The Role of Private Participation in FTA Negotiation : A Case of U.S., Mexico and Japan

FTA협상에서 민간참여의 역할 : 미국, 멕시코, 일본 사례를 중심으로

  • 김홍률 (동서대학교 국제통상학과) ;
  • 정용균 (강원대학교(춘천) 무역학)
  • Received : 2009.08.24
  • Accepted : 2009.09.18
  • Published : 2009.09.27

Abstract

This study investigates the role of private participation in FTA Negotiation in case of US, Mexico and Japan. We utilize Putnam(1988)'s two stage negotiation model, Schelling Conjecture and Principal-Agent(P-A) theory to understand the role of private sector in FTA Negotiation. Those theories are useful to understand the behavior and interaction of key players such as private sector, congress and government in FTA negotiation. Putnam(1988)'s two stage negotiation model divides the FTA negotiation process into two processes: the external negotiation with foreign country and domestic negotiation with domestic interest group. Principal-Agent(P-A) theory provides the theoretical foundation of Putnam's two stage negotiation model, which is that principal's interest is not identical to the interest of Agent. We showed that the private sector and congress play an important role in FTA negotiation in United States. In case of Mexico, the private sector and government occupy the dominant position in FTA negotiation. In particular, the cooperation of industry and government has been successfully established via COECE in Mexico. In contrast to these countries, the role of private participation in trade policy is relatively low in Japan and Korea.

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Acknowledgement

Supported by : 동서대학교