KIEE International Transactions on Power Engineering

The Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers (대한전기학회)
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A Nash Bargaining Solution of Electric Power Transactions Embedding Transmission Pricing in the Competitive Electricity Market

  • Kang, Dong-Joo (Electricity Market Technology Research Group, ETRL, KERI) ;
  • Kim, Balho H. (Dept. of Electrical and Electronic Engineering, Hongik University) ;
  • Chung, Koo-Hyung (Dept. of Electrical and Electronic Engineering, Hongik University) ;
  • Moon, Young-Hwan (Electricity Market Technology Research Group, ETRL, KERI)
  • Published : 2003.01.01
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Abstract

The economic operation of a utility in a deregulated environment brings about optimization problems different from those in vertically integrated one［1］. While each utility operates its own generation capacity to maximize profit, the market operator (or system operator) manages and allocates all the system resources and facilities to achieve the maximum social welfare. This paper presents a sequential application of non-cooperative and cooperative game theories in analyzing the entire power transaction process.

Keywords

References

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