

The Role of Northeast Asian Cities in a Global Urban Network

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Human history can be seen as a process of increased settlement formation accompanied by the integration of settlements into hierarchical networks. Integration occurs through: 1) administrative means as tribes, states, and empires extract tribute and impose order on villages while establishing intermediate points of governance; 2) economic means as surplus goods are first sent by caravan to fortified cities, then sent by periodic markets through itinerant merchants, and eventually areas specialize in production for distant markets; 3) social means as migration promotes social mobility and broadening kinship and diaspora networks; and 4) cultural means as ideas are diffused through oral and written sources and, eventually, contribute to the construction of more encompassing identities as local, national, and global communities are built. In recent decades integrative

processes around the world have accelerated exponentially. The transition continues within countries from inconsistent administrative mobilization to the more pervasive commercial integration, social networks, and global identities. Trade across national borders is growing much faster than production. Migration, sojourning for work or study, and tourism are occurring on a larger scale. Meanwhile, the information age is speeding the globalization of culture at the fastest rate of all. The process of integration has never been so relentless.

This paper considers five factors that have limited urban network formation in Northeast Asia over the past half millenium and asks to what extent are they being overcome in the final decade of the twentieth century. It briefly traces the historical evolution of these factors, while focusing primarily on policies of the 1990s that could

affect their role in the years just ahead. First, is the factor of closed national markets with weak regional integration. Second, is the preeminence of administrative means of integration over commercial ones. Third, is the character of localism, shackled by overcentralization and weak cross-border linkages. Fourth, is the limited nature of internationalism, dominated by state catch-up policies with one-sided global involvement. Fifth, is a lack of regional consciousness. Just as national urban integration was essential for regional networks to form, without regional integration it is difficult to contemplate Northeast Asian cities taking their rightful place in a global urban network.

In Northeast Asia networks of settlements have been forming for about 3,500 years. They appeared on a substantial scale first in China, then in Korea, later in Japan, and finally in areas of Siberia and the Far East settled by Russia.¹⁾ As in other regions of the globe, the presence of one far-reaching urban network set an example for nearby areas. The Chinese model of urbanization stood at the core of the region, facilitating China's reign as the center of regional civilization and the model for other countries. For at least 800 years (roughly 700 to 1500 A.D.) Northeast Asia led in the development of national urban networks, becoming the first region to make systematic use of

marketing networks linking rural and urban and enjoying large-scale administrative stability.²⁾ But over the past five hundred years this region has not fared as well, due at first to forces internal to the region and later to a combination of regional and global factors. From the sixteenth century it lacked the impetus for development observed in Europe, beginning along the Mediterranean Sea.³⁾ In the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries all of the region's countries closed themselves for long periods to the outside world, while the equilibrium between cities and states was changing rapidly in Europe under the impact of cross-national linkages.⁴⁾ The forces of concentration and centrality did not operate with the same vigor in China as in much of Europe.⁵⁾

Although East Asia urbanization of the mid-nineteenth century was substantial by premodern standards, the dearth of cities in China of 3,000 to 80,000 inhabitants left the urban network less prepared for modernization than in Europe or Japan.⁶⁾ Once modernization began, moreover, either state-led, top-down development or foreign-driven coastal development skewed settlement relations in East Asia. In Japan overcentralization in Tokyo grew increasingly problematic. In China a rural-based revolution capitalized on the widening rural-urban gap. During

the second half of the twentieth century despite the high visibility linkage of decentralization to democracy in Japan and the frequent claims to be overcoming rural-urban differences in China,⁷⁾ each country faced a worsening problem of a skewed urban hierarchy at home and a lack of regional urban integration with its neighbors. China under Mao Zedong practiced an extreme form of autarchy deeply reflected in its network of cities. Although in Southeast China the barriers fell rapidly in the 1980s and 1990s, in Northeast China they did not. Whereas urbanization there had been quite advanced, entrepreneurship was not, compounded by the presence of unwelcoming neighbors: a closed North Korea still steeped in communist thinking supportive of a closed urban system, and the Russian Far East, where such thinking had been compounded by the loss of Moscow's economic support.⁸⁾ The legacy of this problematic past limits the region's potential in an emerging global urban network of the early twenty-first century. Only in the 1980s did some of the barriers begin to fall.⁹⁾ Despite the remarkable successes in modernization across the region, many elements of the past have yet to be overcome. The legacy of premodern times and of catch-up strategies of modernization can be seen in our era. China, Japan, and Korea all considered themselves large enough to

encompass a full network of cities. Perhaps, to the sixteenth century this was true, as it essentially was for England to that time, but soon thereafter Korea's small scale, Japan's administrative city dominance, and China's meager mobilization of resources to send up the urban hierarchy all indicated that new linkages and impulses for growth from the outside that could have exerted a transformative impact were not forthcoming. Missing were both cross-national linkages of the sort emerging in early modern Europe and national forces for transformation. After the Meiji reforms and even after the Occupation reforms Japan, which from the seventeenth century had surpassed China in premodern urban network formation, urbanized rapidly, but at the expense of localism. The urban network became skewed, from the 1960s sustaining local development through the administrative tactic of pork-barrel infrastructure projects and protectionism while the Tokaido megalopolis centered in Tokyo grew ever more dominant. In recent years politicians and the media have competed to propose far-reaching programs to alter the status quo and promote decentralization (*chiho bunken*).¹⁰⁾ Prior to the communist revolution China experienced little urbanization, and afterwards it sacrificed market integration. For a long time the state was too weak to

pull urbanization forward. Even when new communist leaders built a powerful state apparatus, they relied solely on administrative means, producing an odd disjuncture without much marketing, migration, or inter-urban mobility until the 1980s. Afterwards, the restructuring of center-local relations became a high priority, vital for development but also worrisome as a threat to unity.¹¹⁾ The cold war had left national boundaries firmly closed, denying any hope for regional consciousness. That would be slow to change.

Urban networks in Northeast Asia have long ignored considerations of efficiency. Cross-border linkages have been sacrificed to nationalist notions of fortified borders. Local divisions of labor mattered little when military-industrial complexes clung to vertical criteria of distribution and transportation costs in no way reflected distance. Russia and China boosted their population in border zones variously through labor camps, exile, sent-down youths, and large bonuses paid to short-term migrants.¹²⁾

At the same time, border towns stagnated as China and Russia reduced border populations for fear of unrest and unauthorized migration. Russian urbanization relied heavily on geostrategic calculations for locating megaprojects and building up a military juggernaut, including the Pacific Fleet and services for it.¹³⁾

Mao's Third Front program from the late 1960s had this effect too by transferring industries inland away from a potential war zone.

In the 1990s border cities revived, especially in China.¹⁴⁾ They set up stalls to sell directly to Russian and other foreign visitors on shopping tours. Servicing Chinese itinerant traders crossing regularly into Russia also boosted the commercial sector in border cities. Dreams soared about a "borderless" frontier where each city could succeed in a strategy to advance from a local center in one country to a regional center over a diverse area.¹⁵⁾ Tight restrictions on migration and travel, however, soon limited urban growth. At first, towns on the Chinese side of the border grew to compensate for the difficulty of setting up business inside Russia. Later, as Russians made travel harder, some of these towns abruptly declined. Russia failed to pursue plans for free economic zones and open regionalism.¹⁶⁾ Towards the end of the decade Russian travel also fell sharply as exchange rates turned against Russian consumers. Reordering the urban networks of Northeast Asia was cut short before a regional network could gain much ground. The flawed regionalism of the past decade reveals the continued operation of factors that over the past centuries have hampered the kind of integration found in Europe.

Cities and Sub-regions

Restarting regionalism through selected engines of growth, Northeast Asia can be expected to forge new urban hierarchies. But the search for a workable model of development takes many directions with little consensus at present.¹⁷⁾ It will not be easy to find such consensus and then to proceed with policies favorable to urban integration. After all, such policies must allow criteria of market efficiency to supercede administrative controls and protectionism. The must focus on regional goals, allowing localism to flourish as long as it accepts principles of internationalism. These are difficult challenges in localities suspicious of their neighbors and fearful of falling into an economic abyss. One of the first steps to enhance market forces and link localism and internationalism is to stop concentrating on the region as a whole and begin to recognize what realistically could become integrated sub-regions in Northeast Asia. At least four prospective sub-regions can be identified.

One may form around the Sea of Okhotsk and the upper Sea of Japan. Given the fact that Hokkaido is the most prosperous area bordering these seas and boasts the largest city, it is no stretch of the imagination to place Sapporo at the top of the sub-regional network. Other cities of note are Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskii on the Bering Sea, Iuzhno-Sakhalinsk and

Magadan, and Komsomolsk-na-Amure upriver from the Sea of Japan. In addition, various ports, including Otaru, Wakkanai, and Nemuro on Hokkaido along with Vanino and Korsakov in Russia could serve as intersections along intensified sea routes. In this Sea of Okhotsk subregion of five or six million, Sapporo would dominate as some of the cities artificially bloated in the Russian North would continue to lose population. Ideas of recent years about Sapporo's more global role in the "northern forum" or more national role on the "northern silk road" need to be refocused.¹⁸⁾

A first step toward Sapporo's supremacy could come with an agreement to develop the disputed islands in the Southern Kuriles jointly under a special administration that would fudge the question of sovereignty but ensure legal and fiscal authority for economic development. This would defuse the territorial problem that has inhibited Japanese plans while also transferring power away from local criminal groups and corrupt officials who stymie investment in the Russian Far East. In 1998 the first serious efforts began to explore joint administration after Foreign Minister Evgenii Primakov had proposed it.¹⁹⁾ Yet, both Tokyo and Moscow are not ready to make the necessary concessions: Moscow by, in effect, ceding control, and Tokyo by

ending its insistence on a formal agreement by the year 2000 to transfer sovereignty.²⁰⁾

The second and, unquestionably, the primary sub-region of Northeast Asia has no existing natural lead city. The competition over the past decade has involved Niigata, Kanazawa, Toyama, and other Japanese cities along what they call the Sea of Japan,²¹⁾ Vladivostok in Russia, and Pusan in South Korea. None of these cities is ideally situated or supported by sufficient infrastructure to meet multinational needs in leading the sub-region. The obvious and much discussed answer is a new city at the Tumen river area delta, drawing on the large and currently inland hinterland of Heilongjiang and Jilin provinces in China. Through a corridor to Vladivostok Russians would be assured of a large presence in the greater Tumen agglomeration. North Korea would have the option of contributing to the city and becoming an active force in regionalism. As in the case of the Southern Kuriles, a creative approach to sovereignty under strict international authority would be essential to assure the countries of the region and international investors that the promise of a "Hong Kong" of the north would be reinforced by formal institutions including banks, courts, and a professional civil service. This sub-region would have a population of forty to fifty million and would be

balanced among four or five countries, none of which would be fully incorporated into it. The new international city at Tumen could become a dragon's head for a Korean diaspora in Northeast China and the Russian Far East, a unifying point for cooperation between North and South Korea, an entryway to the mainland for Japanese corporations rivaling the role now played by Dalian, and a force for the redevelopment of Vladivostok. But planners must make sure that an ideal vision of the city does not eclipse careful guarantees to ensure that international standards are enforced, bringing an abrupt halt to development planning.

Plans for Tumen under the United Nations Development Program have faltered in the 1990s. Russians, especially in the Far East, have been frightened by the competition to their cities and by the prospect of Chinese gaining dominance over a new seaport.²²⁾ At present, the Tumen proposal is moribund because Russians fear it and have no money for it, North Koreans shows no inclination to accept an international city, Chinese are failing to reassure regional and international forces, and Japanese do not see adequate guarantees.²³⁾ Japanese have viewed this more in the interest of an emerging rival in China than in their own. South Korea faces new financial realities at home and in the prospect of helping North Korea to avoid

collapse. It will take an overall regional plan that offers benefits and assurances to each side before Tumen can take shape. The international community must be given a primary role, perhaps through a lease such as that long held by Britain over Hong Kong. Once a special legal status is provided, authorities should make the new city home to regional institutions such as a development bank.²⁴⁾

The third sub-region must take shape inland and rely primarily on Sino-Russian cooperation. Beijing must be careful not to overwhelm the Russian Far East. The more distant the Chinese urban center that emerges for the sub-region, the larger the Chinese presence. Thus Beijing, Dalian, or even Shenyang are best left to the Bo Hai and Yellow Sea region apart from Northeast Asia. Harbin is the likely choice. It is a good match for Khabarovsk to the northeast. Completing the triangle in the northwest along the Amur river are the cities of Blagoveshchensk and Heihe, which must become twin cities working closely together. In this triangle there is no obvious dominant city. Harbin and Khabarovsk could each compete to revive their international communities as a way to show their commitment to regionalism. Both would also have a stake in the twin city arrangement in order to assure that they build a joint hinterland. This inland triangle Amur

sub-region would number about twenty to twenty-five million people.

Troubles of the 1990s and the absence of a primate city indicate that the inland triangle would be a difficult sub-region to develop. Khabarovsk authorities have opposed the transfer of an island on the city's outskirts to China and have fretted over Chinese shipping on the Amur.²⁵⁾ The buildup of a Chinese city close to Khabarovsk and provision for joint settlement of the island would accelerate regionalism, but Russians fear that China would gain an advantage while also worrying about "quiet expansionism" into once disputed territory.²⁶⁾ Harbin has squandered its Russian urban nucleus and failed to convey an international image despite its annual trade fair. Welcoming back a Russian community in part of the business district where Russian architecture remains would change its image, but Russians would be wary to move there amidst Chinese nationalism and massive unemployment, real or disguised. Indeed, the Russian media, led by populist leaders, have painted a scary image of their Chinese neighbors. The presence of an international third element may make finding bilateral balance easier in this long fortified area.²⁷⁾

Finally, further inland we can envision another sub-region taking shape around Irkutsk and a planned energy complex with pipelines through

Mongolia and Inner Mongolia in China. The total population would be small and sparsely settled even in comparison to the Sea of Okhotsk sub-region. Transportation would be least developed among the sub-regions. The international presence, however, could be substantial because of the natural resource and energy projects. Although Sino-Russian summits and the Hashimoto-Yeltsin plan of 1997-98 both held out hope for energy macroprojects in this sub-region, these were statements of political intent without serious economic underpinning or effort to win essential international political support. In the spring of 1999 Prime Minister Evgenii Primakov was beginning to make progress in getting the State Duma to pass production sharing agreements and other necessary legislation before President Yeltsin ousted him. But rising oil and natural gas prices and regional demand should eventually consummate these plans.²⁸⁾

One-by-one the prospective sub-regions of Northeast Asia have run into insurmountable obstacles. Clearly, current approaches will not work nor will grand schemes for Northeast Asian regionalism as a whole that disregard the harsh realities of the 1990s.

Balancing Regionalism and Internationalism

Would the four sub-regions led by Sapporo, Tumen, the Harbin-Khabarovsk Amur triangle, and Irkutsk form a coherent region? Symbolically, they could draw attention not just as disparate areas but as interconnected parts of the Northeast Asia frontier region. By emerging together, they could also assuage concerns in one or another country that it would be gaining little from regionalism. This diversity of leading cities together with a heterogeneous range of developmental priorities would offer clear benefits to each country. Yet, the distances in Northeast Asia are vast and transportation does not connect the various sub-regions more closely with each other than with other areas. As a result, we can presume that there would not be one urban network, but several partial networks. Northeast Asia would not form a region in the usual sense since its separate sub-regions would be oriented more to outside higher-level cities.

The higher-level cities would mainly be capitals. Since they ordinarily are centers of nationalism, they must learn to cooperate with fewer restrictions. Perhaps, a WTO agreement with China would make this possible, and some progress has been made in 1999. In

October 1998 Tokyo and Seoul agreed to closer cooperation, including dropping barriers to cultural exchange and easing the way for Japanese investment in Korean enterprises. Not only for Tumen-centered regionalism, but also for macro-projects around Irkutsk and a supportive role in the Amur triangle, cooperation between Japan and South Korea could play a large role in pushing development forward. Yet, the main challenge remains to enlist China and Russia first, followed by North Korea, as willing partners.

In Japan, China, and Russia despite much talk of decentralization the cities of Sapporo, Harbin, Khabarovsk, and Irkutsk lack the autonomy to serve as sub-regional growth centers in complex international environments. Each country will have to pass enabling legislation. In Japan as part of the "big-bang reforms" under discussion since 1996, decentralization is on the agenda. But in 1998-99 the process has slipped into the background as Sapporo's lead bank (the Takugin) was the first to collapse and financial reform became the national preoccupation. The crony capitalism of local banks should not be an excuse for tighter centralization overall; the center must put in place a system which devolves both authority and responsibility to cities such as Sapporo. Indeed, talk about consolidating Japan's 47 prefectures into roughly one-quarter that number,

each under a lead city, would be just the sort of stimulus needed for Sapporo to rise as a leader inside Japan and beyond.²⁹⁾ China has shifted from decentralization which finally made its way to Heilongjiang province and Harbin in the early 1990s back toward centralization to rein in wasteful financial dealings and smuggling. Although tighter control was justified after Heilongjiang mishandled the opening of its borders and allowed criminal elements to play a large role in trade with Russia, Beijing must not allow new controls to block Harbin's rise as an autonomous center of a sub-region.³⁰⁾ Most serious is the "war between governments" in Russia. At the center of the struggle from 1994 to 1998 was Governor Evgenii Nazdratenko in Vladivostok. Alternately, the target of attacks by Anatolii Chubais and other economic liberalizers and the subject of a deal by Evgenii Primakov or other political compromisers, Nazdratenko came to symbolize the anarchic character of Russia's devolution of power.³¹⁾ In the process of recentralization which may come after the election of a new president in the year 2000, Moscow should recognize the need for sub-regions linked to neighboring countries and grant Irkutsk, Khabarovsk, and other cities and administrative units the necessary autonomy.

Urban competition in the 1990s

followed administrative boundaries. There was little coordination across national boundaries or even within a single country. Officials in the capital comprised the main audience. Would they bestow tax benefits, export privileges, infrastructure projects, etc. on the city in question? The energies of governors focused on network-building in the capital, while minimizing the clout of reformers bent on leveling the playing field or intent on preventing pork-barrel politics from undermining efficiency. In 1993 the Hosokawa cabinet first challenged these cozy relationships, setting in motion the reconsideration of center-local relations in Japan for market efficiency. In Russia Deputy Prime Minister Chubais played the primary role in challenging the backroom deals that flourished in the aftermath of the breakup of the Soviet Union, especially as governors pressed for funds to cover rising deficits and for special control over privatization. Zhu Rongji assumed the role of market-oriented centralizer in China. In the mid-1990s the presence of these new forces in the capital had some effect in diminishing the drive for regionalism through domestic handouts. But governors never made much effort to turn to their cross-border counterparts with realistic proposals. Regionalism never went beyond the stage of dependence on the national capital. Not many cities became

network hubs in this process, and no genuine sub-region materialized. Although cities rose and fell to some degree in this process and in the opening stage of cross-border relations, the changes mainly affected points on the border rather than the big cities further inland.

The distinct globalized nature of the economies of East Asia with their high rates of industrial exports and low level of dependency on international services means that cities have benefited to an unusual degree from jobs in the secondary sector. In each country there has been a duality between protected and inefficient industries and services on the one side, and favored, highly competitive export-oriented industries on the other. The Asian financial crisis and long period of stagnation in Japan have called this model into question, particularly challenging the cozy political arrangements on which it is based.³² Meanwhile, the new rules of the WTO promise to accelerate the spread of global urban networks. Above all, we can expect increasing linkages across the Pacific Ocean as these barriers fall.

The United States and Canada are indispensable partners for regionalism in Northeast Asia. This is so because of the huge capital requirements and the great residue of mistrust and uncertain security. It is also true because these countries are neighbors

of the Russian Far East and active forces already in international discussions aimed at regionalism. Given regional rivalries, it will be easier for certain international guarantees and functions to be located in New York, Seattle, or Vancouver than in the capitals of the region's countries. Not only must Northeast Asia become an "open region," cooperation is most likely to succeed if it is based on a form of regionalism heavily reliant on internationalism.

Strategies for regionalism must stop weighing physical infrastructure far above social infrastructure. Through most of the 1990s plans centered on transportation routes, far outracing the development of human networks necessary to utilize them. If Japanese investors cannot count on legal protection for their showcase hotel in Sakhalin and Japanese tourists are fearful about traveling to Kamchatka or Lake Baikal despite the scenic wonders there, what need is there to discuss a bridge from Hokkaido to Sakhalin and another to Khabarovskii krai as if they could transform Japanese-Russian relations into a steady stream of traffic? If Russians continue to abandon the Far East while resisting the presence of Chinese and other sojourners, what point is there in discussing a new trans-Siberian highway?

Once an international community takes shape in a protected environment

in and out of the region, the social infrastructure can be expected to spread to other cities. Willingness to welcome multinational corporations, ethnic diversity, foreign investment, and other elements of regionalism will help to determine which cities rise in the urban hierarchy. Indeed, areas in different countries will also be tested for their openness. North Korea is likely to be excluded at first, and Russia will be challenged to ensure its participation beyond an initial decision required to set regionalism in motion. Initially, it will be the responsibility of China to embrace multi-nationalism in coordination with Japan, South Korea, and the US. With most of the population of the region and the most serious economic problems apart from North Korea, China stands to win the most by creating a hospitable environment for regionalism. This demands far more than Chinese have admitted in their intense coverage of regional economic issues.³³) Only through a conceptual breakthrough followed by a joint political commitment and an impetus for social networks will construction of the physical infrastructure be possible leading to the much desired economic regionalism.

A legacy of barriers to a regional urban network has plagued Northeast Asia. In the 1990s hopes soared that normalization, marketization, decentralization, and other long delayed

processes would transform the region. Yet, none of these lived up to its potential. The best prospect for the coming decade is to reenergize cooperation targeted at several subregions and relying more on the principles of internationalization. On this basis, a balance of interests may be secured, creating the necessary trust for coordinated planning of subregional growth centers and cross-border projects. A new vision of regionalism must symbolize the shared aspirations of Asian nations on the basis of a realistic understanding of how the serious barriers of the past are now being overcome. Integrated urban networks can bring great benefits to Northeast Asia only if problems of security and trust are faced early without the erroneous thinking that economics come first and solve all other problems.

Relatively closed national markets, administrative means of integration, weak localist authority and responsibility, weak internationalism, and a lack of regional consciousness are not just problems of the past that have left East Asia with urban networks far different from those in Western and Central Europe. They remain the principal barriers to regionalism at the end of the 1990s. In contrast to the optimism at the beginning of the decade when many observers expected the countries of the region to take advantage of a fresh

start, in 1999 there is mostly pessimism. Financial crisis, the North Korean missile firing over Japan, and the contrasting response to the war in Yugoslavia are but the latest forces that have reopened the divide between the two sides of Northeast Asia that was formed in the second half of the 1940s. Although security ties between China and the US defied this split in the 1970s and 1980s and trade between China and South Korea, Japan, and the US has risen rapidly in the 1990s, a sense of common community has yet to be built. By now, we should recognize that in this part of the world regionalism can only develop if there are shared ways of thinking about global priorities. Even before attention shifts to constructing the symbols of regionalism, we must recognize the necessity of building a common base of thinking about the international community. This, in turn, will be much easier if there is shared trust in the efficacy of the market as well as the fairness of emergency measures when the market is not working properly. This means that rebounding from the Asian financial crisis is a prerequisite for first internationalism and then regionalism. A second prerequisite is starting on the path of domestic reform to limit excessive administrative control and to achieve a balance between local and regional goals. If Japan, South Korea, and the United States work together

on the plans for this region, the chances will rise that the other countries, one by one, will go along. At stake is Russia's most exposed appendage reaching all the way across Asia, China's swing area between coastal dynamism and inland laggards, and North Korean isolationism. A successful strategy for regionalism could have a huge payoff for global peace and development.

Notes

- 1) Gilbert Rozman, 1974, *Urban Networks in Ch'ing China and Tokugawa Japan*, Princeton: Princeton University Press,; and Gilbert Rozman, 1976, *Urban Networks in Russia, 1750-1800, and Premodern Periodization*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- 2) Gilbert Rozman, 1981, "Urban Networks and Historical Stages," in Theodore K. Rabb and Robert I. Rotberg, *Industrialization and Urbanization: Studies in Interdisciplinary History*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 257-83.
- 3) Jan de Vries, 1984, *European Urbanization 1500-1800*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- 4) Wim P. Blockmans, 1994, "Voracious States and Obstructing Cities: An Aspect of State Formation in Preindustrial Europe," in Charles Tilly & Wim P. Blockmans, eds., *Cities & the Rise of States in Europe, A.D. 1000 to 1800*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, pp. 218-50.
- 5) S. N. Eisenstadt and A. Shachar, 1987, *Society, Culture, and Urbanization*, Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications.
- 6) Gilbert Rozman, 1990, "East Asian Urbanization in the Nineteenth Century: Comparisons with Europe," in Ad van der Woude, Jan de Vries, and Akira Hayami, (eds.), *Urbanization in History: A Process of Dynamic Interactions*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- 7) Muramatsu Michio, 1988, *Local Power in the Japanese State*, Berkeley: University of California Press,; Gilbert Rozman, (ed.), 1981, *The Modernization of China*, New York: The Free Press, pp. 378-82.
- 8) Gilbert Rozman, 1998, "Northeast China: Waiting for Regionalism," *Problems of Post-Communism*, July/August, pp. 3-13.
- 9) In China tight controls on movement, forced resettlement, and low marketization combined with provincial self-reliance led to underurbanization and low levels of urban network integration. In Japan excessive bureaucratization and undue restrictions on foreign competition led to overcentralization in Tokyo and weak integration of local urban networks beyond prefectural boundaries. In Russia military-industrial priorities led to overurbanization in the Far East. The region was separated into countries with few links to each other's urban systems.
- 10) Asahi shimbunsha chiiki hodobu, 1997, *Chiho bunken no ashioto: arata na jiji o mezashite*, Tokyo: Kojin no yusha; Yomiuri shimbunsha, (ed.), 1997, 21 seiki no koso: kuni no shisutemu to jichi no saikochiku o mezashite, Tokyo: Yomiuri shimbunsha.
- 11) Dali Yang, 1994, "Reform and the Restructuring of Central-Local Relations," in David S.G. Goodman and Gerald Segal, *China Deconstructs: Politics, Trade and Regionalism*, London: Routledge, pp. 59-98.
- 12) Victor F. S. Sit, 1985, "Introduction: Urbanization and City Development in the People's Republic of China," in Victor F. S. Sit, (ed.), *Chinese Cities: The Growth of the Metropolis Since 1949*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 1-66.
- 13) Leslie Dienes, 1987, *Soviet Asia: Economic Development and National Policy Choices*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- 14) Chinese in the Northeast showed a strong interest in how particular cities and groups of cities would gain from regionalism. Journal and conference articles focused on this, for example Cui Man, 1993, "Suifenhe shi duiSu (E) maoyi de xianzhuang ji weilai fazhan," *Dongbeiya yanjiu*, 2, pp. 73-75.
- 15) Ogawa Kazuo, 1993, *Saigo no niu-furontia: kan Nihonkai keizai ken*, Tokyo: Keizai chosakai.
- 16) Gilbert Rozman, 1997, "Troubled Choices for the Russian Far East: Decentralization, Open Regionalism, and Internationalism," *The Journal of East Asian Affairs*, 11(2), Summer/Fall, pp. 537-69.
- 17) See the series of articles in "Northeast Asia: The Search for a New Paradigm," *Peace Forum*, 24, Winter 1997/98.

- 18) "Northern Forum Symposium: Toward the New Development of Northern Regions", Sapporo: The Northern Forum, Prefecture of Hokkaido, September 11-13, 1995; "Kita no shiruku rodo to shinkansen", Sapporo: '95 shinkansen forumu hokokusho, November 7, 1995.
- 19) "Ugokidashita 'hoppo ryodo mondai': Purimakofu gaisho tojo de funiki ga ippen" *Sentaku*, 1, 1997, pp. 14-16.
- 20) Gilbert Rozman, (ed.), *Japan and Russia: The Tumultuous Path to Normalization, 1949-1999*, (forthcoming).
- 21) Many books and conferences have been prepared in Japan to discuss the Sea of Japan economic rim (kan Nihonkai keizai ken), for instance Ebina Yasuhiko, 1995, *Kan Nihonkai chiiki no keizai to shakai*, Tokyo: Akaishi shoten. See also Gilbert Rozman, 1999, "Backdoor Japan: The Search for a Way Out via Regionalism and Decentralization," *The Journal of Japanese Studies*, 25(1), Winter, pp. 3-31.
- 22) Such views have been widely reported in articles such as V. Larin and E. Plaksen, 1993, "Primor'e: perspektivy razvitiia cherez prizmu obshchestvennogo mneniia," *Rossiiia I ATR*, 1, pp. 5-21.
- 23) Gilbert Rozman, 1998, "Flawed Regionalism: Reconceptualizing Northeast Asia in the 1990s," *The Pacific Review*, 11(1), pp. 1-27.
- 24) Reports on the infrastructural needs of the Tumen urban complex, in one form or another, can be found in *Erina Report*, issued since 1994 from the Economic Research Institute for Northeast Asia in Niigata.
- 25) Gilbert Rozman, 1999, "Sino-Russian Cross-Border Relations: Turning Fortresses into Free Trade Zones," in Sherman Garnett, ed., *Rapprochement or Rivalry: Russian-Chinese Relations in a Changing Asia*, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.
- 26) Alexander Lukin, 1999, "Russia's Image of China and Russian-Chinese Relations," *East Asia: An International Quarterly*, 17(1), pp. 5-39.
- 27) Gilbert Rozman, 1998, "Sino-Russian Relations in the 1990s: A Balance Sheet," *Post-Soviet Affairs*, 14, pp. 93-113.
- 28) Essential for regional trust and international cooperation in this sub-region is a shift in Russian thinking about the perspectives for development in this area, the limitations of which can be seen in *Rossiiskii Dal'nii Vostok I Severo-vostochnaia Azia: problemy ekonomicheskogo sotrudnichestva*, Moscow: Editorial URSS, 1998.
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ABSTRACT

This paper identifies five factors that limited urban network formation in Northeast Asia over the past half millennium, questions the extent to which they are being overcome in the 1990s, and sketches a new network of cities that could boost regionalism. It briefly traces the historical evolution of these factors, including comparisons with European integration, while focusing primarily on the policies of the 1990s that have affected their continuing role. First is the factor of closed national markets with weak regional integration. Second is the preeminence of administrative means of integration over commercial ones. Third is the character of localism, shackled by overcentralization and weak cross-border linkages. Fourth is the limited nature of internationalism, dominated by state catch-up policies with one-sided global involvement. Fifth is a lack of regional consciousness. Just as national urban integration was essential for regional networks to form, without regional integration it is difficult to contemplate Northeast Asian cities taking their rightful place in a global urban network.

After noting the failures of the 1990s, the paper points to the potential role as dragon's heads for sub-regional urban networks of

potential front-line cities: Tumen, Sapporo, Irkutsk, and what I call the Amur triangle . Also of interest are how the capitals of Beijing, Moscow, Seoul, and Tokyo will adjust to a transformed urban network. After all, their current skepticism must be overcome with a program that links the benefits on all sides in order to build trust in regionalism.

This requires internationalism and symbols of a balanced approach to each country's needs.