Journal of the Institute of Electronics Engineers of Korea CI (전자공학회논문지CI)

The Institute of Electronics and Information Engineers (대한전자공학회)
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Multiple and Unlinkable Public Key Encryption without Certificates

불연계성을 갖는 다중 공개키 암호 시스템

  • Park, So-Young (School of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, University of Central Florida) ;
  • Lee, Sang-Ho (Dept. of Computer Science and Engineering, Ewha Womans University)
  • Published : 2009.01.25
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Abstract

We newly propose a multiple and unlinkable identity-based public key encryption scheme which allows the use of a various number of identity-based public keys in different groups or applications while keeping a single decryption key so that the decryption key can decrypt every ciphertexts encrypted with those public keys. Also our scheme removes the use of certificates as well as the key escrow problem so it is functional and practical. Since our public keys are unlinkable, the user's privacy can be protected from attackers who collect and trace the user information and behavior using the known public keys. Furthermore, we suggest a decryption key renewal protocol to strengthen the security of the single decryption key. Finally, we prove the security of our scheme against the adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack under the random oracle model.

본 논문에서는 서로 다른 그룹 및 응용 서비스에서 다수의 아이디 기반 공개키를 사용하되, 하나의 복호키를 이용하여 각 공개키로 암호화된 암호문을 모두 복호화 할 수 있는 불연계성을 갖는 다중 아이디 기반 공개키 암호 시스템을 새롭게 제안한다. 공개키는 서로 불연계성을 갖기 때문에, 공격자가 알려진 공개키를 이용하여 사용자 정보나 행동 패턴을 수집하거나 추적할 수 없으므로, 사용자 프라이버시가 보장되고, 인증서를 필요로 하지 않을 뿐만 아니라, 아이디 기반 암호 스킴이 갖는 key escrow문제도 해결하였다. 반면에, 다수의 공개키에 대해서 하나의 복호키가 사용되므로, 복호키의 안전성을 제공하기 위해 복호키 갱신 프로토콜도 함께 제공한다. 마지막으로, 제안한 암호 시스템이 랜덤 오라클 모델에서 선택적 암호문 공격(adaptively chosen-ciphertext attack)에 대해 안전함을 증명한다.

Keywords

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