이었던 정량적 국제분쟁 연구에 두 국가의 분쟁역사를 포함시키는 정성적 연구를 접합시키고 있다.

본 연구는 1945년 이후 숙적관계 국가들의 관계종식과 관련하여, 거시론적이고 전체론적 접근방법(Macro-level Holistic Approach)을 제시하고 있다. 먼저 1945년 이후 발생한 국가들 간의 숙적관계 종식(Rivalry Termination)을 이해하기 위해, 거시적 관점에서 숙적관계를 발생시키게 된 역사적 원인을 살펴보고 있다. 특히 1945년 이후 숙적관계와 관련된 중요한 요인들 중에서 전쟁, 영토분쟁, 그리고 근대국가 형성에 대해 살펴보고 다음과 같은 두 가지 명제(proposition)를 제시한다. 첫째, 1945년 이후의 숙적관계 형성과 지속에는 2차대전 이후 독립국가 형성, 헌팅턴이 주장한 제3의 물결(민주화), 그리고 냉전기 미소경쟁 등의 역사적 배경이 영향을 주었다는 것이다. 둘째, 이러한 역사적 배경에 더하여 1945년 이후 숙적관계는 전쟁에 의해 시작된 숙적관계와 전쟁 없이 시작된 숙적관계 등 2가지로 나눌 수 있으며, 전쟁에 의해 시작되고 영토분쟁과 근대국가 형성 문제를 내포하고 있는 숙적관계가 그렇지 않은 숙적관계에 비해 오랫동안 지속되며 관계해결이 어렵다는 것이다.

앞서 제시된 2가지 명제들과 관련하여 본문에서는 다양한 학자들이 제시한 숙적관계 정의들에 일치하는 23개의 숙적관계(Consensus Rivalries)를 선정하여 이들에 대한 비교분석(Descriptive Analysis)을 실시하였다. 이들 사례들을 1945년 이전과 이후로 나누어, 숙적관계 형성과 종식에 있어 핵심요소인 국가들 간 힘의 차이(Power Relations), 분쟁의 주요 원인(Primary Conflict Issue), 숙적관계에 있어 다른 국가들과의 연계성(Rivalry Linkage), 전쟁의 횡수와 시기 등을 통해 비교하였다. 숙적관계의 종식과 관련하여 약소국 간의 숙적관계(Minor Dyad)가 오래 지속되고, 영토분쟁(Territorial Disputes)이 숙적관계를 지속시키는 주요인이며, 다른 숙적관계와의 연계성이 적은 숙적들이 오래 지속된다는 비교분석 결과가 나왔다. 또한 전쟁의 횡수는 숙적관계 종식에 큰 영향을 미치지 못하지만 전쟁으로 인해 시작된 숙적관계가 그렇지 않은 경우보다 더욱 오래 지속되는 것으로 확인되었다. 끝으로 2차대전 이전의 숙적관계는 대부분 전쟁을 통해 종식되었지만, 1945년 이후에는 전쟁 없이도 숙적관계가 종식된 경우가 많았음을 보여 주고 있다.

본 연구의 주목적은 “1945년 이후 형성된 숙적관계를 어떻게 종식시킬 수 있을 것인가?”라는 규범적 논제를 통해, 23개의 주요 숙적관계를 발굴하여 거시적, 역사적 관점에서 비교분석함에 있다. 이는 특히 우리나라가 처한 현실과 관련하여 중요한 시사점을 갖는다. 남북관계가 갖는 특수성보다는 1945년 이후 국제정치 역



사속에서 발생한 숙적관계 현상이라는 일반성의 틀에서 남북관계를 이해하고자 했다. 남북관계를 베트남, 예멘, 독일 등 분단국가의 사례들과만 비교 연구하는 제한된 시각에서 벗어나, 인도-파키스탄, 그리스-터키, 에콰도르-페루 등 유사한 숙적들 간의 관계들과 비교하는 새로운 연구의 장을 제시하고자 한다. 따라서 앞으로 숙적관계 종식에 대한 더욱 다양화된 사례연구를 통해 한반도 분쟁해결에 필요한 새로운 교훈을 얻을 수 있을 것이다. 예를 들면 2차대전 이후 발생한 국경을 접하고 있는 비강대국들의 평화적인 숙적관계 종식에 대한 사례연구는 남북한이 앞으로 지향해야 할 방향을 제시해 줄 수 있을 것이다. 끝으로 본 연구는 특정한 정책적 함의를 도출하기 보다는 숙적관계와 관련된 하나의 거시적 이론을 제시하고, 주요 숙적관계 국가들에 대한 비교설명을 통해 현존하는 숙적관계 해결을 위한 하나의 분석의 틀을 제시하는 것으로 국제분쟁 연구에 기여하고자 하였다.

\* 주요 핵심 연구 주제어: 전쟁의 원인, 국제분쟁, 숙적관계, 숙적관계 종식, 남북관계