A Study on *Will* as Modal or Non-modal

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The purpose of this article is to explain the meanings and uses of the English auxiliaries *will* morpho-syntactically, and answer the question of whether *will* is a tense auxiliary or a modal one. Some writers even exclude *will* completely from the semantics of the modal auxiliaries. They argue that the semantics of *will* is fundamentally non-modal and has only a few modal-like uses. There are some people who treat *will* to be semantically separate from the other modal auxiliaries. In the light of modal *will*, the semantics of *will* basically remains anchored in volition because the lack of required speaker subjectivity, but has undergone so much semantic bleaching that it may also express future time without volition. On the other hand, the semantics of *will* in the exclusionist view is erroneous and that its semantics is in fact closely related to the semantics of the other modals. This view reinforces the argument that the morpho-syntactic kinship of *will*, *can*, *may* and *must* also reflects semantic kinship. It is suggested that all the modal auxiliaries show that the correspondence relation is non-verified but potential. And the specific place that *will* holds is that the correspondence is unverified at the time of utterance but will turn out to become verified. The overall conclusion is that idiosyncratic morpho-syntax shared by the modals reflects the semantics and pragmatics of the English modal auxiliaries and is forced also to include *will*.

[modal meaning/non-modal meaning/future reference/deontic/epistemic/dynamic]

I. INTRODUCTION

There are various linguistic approaches to the topic of modality. If we take a look at an overview of the literature of the past 50 years, we can find that there is no general

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consensus on the kinds and degrees of modality. Writers seem to employ different degrees and forms of modality that are necessary to establish an adequate theoretical framework that explains modality and modal expressions in language. Some writers use intuitive paraphrases such as possibility, permission, prediction, doubt, etc. Other writers rely on various subdivisions of a general notion of modality into, for instance, extrinsic and intrinsic modality, or speaker-, hearer-, and subject-oriented modality, or various force-dynamic concepts. Some writers simply regard modality as including only the formal class of modal auxiliaries. Other writers include all shades of attitudes to propositions and some even include negation (Frawley, 1992, p. 384).

Von Wright's work in philosophical logic has consistently provided with the source of inspiration for the study of linguistic modality, especially in his seminal publication on modal logic in 1951. Von Wright distinguished several *modi*, and some of them have become the stock-in-trade of many linguists:

• Alethic modality, or modes of logical truth;
• epistemic modality, or modes of knowing;
• deontic modality or modes of obligation. (p. 28)

In a foot note (Von Wright, 1951, p. 28) he also introduced dynamic modality, which is concerned with abilities and dispositions. Von Wright effectively employed *modi* as a framework for organizing linguistic expressions by treating epistemic, deontic and dynamic as kinds of modalities which are internally classified into degrees of modality, namely possibility/permission vs. necessity/obligation (Palmer, 1990, p. 36). Most linguists have assumed that alethic modality, the modality of logical truth, is not encoded in natural language (Durst-Andersen, 1995, pp. 611-653, for a different view). It should also be noted that some writers combine deontic and dynamic modalities into non-epistemic, or 'root' modality. This seems to be the linguistically most salient controversy that one can find in many languages.

One thing that a majority of writers do agree on is that modality is a notion covering the difference between presenting a proposition in a conditional manner as non-verified and only potentially true. The following two prototypical sentences in (1) exemplify the basic opposition.

(1) (a) John is in his office. (non-modal)
     (b) John may be in his office. (modal)

In a standard utterance of (1a), the proposition *John be in his office* presented by the speaker is verified, relative to the situation she is referring to. By uttering the sentence, the

speaker is encouraging the hearer to regard the proposition as true of the world that he or she is referring to. On the other hand, in a standard utterance of (1b), the proposition is an unverified one but carries an indication that the speaker believes that it is potentially true of the actual situation she is referring to. He or she is encouraging the hearer to regard the proposition as only potentially true, relative to the current state of knowledge of the speaker. In other words, the traditional way to understand this is that the utterance of (1b) shows that the speaker does not have perfect access to the truth of the proposition. This feature modality is generally considered to be the hallmark of it.

The conception of modality illustrated above is usually turned into a definitional boundary of modality which depends on the speaker. Palmer (1986) provides the following definition.

(2) Modality in language is, then, concerned with subjective characteristics of an utterance. In this case, it could even be further argued that subjectivity is an essential criterion for modality. That is, modality could be defined as the grammaticalization of speakers' (subjective) attitudes and opinions. (p. 36)

According to Palmer, subjectivity is the central, even standard feature of the definition of modality. Writers who take speaker subjectivity as the topic of their argument will have to decide how to explain possible utterances of the following sentences containing the modal *will.*

(3) (a) The service to Carlisle will arrive at platform two in ten minutes.
    (b) We will bring the wine.
    (c) They will be home at this time of the day.

There is no serious subjectivity in either (3a) or (3b) according to the traditional definition of modality. In contrast, (3c) constitutes a perfect example of modal semantics. Writers suggest a number of solutions to this descriptive problem. Some writers adopt morpho-syntactic criteria and regard *will* as a modal auxiliary not different from the other modals. Other writers operate with *will* as polysemous(having many meanings), which only sometimes behave as modal. Some writers even exclude *will* completely from the semantics of the modal auxiliaries. They argue that the semantics of *will* is fundamentally non-modal and has only a few modal-like uses. This radical position is based on the grounds that *will* is essentially semantically different from the other modal auxiliaries. This is found in Palmer(1986), Davidsen-Nielsen (1988), Groefsema (1992), Bache and Davidsen-Nielsen (1997) and, most recently, Papafragou (2000). In the following, whether the division or exclusion of *will* is truly reasonable will be addressed. From what does the

motivation for division or exclusion follow? Does it follow from the inherent semantics of the modal auxiliaries? Or does it follow from the prior definition in (2), which may or may not have anything to do with the semantics of the modal auxiliaries?

II. MORPHO-SYNTACTICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF *WILL*

The lexeme *will* has the present tense form *will* and the past tense form *would*. The lexeme also has the enclitic forms '*ll* and '*d*. The etymology of the modern form is derived from Old English present tense base *will*[-] and past tense base *wolde*[-]. The root of these Old English words comes from the Germanic forms which cluster around the semantic ground of 'want to', 'desire' and 'intend to'. There are cognates in modern Danish forms, which are the infinitive *at ville,* present tense *vil*, past tense *ville*, and the past participate *villet*. The cognate modern German forms are the infinitive *zu wollen*, the present tense bases *will*[-] and *woll*[-], the past tense base *wollt*[-], and the past participate form *gewollt*,.

Although they share the common ancestry, the three lexemes have very different morpho-syntactic status. An interesting point is that the lexemes *will*, *ville* and *wollen* in the three languages are all subject to the morpho-syntactic characteristics of the other central modal auxiliaries. In the case of modern standard English, the central modal auxiliaries *can*, *may*, *must*, *shall*, and, *will* and they possess quite distinct morpho-syntactic features from one another:

(4) English modal auxiliaries:

      (a) have no lexical counterparts, i.e. ;
        *He will a lot;

      (b) have no non-finite forms, i.e. ;
        *You need to will win.
        *She was in the habit of willing win.
        *She had willed win for a long time;

      (c) cannot be stacked, i.e.;
        *She will could win;

      (d) do not take person/number agreement, i.e. ;
        *She wills win

There are no particularly distinct features in Danish and German modal auxiliaries. There are some distributional constraints of these auxiliaries. Danish and German modal auxiliaries have non-auxiliary counterparts and non-finite forms, and they allow stacking. In the case of German, they carry agreement features. If we suppose that there is a higher degree of grammaticalization in the easily noticeable deficiencies of English modal auxiliaries, we would also expect that a greater degree of semantic bleaching is consequently accompanied. In other words, the standard grammaticalization argument would be that in English, the loss of lexical content reflects or accompanies the loss of lexical function.

Let us suppose that we accept the traditional view that the original Germanic *will*-lexemes is clustered around the semantic ground of 'want to' , 'desire' and 'intend to'. Then, considering the basic effects of grammaticalization processes, we can predict that modern English *will* is likely to be more abstract compared to the original semantic ground of German *wollen*. Now, consider the following contrast between modern English *will* and German *wollen*. Indeed, modern English *will* is relatively more vague that it can be used in sentences that convey volition/intention and also in sentences that to convey simple future-time reference. When they are used in such sentences, there is no hint of future-time reference or the volition/intention. On the other hand, German *wollen* retains too much of its lexical content that it is usually not used in utterances that convey simple future-time reference. Instead, the German auxiliary *werden* is used to convey non-volitional future-time reference.

(5) She will leave us. (=intends to or non-volitional future)

(6) (a) *Sie will uns verlassen* (=intends to)
    (b) *Sie wird unw verlassen* (=non-volitional future)

From the sentences above, we can assume that English *will* is semantically vaguer and thus more versatile than German auxiliaries. This means that an adequate framework of English *will* does not necessarily amount to an adequate framework of German *wollen* or, of Danish *ville*. This also suggests that like the semantics of all the other English modal auxiliaries, the semantics of English *will* has risen higher up the semantic tree, as it was in the past. English modals are incapable of being untied with, that is, it is strongly bound up with tense. This indicates that their semantic point of insertion is directly attached to the illocutionary level as a sister of the propositional content.

FIGURE 1

the Semantic Tree

Our point of departure is the following. English modal auxiliaries are linked to a higher operator position and they have to be pragmatically interpreted 'down' to affect subject-predicate relations such as volition and ability. The basic morpho-syntactic fact is that *will* is closely related to *can*, *may*, and *must* and they share the same feature which is 'auxiliary verbs'. An interesting point here is why *will* should have been such a faithful companion in morphology and syntax. Would it implausibly if *can, may, must* and *will* (and *shall* in the relevant dialects of English) behave together simply because of the fact that they share the same semantic feature? There are some people who treat *will* to be semantically separate from the other modal auxiliaries. They seem to reject the possibility that it is the semantic coherence that keeps all the modal auxiliaries tightly together morphologically and syntactically.

III. FEATURE OF *WILL* AS NON-MODAL, OBJECTIVITY

In traditional literature that relies on intuitive paraphrases for the modals, writers inevitably regard and describe the individual modals as polysemic, which carry at least two or three meanings. For example, writers have argued that *may* carries meanings such as epistemic possibility, deontic permission, dynamic possibility and benediction (Coates, 1983; Palmer, 1990). In the context of intuitive polysemic frameworks, *will* possesses the greatest number of meanings that are uncovered in the literature, though it is somewhat doubtful. Leech(1997) identifies no less than five observable meanings, namely future-time reference, willingness, insistence, intention and predictability, illustrated in (7a) to (e). The number actually rises to six because characteristic behavior is regarded as an independent

meaning under predictability, illustrated in (7f). And we might add another meaning that is often omitted, namely order, illustrated in (7g). There are possibly seven meanings in total.

(7) (a) Tomorrow's weather will be cold and cloudy. (future time)
   (b) My chauffeur will help you. (willingness)
   (c) He will go swimming in dangerous waters. (insistence)
   (d) I will write tomorrow. (intention)
   (e) That will be the milkman. (predictability)
   (f) He'll go all day without eating. (characteristic behavior)
   (g) You will do as I tell you. (order)

Such intuitive interpretations may unfortunately be inadequate and quite misleading as representations of the semantics of the lexeme *will*. However, the sentences above exemplify a variety of potential utterance meanings. They illustrate a range of potential meanings which any adequate theory of *will* will be able to explain at some level of description going from morpheme to utterance processing in context.

Several meanings shown in (7) seem to fall clearly into the categories of epistemic, deontic and dynamic modality. The question that should arise at this point is: what makes some writers exclude *will* from the other modal auxiliaries? Concerning the answer to this question, exclusionist writers usually employ two related, but independent arguments (Davidsen-Nielsen, 1988; Palmer, 1990).

(8) (a) The semantics of *will* basically remains anchored in volition, but has undergone so much semantic bleaching that it may also express future time without volition;
  (b) The semantics of *will* basically developed from volition into categorical temporal reference to future time, synchronically yielding a separate non-volitional *will* with a synchronic prediction sense, which is extended to certain modal uses.

The explanation in (8a) argues that volition is at the centre of the semantics of *will*. The utterances that are clearly volition-related from the sentences above are (7) (b) *My chauffeur will help you,* (c) *He will go swimming in dangerous waters* and (d) *I will write tomorrow.* When a speaker utters either of the three sentences (b), (c) or (d), he or she would normally intend to state the objective facts that the referents of the subjects *my chauffeur, he* and *I* are in a given volitional/intentional relation to the situations denoted by the semantics of the predicates *help you, go swimming* and *write.* This means that if we assume that (7b), (c) and (d) represent core occurrences, *will* does not conform to the criterial speaker subjectivity of modality which Palmer presented in the quotation in (2) above. According to such explanation of modality, *will* is non-modal as a point of

departure. *Will* shares this same characteristics with *can* when *can* is used basically to express ability. This is because when a speaker utters a sentence such as *John can speak Italian* (Palmer, 1986, p. 102), he or she would normally intend to state an objective fact that the referent of the subject *John* possesses a given ability relative to the situation denoted by the semantics of the predicate *speak Italian.* In fact, Palmer's (1986, p. 103) argument about *can* meaning ability and *will* meaning volition is that:

(9) They are subject-oriented in that they are concerned with the ability or willingness of the subject, not with the opinion or attitude of the speaker. This type can be omitted from the strict typological classification of modality, although it is of interest that modal verbs have these meanings.

In fact, Palmer demotes dynamic modality to non-modal. So according to Palmer's argument of excluding *will,* together with *can,* is that its basic semantics does not qualify the speaker subjectivity requirement. Therefore in such a perspective, *will* is simply not modal. Another line of reasoning takes its point of departure in the future-time reference in (7a). Some writers argue that future-time reference inherently falls under the category of epistemic modality (Coates, 1983, pp. 169-183; Palmer, 1990, pp. 161-163) argues that 'futurity is never a purely temporal concept; it necessarily includes an element of prediction or some related modal notion.' However, against this view, Davidsen-Nielsen (1988, pp. 6-8; Bache & Davidsen-Nielsen, 1997, pp. 290-293) maintains that the speaker's statements about the future may in fact have a definite truth value which can be used to make categorical statements. Therefore, an utterance *Tomorrow's weather will be cold and cloudy* would be factually binding on the speaker in respect of the weather the day after the utterance is made in precisely the same way that an utterance of *Today's weather is cold and cloudy* would be factually binding on the speaker at the time of utterance. As in (7e) *That will be the milkman* and (7g) *You will do as I tell you,* examples which are apparently both epistemically and deontically modal, are interpreted by Bache and Davidsen-Nielsen (1997, pp. 316-317) as secondary modal uses of the alternative categorical future tense marker. Davidsen-Nielsen uses distributional tests to argue that the future tense lexeme *will* is a different lexeme from (dynamic) volitional *will.* First of all, future tense *will* does not occur in conditional subclauses, while volitional *will* does.

(10) (a) *If he will help me tomorrow, I can finish before Friday. (future tense)
     (b) If he will help me tomorrow, I can finish before Friday. (volition)

Secondly, according to Davidsen-Nielsen (1988, p. 11), ambiguity can be shown to be an either-or choice between the two meanings of one form, i.e. formal syncretism.

(11) (a) He will take care of all the rest. (future tense)
    (b) He will take care of all the rest. (volition)

Thirdly, in view of Davidsen-Nielsen's argument, volitional *will* is highly constrained in (non-negated) passive clauses.

(12) (a) I will be brought back in disgrace. (future tense)
    (b) I will be brought back in disgrace.

Fourthly, according to Davidsen-Naelsen, volitional *will* behaves like the other tenses in having secondary modal uses.

(13) (a) they will be home at this time of day.

While Davidsen-Naelsen (1988, pp. 12-13) concedes that 'from a strictly formal point of view, it is impossible to operate with two *will*'s, namely the temporal *will* and the modal *will*', he maintains that one form may turn into two semantically distinct linguistic entities. So far the two main arguments were introduced and illustrated, i.e. the lack of required speaker subjectivity and categorical future-time reference, which are used to denounce or exclude *will*. I intend to argue that they are both based on untenable premises and yield unwarranted conclusions.

IV. ANOTHER FEATURE OF *WILL*'S MODALITY, SUBJECTIVITY

In order to refute the arguments presented by the exclusionists, it should be proved that the semantics of *will* in the exclusionist view is erroneous and that its semantics is in fact closely related to the semantics of the other modals. This view reinforces the argument that the morpho-syntactic kinship of *will*, *can*, *may* and *must* also reflects semantic kinship. This argument alone provides enough grounds to support the view that *will* does have a solid position as a modal. However, to prove that these views are not without reasonable evidence, it would be suggested that subjectivity in the sense employed by Palmer in (2) above is not a defining feature of the semantics of the modal auxiliaries. Finally, whether the distributional tests proposed by Davidsen-Nielsen can actually be a useful test for showing that *will* has two semantically distinct forms.

The first purpose to be accomplished is to refute the claim that volition is the core semantics of *will*, which can be paraphrased into *want to, willing to* and *intend to,* for example. The preferred utterance interpretation of a couple of minimally opposed sentences containing *will* will raise serious doubts on whether it makes sense to say that *will* represents volition. Consider contexts in which a prize fighter might conceivably utter:

(14) (a) I will win a stunning victory if I ever fight him again
     (b) I will suffer a crushing defeat if I fight him again

In all possibilities, it would be most plausible that the fighter's utterance of (14a) conveys his strong intention to knock out his opponent when he has a potential opportunity. In (14b), on the other hand, it would be awkward to interpret the fighter's utterance as indicating his intention to be defeated. In a rare case such as a matching context, such an interpretation might be possible. If anyone chooses to argue that *will* in (14a) carries volitional meaning, he or she should also describe why the same meaning is not present in (14b). And if anyone maintains that volition is not a synchronic semantic feature of *will,* he or she will have to explain the intentional interpretation of (14a).

In order to understand why the intentional interpretation applies to (14a) but not to (b), it could be needed to account for a basic, informal understanding of what intention is. Let us assume that we fundamentally see normal human beings as potential agents who bring about new states of affairs in the world if they want to. This is possible as long as we have the necessary control and there are no external constraints. In other words, because we as human beings have the assumption of our relation with the world in future time, we can plan future activities and actions on the basis of those assumptions. And we also make assumptions about other people and their plans for the future. Moreover, in normal situations, we expect potential agents to choose to bring about new states of affairs that are desirable to them. On the other hand, when there is external motivation such as coercion or persuasion that operates on the agents, we expect them to choose to bring about new states of affairs that are non-desirable, or undesirable, to them. Then, intention is a planned future activity or action by an agent to bring about new states of affairs. However, it previously had no correlative representation to the agent's assumption about the course of the world. Most of the time, agents only intend to bring about non-desirable states of affairs only if they are affected by external motivation.

A reasonable interpretation in considering the semantics of (14a) and (b) would be the following. The speaker is encouraging the hearer to store I *win* and I *lose* as representations which do not have verified referential correspondence situations in the world at the time of utterance. However, according to the speaker, the representations will later turn out to have a verified correspondence relation with a referential situation in the world. Our assumption

about desirability and internal and external motivation that connects the fighter to situations of either he is a winner or a loser will determine whether we expect him to be an intentional or a non-intentional agent of the situations referred to in (14a) and (b). In other words, the type of context sensitivity involved here is a good indication that the intention meaning is a property of utterance interpretation rather than of the semantics of *will.*

Consider some possible interpretations of utterances of the following sentences.

(15) (a) I will help him.
    (b) You will help him.
    (c) She will help him.

In the case of (a), we would most likely infer intention and willingness from the speaker's utterance. However, in the case of (b), we would not normally infer that the referent of *you* has any intention or willingness to help. In fact, it would be more reasonable for (b) to receive directive interpretation. In (c), the referent of *she* might or might not appear to represent intention. This depends clearly on assumptions that are not an encoded part of the utterance. Why are the interpretations regarding the alleged basic volitional semantics so unstable? This means there is no adequate explanation that follows in a logical way from a theory that argues for a basic volitional meaning for *will.*

Above morpho-syntactical characteristics *will* has been taken out of the subject-predicate relation through semantic bleaching and moved into a higher operator position where it is bound up with tense. The purpose of the existence of the tense category is to establish a correspondence relation between the representation derived from a clause and a referential state of affairs. It is to indicate that their representation displayed in the clause lacks a non-verified referent but has a potential correspondence with a referential state of affairs in the world. Each modal auxiliary represents a different combination of potential between representation and referential state of affairs (Klinge, 1993). Only in the instance of utterance, on the basis of assumptions activated in the context, the hearer figures out whether the correspondence depends on:

i) Circumstances in the general course of the world;
ii) an intentional agent, who may be internally or externally motivated; or,
iii) whether he is himself the agent being motivated by the very utterance.

Thus all the modal auxiliaries show that the correspondence relation is non-verified but potential. And the specific place that *will* holds is that the correspondence is unverified at the time of utterance but will turn out to become verified. It is only by the assumptions that activation in a given utterance can provide the additional information whether

correspondence should be taken to follow as a result of the general course of the world, i.e. prediction and future-type interpretations, or as a result of the activities of an agent, internally or externally motivated, i.e. volition- and directive-type interpretations. If we apply such semantics to (15a) to (c) in conjunction with the informal definition of intention above, we can estimate the desirable interpretations.

Let us examine the semantics conveyed in (15a). The semantics that the speaker presents to the hearer is that the correspondence relation between the representation and the referent of *I* engaged in the activity of helping the referent of *him* is non-verified to the speaker at the time of utterance. But it will later turn out to become verified. Here, the speaker has used a pronoun referring to herself in the subject position and the subject is representing the agent of helping. From these facts, the hearer can conclude that the speaker is in full control of her own future activities, which is in this case helping the referent of *him.* So the speaker is taken to be internally motivated. So far an intentional interpretation is clearly guaranteed. If we add the specific desirability assumptions activated by the two-place predicate *help* (x,y),   then the act of helping is more desirable to the person being helped than to the person helping. When the speaker has intention to perform an activity in future time which is desirable for someone else without external force, it is the same as saying she has willingness. If there is no assumption of agent control, the interpretations of intention or willingness are immediately lost, cf. *I will receive my exam results next week.*

Let us now turn to (15b). Compared to (15a), the assumptions activated from it will turn out to be very different. In (15b), the speaker sets the hearer as the agent in control of creating the correspondence relation between the representation of the sentence uttered and the actual referential situation. That is, the speaker is saying that it turns out to be true that the referent of *you* performs the activity of helping the referent of *him.* The hearer, on the other hand, already has clear assumptions about his own future and his own planned activities. If the speaker asks him to store the representation, which is an *I will help him* representation to the hearer, there are two possible ways that the hearer can store the given utterance. Firstly, he can store it as information about the general course of the world. However, this interpretation is a bit odd because in normal circumstances he should hold better assumptions about his own future than the speaker. On the other hand, he can store it as a new assumption where the speaker has set the hearer as controlling agent of the relevant state of affairs in the world, which is the act of helping. Such an interpretation amounts to direct motivation through the utterance. It is required to be supported by some kind of speaker-authority to persuade him to store it as a new assumption about his own future activity. It is quite interesting that there are some sets of perception verbs contrast in terms of active perception with inherent agent control as against passive perception with no agent control. The examples are 'note' vs. 'notice', 'see' vs. 'look at', 'hear' vs. 'listen to', etc. If a speaker combines the verbs that specify agent-control with the semantics of *will*

and *you* as the subject, then the hearer is the underlying agent of the action. The speaker will then also inherently interfere with the future activity of the hearer and thus is taken to make the utterance for directive purposes, which is not the case with the passive perception forms, as you can see in the following sentences. *You will note the warning on the lid vs. you will notice the warning on the lid and You will look at me when I am talking to you vs. You will see me when I am talking to you.* The directive meaning is derived from the combination of the three, but not from the semantics of *will* alone. Finally, the interpretation of (15c) can be possible either way: willingness or simple future-time interpretation. In either case, the semantics is the same. There is no verified correspondence between the representation derived from the sentence *She will help him* and a referential state of affairs. But according to the speaker, the potential is that it turns out there is a verified correspondence. There are two possible ways that this utterance can appear to the hearer. The first is that the speaker intends the hearer to process and store the utterance as information about the general course of the world, leading to a future-time interpretation. The other is that the information about the referent of *she* is an interpretation or, less likely, a directive interpretation. The hearer has to figure out the interpretation on the basis of contextual assumptions. The volitional interpretation does not come from *will* and that the only contribution *will* makes is to convey that the correspondence relation between representation and state of affairs follows subsequently to the utterance. Consider the minimal pairs in (16):

[1](16) (a) I want to help him but unfortunately I cannot.

      (b) I am willing to help him but unfortunately I cannot.

      (c) I will help him but unfortunately I cannot.

  In all three sentences above, the speaker consistently asks the hearer to process and store a representation of the speaker's intention or willingness to provide the activity of helping, but the actual referential helping-activity is unfortunately blocked. However, it is not consistent to ask the hearer to process and store a representation which the speaker says will subsequently correspond with a referential state of affairs and then to say that that same state of affairs is to be blocked.

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[1] The sample sentences in this article were partly cited from literatures of Coates(1983), Palmer(1986, 1990), Alex Klinge(1993) for the convenience of explanation and discussion.

V. CONCLUSION

The point of departure was set with the question if there are reasons that support the exclusion of *will* from the semantics of the other modals on the grounds that *will* is not modal. We also raised a question if we can split it into two *wills*, one modal, on non-modal. The morpho-syntactic case shows that *will* shares the same characteristics of the other central modal auxiliaries. We need to rely on synchronic semantic arguments to understand exclusion and division. The exclusionist view considers speaker-subjectivity as the crucial feature of modality. They also argue that the central meaning of semantics of *will* is volitional or temporally deictic. Therefore, it follows that they also inevitably come to the conclusion that *will* is not modal and thus semantically fundamentally different from the 'real' modal auxiliaries.

The argument against the exclusionist view is that, first of all, meanings such as 'volition' and 'feature-time reference' are not lexico-semantic meanings embedded in *will*. Those meanings are created as a result of interpretation of utterances containing *will* against assumptions activated in the instance of utterance. Some relevant assumptions in explaining context sensitivity of sentences containing *will* have been suggested. In order to see in detail how assumptions may determine interpretation, relevance-theoretic framework in Groefsema (1995) and Papafragou (2000) could be referred to. However, neither of them considers *will* as a member of the category of modal auxiliaries. An approach based on context sensitivity can be taken, it will lead to a rather distinct interpretation of the distributional tests proposed by Davidsen-Nielsen, which was to identify two different semantic entities encoded in *will*. Different types of assumptions may be derived from different sentence-semantic environments, and through the assumptions, sentences contribute to establish given types of preferred interpretations.

Investigations on the semantics of modal auxiliaries in general should not start with treating speaker-subjectivity. It is simply a false start. Morpho-syntax and the semantics of *will* prove that *will* is a central modal auxiliary. Like the other English modal auxiliaries, *will* control the correspondence relation created by tense, which the modal auxiliaries turn into a potential correspondence relation. The correspondence relation in turn becomes verified by the existence of *will*. The same semantics applies to different interpretations of an utterance of a sentence containing *will*; whether it is epistemic, deontic or dynamic in traditional modality terms. What determines a given utterance to be an epistemic, deontic or dynamic interpretation is the assumptions activated. The overall conclusion is that idiosyncratic morpho-syntax shared by the modals reflects the semantics and pragmatics of the English modal auxiliaries and is forced also to include *will*.

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