Nuclear Engineering and Technology

Korean Nuclear Society (한국원자력학회)
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ORGANIZATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SAFETY

  • GHOSH S. TINA (US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards) ;
  • APOSTOLAKIS GEORGE E. (Massachusetts Institute of Technology Department of Nuclear Science and Engineering, and Engineering Systems Division)
  • Published : 2005.06.01
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Abstract

Nuclear power plants (NPP) are complex socio-technological systems that rely on the success of both hardware and human components. Empirical studies of plant operating experience show that human errors are important contributors to accidents and incidents, and that organizational factors play an important role in creating contexts for human errors. Current probabilistic safety assessments (PSA) do not explicitly model the systematic contribution of organizational factors to safety. As some countries, like the United States, are moving towards increased use of risk information in the regulation and operation of nuclear facilities, PSA quality has been identified as an area for improvement. The modeling of human errors, and underlying organizational weaknesses at the root of these errors, are important sources of uncertainty in existing PSAs and areas of on-going research. This paper presents a review of research into the following questions: Is there evidence that organizational factors are important to NPP safety? How do organizations contribute to safety in NPP operations? And how can these organizational contributions be captured more explicitly in PSA? We present a few past incidents that illustrate the potential safety implications of organizational deficiencies, some mechanisms by which organizational factors contribute to NPP risk, and some of the methods proposed in the literature for performing root-cause analyses and including organizational factors in PSA.

Keywords

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