한국통신학회논문지 (The Journal of Korean Institute of Communications and Information Sciences)

  • 제35권4B호
  • /
  • Pages.610-619
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  • 2010
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  • 1226-4717(pISSN)
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  • 2287-3880(eISSN)
한국통신학회 (The Korean Institute of Commucations and Information Sciences)
권호 표지

중계 공격을 예방하는 효율적인 RFID Distance-Bounding 프로토콜

An Efficient RFID Distance-Bounding Protocol to Prevent Relay Attacks

  • 투고 : 2010.02.06
  • 심사 : 2010.04.05
  • 발행 : 2010.04.30
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초록

최근 다양한 분야에서 사용되고 있는 RFID 시스템은 악의적인 공격자로부터의 중계공격에서 취약함을 갖고있다. 따라서 Brands등은 Distance-Bounding 이라는 개념을 이용하여 증명자와 검증자 간의 인증 프로토콜을 제안하였고, 여기에 Hancke등은 RFID의 개념을 도입하였다. 그러나 RFID의 주요 기능 중 하나인 태그 아이디의 전달이 없다는 점과, Kim이 제안한 태그 아이디 전달에서의 익명성 및 리더 태그 간에 데이터 교환 단계에서 발생 가능한 에러 체크 방법에서 태그 아이디 검색의 비효율성의 단점이 있다. 따라서 본고에서는 태그의 익명성 및 위치 추적 불가능성을 만족하고, 태그의 정보 교환 단계에서 발생 가능 에러에 대한 저항성과, 태그 아이디의 검색에서 보다 효율적인 검색이 가능한 프로토콜을 제안한다.

RFID (radio frequency identification) systems, recently being used in a wide range of areas, are vulnerable to relay attack from malicious attackers. For that reason, Brands, et al. proposed a certification protocol between a certifier and a verifier based on the concept of distance-bounding, and in addition Hancke et al. introduced the concept of RFID. However, the delivery of tag IDs, one of the main RFID features, is not still available, and there are two important demerits: anonymity in the delivery of tag IDs suggested by Kim et al. and inefficiency in finding a tag ID with regard to how to check errors which may occur in the process of data exchange between readers and tags. Therefore, this study proposes a protocol that meets the requirements of tag anonymity and location untraceability, has resistance to errors which may take place in the phase of tag data exchange, and is very efficient in finding tag IDs.

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참고문헌

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