Effect of Board Independence on Performance: Interaction Effect with CEO's Firm Specific Experience

이사회의 독립성이 기업성과에 미치는 영향 : CEO의 기업 내 경력과의 상호작용효과에 대한 연구

This paper examines the direct effects of board independence and also its interaction effects with CEO's firm specific experience on firm performance. The findings in an hierarchial regression analysis of multiyear sample of computer hardware companies indicate that independent, outsider directors are beneficial to firms' performance when CEO has high-level of firm specific experience whereas it is harmful when CEO has low-level of firm specific experience. However, separating the positions of board chair and chief executive officer that has been used as another means for increasing board independence does not influence to firms' performance. These findings imply that researchers in corporate governance should reconsider the relative weight placed on directors' monitoring and assistance role. Rather than focusing predominantly on directors' willingness or ability to control executives, in future research scholars should yield more productive results by focusing on the assistance directors provide in bringing valued resources to the CEOs and in serving as a source of advice and counsel especially for CEO's improvement of management technique. In addition, they should pay more attention on identifying intervening processes between board and firm performance in order to provide optimal governance mechanisms and configurations to practitioners.