

# Presupposition Inheritance in Conditionals

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**Kim, Kyoung Ae.** 1998. **Presupposition Inheritance in Conditionals.** *Language and Information* 2.2, 53-79. This paper is an attempt to give an account of presupposition inheritance (henceforth PI) in conditionals from a functional-discourse perspective. The focus of study is on how to evaluate the embedded presupposition (EP) nested in the hypothetical world. I propose the view that if the EP satisfies the condition on the presupposition satisfaction, it becomes background information in the relevant world, arguing against the theories which employ simple cancellation or disappearance of those EPs. The discourse processing among discourse participants is to be considered in the light of functional significance for the explication of the contrastive mechanism of presupposition and assertion. I advance a revised model of PI in conditionals and analyze several problematic cases of conditionals, with a particular attention to their DRSs. (**Ansung National University**)

## 1. Introduction

Recently, many scholars accept the idea of altering status of presupposition during the discourse. Over the discourse in which

different speakers participate it is likely that a speaker's knowledge or belief contradicts another speaker's knowledges or beliefs, consequently ending in alteration of the common ground. This paper deals with the PI, centering on the indicative conditionals. Those cases involving complementizers and world creating verbs are analyzed and the conditions which determine inheritance or non inheritance of presupposition will be investigated. It is contended that the presuppositions in the hypothetical world are not simply filtered away nor disappear, but within the associated world they function as delimiters of the context which are discussed.

The problems of PI in complex sentences arise because the anticipated presuppositions sometimes disappear and are not inherited by the whole sentence or by the speaker's reality. The phenomena of presupposition failure in the hypothetical contexts, belief contexts or reported speech contexts have been the center of controversy among the semanticists. Recently attempts have been made to solve the problems from the pragmatic or discourse perspectives. Gazdar (1979) and Soames (1982) attempt to account for it in terms of a cancellation mechanism, while Karttunen (1974) presents plugging or filtering devices, setting up specific principles for PI in complex sentences. Van der Sandt (1987) and Heim (1988) take the context acceptability approach.

I take a functional discourse approach based on the concepts of world and context and on the discourse processing between the speaker and the hearer. My view is that presuppositionality should be understood as functionally motivated phenomenon, centering around the interaction between the speaker and the

hearer. I will discuss the notions of presupposition satisfaction and presupposition accommodation for which Lewis's (1979) theory will offer part of the supporting ground.

## **2. Problems of Presupposition Inheritance in Conditionals**

PI in conditionals has long been a controversial issue among the linguists. Karttunen (1974) called the operator 'if~then' a filter since it sometimes lets through presuppositions and sometimes it blocks them. Consider the following examples. (1a) and (1b) have the presupposition (1c), as the speaker takes the truth of the complement clause for granted. (Both 'regret' and 'know' are considered factive verbs)

- (1) a. If Yuna regretted that she broke a porcelain, she would buy another.
- b. If Lisa knew that Yuna broke a porcelain, she would regret it.
- c. Yuna broke a porcelain.

Whereas in (2a) and (2b) the speaker is non committal to the truth of the EP, (2d). In (2a) the EP appears in the scope of Lisa's belief world, and in (2b) the EP goes under the scope of hypothesis induced by the protasis. In (2c) it is evident that the speaker is negative to the truth of the EP.

- (2) a. If Lisa believes that Yuna broke a porcelain, she will

- regret it.
- b. If Yuna broke a porcelain, she would regret it.
- c. If Yuna had broken a porcelain, she would have regretted it.
- d. Yuna broke a porcelain.

The following (3a) shows another kind of presupposition failure in which the EP is obviously denied by continuing assertion.

- (3) a. If he stopped smoking, it will be amazing, but in fact he never used to be a smoker.
- b. He used to smoke.

These examples show that in the conditionals the EP which is anticipated by the presupposition construction (PC) often goes under the scope of hypothesis and is not inherited by the whole sentence. I will examine these non committal cases of the EPs in the conditionals, discussing several approaches.

### 3. Review of Approaches to PI in Conditionals

Karttunen and Peters (1979)<sup>1</sup> propose the rule of PI in the

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<sup>1</sup>Karttunen and Peters (1979) claim that the set of presuppositions including the class of factive verbs, clefts, pseudocleft, etc., are in fact the instances of conventional implicatures. They propose the device of heritage expression including the information about the projection of conventional implicature for each basic phrase taking the compositional approach. They present the following rules for PI in complex sentences, where  $p^i$  is a set of implicatures associated with  $p$

conditionals such as  $p^i \wedge (p^e \supset q^i)$ . According to the rule, the presuppositions of the protasis are inherited as they are by the whole sentence but in the apodosis the presuppositions are inherited in the form of  $p^e \supset q^i$ . Consider the following examples.

- (4) a. If all of John's children are bald, then baldness is hereditary.  
 b. If baldness is hereditary, then all of John's children are bald.  
 c. If John has children, then all of John's children are bald.  
 d. John has children.

According to the rule, (4a) has the EP of the protasis, (4d), which is inherited by the whole sentence. In (4b), the EP (4d) is inherited in the form such as 'If baldness is hereditary, then John has children.', which is somewhat awkward since the apodosis doesn't seem to be a natural consequent of the protasis. In (4c) the EP is filtered away since according to the rule the presupposition of the whole sentence is a mere tautology like 'If John has children, then John has children.' The problem is that his rule sometimes produces very odd sentences as presuppositional propositions. The example (5a)

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and  $p^e$  is its truth-conditional content, extension.

- (i) Inheritance rules for complex sentences  
 a. if p, then q :  $p^i \wedge [p^e \supset q^i]$   
 b. p and q :  $p^i \wedge [p^e \supset q^i]$   
 c. p or q :  $[(p^i \vee q^e) \wedge (p^e \vee q^i)]$

shows an evidently unnatural sentence (5b) as its presupposition.

- (5) a. If Peter wins the prize, his son will buy a car.
- b. If Peter wins the prize, he has a son.

While his approach offers a descriptive account for the PI in general, it does not account for the speaker's intention and the language user's intuition. Further, van der Sandt (1987) points out that Karttunen (1974) cannot account for the PI in the discourse context which consists of more than two independent sentences. In the following (6a) his theory cannot account for the filtering of the presupposition (6b), since it does not deal with the ones beyond the sentence level.

- (6) a. If John has children, he will be happy. If his children are fertile, he will have grandchildren.
- b. John has children.

Gazdar (1979) proposes the device of presupposition cancellation by which among the potential presuppositions the consistent ones with the context become the actual presuppositions. In the conditionals in which the speaker does not commit himself to the truth of the protasis, putting it under the scope of hypothesis, all the presuppositions of the apodosis implicated by the protasis will be simply cancelled. For the above examples (4a-4c), Gazdar (1979) predicts the same results. Gazdar's mechanism explains presupposition cancellation through context incrementation but still has limitation, unable to capture the discourse participants' intention. For the following (7) his

theory cannot account for its presuppositional reading.

(7) If he killed his father, then he regrets it.

Van der Sandt (1987) proposes a notion of contextual acceptability, attempting to give an account of presuppositions as context selection in the discourse. He defines presupposition as a three place relation between sentences, contexts and propositions. Elementary presuppositions are conceived as syntactic or lexical indicators of context selection or context construction which is regulated by a number of restricting factors like context acceptability and coherence. The acceptability conditions are such factors as consistency, informativeness and logical sequence.<sup>2</sup> Van der Sandt states that 'a sentence  $\phi$  presupposes a proposition  $x$  in a context  $c$  iff i)  $x$  belongs to the elementary presuppositions of  $\phi$ , and ii)  $\phi$  is acceptable in the  $c$  extension of  $x$ . On the basis of this principle van der Sandt explains that a conditional sentence is accepted into the context if first, the protasis is accepted into the initial context and then in the extended context by the protasis the apodosis is accepted.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup>Van der Sandt presents the following principles concerning the presupposition projection: i) When a sentence has an elementary presupposition and the text resulted from the addition of the presupposition to the context is unacceptable, the presupposition is never preserved ii) When a sentence has an EP and the text resulted from the addition of this EP is acceptable, the sentence allows a presuppositional interpretation.

<sup>3</sup>Van der Sandt (1987) presents the following acceptability condition of a conditional sentence  $\phi$  where  $A(\phi, c)$  means that the assertion of  $\phi$  is acceptable in  $c$  and  $c/[x]$  is the  $x$  extension of  $c$ : If  $\phi$  is of the form 'if  $x$ , then  $y$ ',  $A(\phi, c)$  only if  $A(x, c)$  and  $A(y, c/[x]c)$ .

Van der Sandt contends that for (8), in which two readings, presuppositional and non presuppositional, are possible, Karttunen (1974) and Heim (1988) provide just a discussion of the latter reading, whereas the context acceptability approach explains the fact that the former reading is preserved with a contrastive stress assigned on *at the conference*.

- (8) If someone at the conference solved the problem, it was John who solved it.

Dinsmore (1981) presents the notions of presupposition satisfaction which was first mentioned by Karttunen (1974) and world binding function.<sup>4</sup> Dinsmore defines presupposition as given information in a certain context and a world, which is in turn defined as information stored in the hearer's memory. He presents the idea that an EP must be satisfied in the context in which the associated PC occurs, and in the world in which the PC has its referent. Associated with lexical items and syntactic structures, presuppositions may be inherited by other worlds

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<sup>4</sup>Dinsmore presents the following conditions for world-binding and filtering.

[Df. WBF] For any function  $f$  from propositions to propositions  $f$  is a world-binding function iff for any  $p, q \in P$ , if  $p$  entails  $q$ , then  $f(p)$  entails  $f(q)$ .

[W3] For any function  $f$  from propositions to propositions, if  $f$  is a WBF, then for any  $p \in P$  and any  $w_0 \in W$ , if  $f(p)$  is true in  $w_0$ , then for some  $w \in W$  (said to be bound to  $w_0$  by  $f$ ),  $p$  is true in  $w$ , and for any  $q \in P$ , if  $q$  is true in  $w$  then  $f(q)$  is true in  $w_0$ .

[G3] For any  $w \in W$ ,  $p \in P$ ,  $c_0, c \in C$ , where  $c_0$  is temporally ordered before  $c$ , if  $p \in G(c, w)$ , then  $(C(c_0, c, w) \rightarrow p) \in G(c_0, w)$ .



related by world binding function iff they satisfy the condition of satisfaction of presupposition (CSP).<sup>5</sup> Let's consider the following example.

- (9) a. [s1 Peter believes that [s2 George's crocodile ate the mayor's rabbit.]]  
b. Peter believes that George has a crocodile.  
c. George has a crocodile.

In (9a), (9c) is taken to be true in Peter's belief world and thus (9b) can be said to be true in the speaker's world. If s1 is uttered in  $c_0, w_0$  and s2 is in  $c, w$ , then  $w$  is bound by  $f_p$ , which is a world binding function. (9a) entails  $f_p(s_2)$  in  $c_0, w_0$  and it follows that (9c) is true in a world  $f_p$  bound to  $w_0$  by  $f$ . By (CSP) the presupposition (9c) must be satisfied with respect to  $w$ , i. e.,  $(9c) \in G(c, w)$ . By (W3)  $f(9c) \in G(c, w_0)$ . By assumption  $f(9c) \in G(c_0, w_0)$ . Therefore, (9a) presupposes (9b). For the PI in conditionals, he introduces the notion of antecedent information which serves to identify a world in which communicated information might be considered. He explains that the interpretation of (10a) involves constructing a complex link from real world  $w_0$  to a hypothetical world  $w$ , and then adding apodosis to  $w$ . (10b) is given information in  $w$  since any given information in  $w_0$  becomes given information in  $w$ .

- (10) a. If the King of France is bald, then the King of France doesn't wear army boots at all.

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<sup>5</sup>For detailed discussion of (CSP), which Dinsmore defines by means of entailment, refer to Dinsmore (1983:41-3).

b. The King of France exists.

I have reviewed several approaches concerning PI such as compositional, cancellation, acceptability and procedural approach. Each of them offers a different view of presupposition and gives different accounts of the PI in conditionals, though ultimately they predict similar results. Karttunen's (1974) theory has its limitation since the scope of analysis remains within the sentence level. Van der Sandt attempts to provide a construal rule of presupposition centering around three place relations such as sentences, propositions and contexts. Basically I will take the view of Dinsmore who proposes two dimensional model of PI based on the notions of world and context, but I present different accounts for PI from his in several respects.

## **4. Discourse-Functional Approach**

### **4.1. Presupposition Satisfaction**

In this section I will discuss the notions of presupposition satisfaction and presupposition accommodation and present a revised model based on Dinsmore's and analyze the Korean data. My view is that presupposition is primarily to be dealt with as a pragmatic concept, which is employed by discourse participants for the effective processing of conversation, making default inferences easier. Presupposition is defined as background information in the given world and context,<sup>6</sup> which is common

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<sup>6</sup> $p \in B(c, w)$ , it reads, 'For any proposition  $p \in P$ ,  $c \in C$ ,  $w \in W$ ,  $p$  is background information in  $c$  with respect to  $w$ '.

ground among the discourse participants or accessible information in the given world and context.

Discourse participants tend to center on the new foreground information on the basis of the common ground which they share about the world prior to the utterance, which constitutes the part of presupposition of the utterance. Basically, the speaker chooses the presupposition indicators, intending to make them unarguable part of the conversation. The focus of accounts of presuppositions is to be on how the speaker tries to convey more effectively what he intends to inform and how the hearer interprets the message that the speaker intends to convey, that is, on how the participants make use of the contrast between presupposition and assertion from the functional point of view. Presuppositions are induced by the specific linguistic features with which presuppositions are associated, but the ultimate presuppositionality of the EP is up to the speaker. The psychological reality of the participants is frequently referred to for interpreting presuppositionality and evaluating the PI by the upper clause. The EP normally becomes background information in the given world and is inherited by the upper clause if it satisfies the CPS (condition on presupposition satisfaction), but in the hypothetical or belief contexts there are cases the EP doesn't come up to the higher clause since the speaker is not committed to its truth.

In the conditionals and the utterances containing the propositional attitude verbs, presuppositions are used and interpreted in somewhat different ways from the ones in the declarative or assertoric contexts, in which the speaker is not always committed to the truth of the EP, often being neutral.

However, it seems not the case that the presuppositions are simply cancelled or filtered away to no effect. Rather, they function as signals such that the speaker wants the hearer to relativize them as background information against the hypothetical world if he doesn't object to them and to consider the asserted information on the basis of this hypothetical common ground. The information conveyed by the PCs are to be stored in an associated world temporarily and the continuing conversation is to increment the context against each associated world, organizing the communicated information according to the appropriate worlds and contexts. Now, I will discuss CPS and presupposition accommodation.

CPS is a similar condition to the admittance condition which specifies that the EP be consistent with the given context and be taken to be true by the speaker against the given world. CPS is able to check at once whether the EP satisfies the speaker presupposition condition. If the EP satisfies CPS, it becomes the presupposition in the associated world or in the world bound by world binding function. CPS is specified as follows:

(11) Condition on Presupposition Satisfaction

For any proposition  $p \in P$ ,  $c \in C$ ,  $w \in W$  the embedded presupposition  $p$  is satisfied in the given world and context iff there is no  $\neg p$  in  $C$  and  $p \in T(c, w)$ .<sup>7</sup>

By CPS, the EP which is not inconsistent, that is, which is not denied by the speaker will be presupposition, at least, in the

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<sup>7</sup>' $p \in T(c, w)$ ' reads 'p is true with respect to the context c and the world w'.

relevant world. As I argued before, the notion of world offers a good ground for the account of the presuppositional phenomena in the hypothetical and belief contexts. Morgan (1969) discussed the notion of *world* in explaining the presupposition phenomena, pointing out that in the case of world creating verbs (Lakoff, 1971) presuppositions hold within their sphere. In the following example at the utterance time the speaker does not presuppose (12b), rather the first complement of dream in (12a) acts as presupposition for the second, but the presupposition just holds in the sphere of dream.

- (12) a. I dreamed that there was presently a king of France  
and that he was bald.  
b. There was a king of France.

The notion of world used by Dinsmore, which is similar to Morgan's idea of world, is very effective in accounting for the concept of presupposition satisfaction or PI in the hypothetical and belief contexts, in which presuppositions hold in the limited relevant world and still stands in contrast to the assertion in a significant way. In the following example (13), the complement clause has the EP (13c) but it isn't obvious whether it is inherited by the whole sentence, that is, presupposed by the speaker. The PI is supposed to proceed in two ways such that the EP just holds within the sphere of the Sally's belief world or the EP is inherited by the real world, the speaker's world. In this way the EP is interpreted at least to be accepted into Sally's belief world. In this case the altered form of the EP, (13b) is inherited by the whole sentence. In (14a), the apodosis

has the EP (14b), which is under the scope of hypothesis. This kind of EP entailed by the protasis has been considered to be lost away by Karttunen (1974) and others. I take the view that the EP should remain to be considered against the relativized hypothetical world. The EP (14b) becomes the background information in the world bound by WBF, to the base world. The notion of modal subordination by Roberts (1989) supports this idea.

- (13) a. Sally believed that Peter regrets leaving Seattle.  
b. Sally believed that Peter left Seattle.  
c. Peter left Seattle.
- (14) a. If Peter has a car, his car must be out of order.  
b. Peter has a car.

Roberts contends that in the conditionals the consequent clause is modally subordinate to the antecedent clause in that it is evaluated relative to the truth of the antecedent, which is hypothetically added to the common ground, narrowing the context set.<sup>8</sup> Thus in the conditionals first the protasis is admitted into the context and then into the incremented context and in the temporarily built hypothetical context which is subordinate to the protasis the apodosis is admitted.

Let's consider one more example. In (15) the presupposition of

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<sup>8</sup>Sweetser (1996) mentions that the conditional construction exists precisely to set up a relation between a conditional mental space and a proposition which applies specifically within that space, so subordination of the apodosis content to the protasis space is part of the deal.

the apodosis is entailed in the protasis, the Gerald's belief world. The EP (15b) of the apodosis should be evaluated against the relativized Gerald's world. First, in the base world and the context, (15a) is uttered and admitted and to the hypothetical world and the context added by the protasis, the apodosis is interpreted. Since it satisfies CPS, (15b) becomes presupposition in  $c_0, w_0$

- (15) a. If Gerald believes that Lisa hated him, he will regret it.  
b. Lisa hated Gerald.

In this case the information is taken to be true tentatively in a sense, thus not globally but locally accommodated into the context. It might not hold in the real world in the end, but it stands as presupposition within the limited sphere. The hearer tends to accommodate the presuppositions to the contexts in the given world locally if he has no objection, which are later rectified or accommodated globally.

## **4.2. Presupposition Accommodation and PI in Conditionals**

Lewis (1979) presents the notion of accommodation which simply allows the insertion of the required presupposition into the context. In certain situations in which the presupposition is not among the common ground, and the hearer cannot find its antecedent, the hearer will not simply reject the presupposition, rather he will be likely to adjust his context by accommodating

the required presupposition so as to make the conversation proceed smoothly. It is seen as a mechanism devised for the efficiency of conversation on the basis of pragmatic principle. Grice's(1975) cooperative principle seems to offer the ground on which the accommodation mechanism is put into operation. The discourse participants understand that each of the discourse participants is cooperating toward the accepted goal of the conversation. The speaker believes that the hearer will cooperate and will not challenge if he himself has no evident objection. Though the speaker is not sure that the hearer already knows the information prior to the utterance, he believes that the hearer is likely to accept it into the common ground if he presents it as such. The hearer also tends to cooperate as expected and accommodate the required presupposition according to the cooperative principle and the maxim of quality.

Heim (1988) argues that in real life situations when a sentence S is uttered in a context c which doesn't admit the presupposition of S, people usually tend to adjust the context to a slightly richer context to admit the presupposition and compute i)  $c+p/c+p + S$  (global accommodation) or ii)  $c/c+p + S$  (local accommodation). In general cases people prefer the global option except for the circumstances that make the local option unavoidable.

Let's consider the following example (16). (16a) has the presupposition (16b) and if the information of (16b) has not been given before the utterance, the hearer may adjust his context to admit it, thus ending up with a non defective context by accommodation.



- (16) a. What Marianne broke is a valuable vase.  
b. Marianne broke something.

In (17a), the problem becomes somewhat complicated since the presupposition of the apodosis is entailed by the protasis and is put under the hypothesis. According to Karttunen and Peters (1979) the presupposition will be the form such as 'If Suzy broke something, then she broke something.', which is filtered away because it is a trivial tautology. However, from the discourse view of presupposition the focus should be put on how the discourse participants make use of the contrast of presupposition and assertion rather than on simple prediction of final PI. Suppose that the speaker saw Mother get angry about Suzy, but she didn't know exactly about what her mother got angry and she just guessed from the pieces of Mother's talk that Suzy broke something. This guess is likely to be true but not necessarily. Thus when she talks about this event later, it seems likely that she first presents her guessing as a hypothesis, and in the next clause this information is presupposed and on the basis of this hypothetical common ground she asserts some other thing. The presupposition is satisfied in the hypothetical common ground and functions as background information in the given world in contrast with the assertion. The prediction about the final result concerning the inheritance of the EP with respect to the real world may be the same as other theories, but the account that the EP (17c) should be evaluated against the hypothetical common ground organized in the different world from the real world gives a better explanation of the discourse processing and the psychology of

the discourse participants. In (17b), in which the EP of the apodosis is the presupposition of the protasis, if the speaker already knows that Mother is angry with Suzy because she broke something, then the EP (17c) is taken to be true in the real world and is inherited by the whole utterance.

- (17) a. If Suzy broke something, what she broke must be a valuable vase.  
b. If Mother is so angry that Suzy broke something, what she broke must be a valuable vase.  
c. Suzy broke something.

Now, on the basis of the discussion the PI in conditionals is defined as follows.

(18) Presupposition Inheritance in Conditionals (PIC)


For any sentence  $S$  which entails the form if  $S_1$  then  $S_2$ , if  $S$  is uttered in  $c_0, w_0$  and  $S_1$  serves to identify a world  $w$  (bound to  $w_0$  by WBF  $f$ ), producing the context set  $c_1$  by adding  $S_1$  to the initial context  $c_0$ , to which  $S_2$  is modally subordinate, for the EP  $p$  of  $S_1$ ,  $p \in B(c_0, w)$  iff  $p \in T(c_0, w)$  and the EP  $q$  of  $S_2$   $q \in B(c_1, w)$  iff  $q \in T(c_1, w)$ . By (CSP), if  $p \in T(c_0, w_0)$  and  $q \in T(c_0, w_0)$ , then  $p \in B(c_0, w_0)$  and  $q \in B(c_0, w_0)$ .

### 4.3. PI in Conditionals in Korean

Now, let's consider several examples in Korean. In (19) 'kesul hwuhoyhata' is a WBF which preserves the truth value of the embedded proposition. (19a) entails  $f(s_2)$ . By (W3) there is a world  $w \in W$  such that  $w$  is bound to  $w_0$  by  $f$  and (19a) entails the truth of  $s_2$  in  $w$ . By (CPS) (19b) is satisfied in the incremented context  $c_1$ , and  $w$ . By (PIC)  $(19b) \in B(c_1, w)$  and by (CPS)  $(19b) \in B(c_0, w_0)$ . The DRS diagram (20) shows that the apodosis is modally subordinate ( $\square$ ) to the protasis and the EP of the apodosis is inherited by the whole sentence.<sup>9</sup>

- (19) a.  $[[s_1 \text{ manil Yunsoo ka silpayhantamyun}], [s_2 \text{ ku nun kohyang ul ttenan kesul hwuhoyhalkesita}]]$ .  
 'If Yunsoo fails, he will regret leaving his hometown.'  
 b. Yunsoo ka kohyang ul ttenassta.  
 'Yunsoo left his hometown.'

(20)




In the following examples it is shown that the EP is satisfied

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
<sup>9</sup>Presupposition separated by a pair of lines from the left box of assertion serves as a restriction of the proposition to the left.

in the relevant world and context respectively, but not in the base world. The DRS diagrams of the cases of conditional, conjunction and disjunction are compared. The dotted line represents the potential presuppositional status.


- (21) a. manil Mihi ka Seoul ul ttenanta myun, kunye nun  
 Seoul ul ttenan kesul hwuhoyhal kesita.  
 'If Mihi leaves Seoul, she will regret it.'



- b. Mihi nun Seoul ul ttenass ko, Seoul ul ttenan kesul  
 hwuhoyhanta.  
 'Mihi left Seoul and she regrets it.'




- c. Mihi nun Seoul ul ttenaci anass kena, Seoul ul ttenan kesul hwuhoyhanta.  
 'Mihi didn't leave Seoul, or she regrets leaving Seoul.'



The following (21d) is the case of a counterfactual conditional in which a counterfactual presupposition, namely, the opposite of the EP 'Mihi left.' is taken to be true by the speaker.<sup>10</sup>

- d. Mihi ka Seoul ul ttenasstelamyun, kunye nun Seoul ul ttena nkesul hwuhoyhayssulkesita.  
 'If Mihi had left Seoul, she would have regretted leaving Seoul.'




<sup>10</sup>Fillmore argues that the verb forms of English conditional constructions can be analyzed as depending on two central factors, epistemic stance and tense structure. (So a form like 'had gone' is used for a past protasis with negative epistemic stance, and 'went' is used for past protasis with positive or neutral ...)

The following examples show the case of 'mitta (believe)', in which two ways of embedding are differentiated such as '...kesul mitkkoissta' and '...ko mikkoissta'. The former is a WBF which lets the EP go up to the higher clause, while the latter blocks it. However, in both cases the presupposition holds within the associated world. (23) shows the DRS of each case.


- (22) a. manil Mihi ka Minsoo ka ttenan *kesul* minuntamyun,  
 kunye nun sulpehalkesita.  
 'If Mihi believes that Minsoo left, she will be sad.'  
 b. manil Mihi ka Minsoo ka ttenassta *ko* minnuntamyun,  
 sulpulkesita.  
 'If Mihi believes that Minsoo left, she will be sad.'  
 c. Minsoo ka ttenassta.  
 'Minsoo left.'

(23)

a'.



b'.



Lastly, I will discuss several cases of metarepresentational use<sup>11</sup> in which the PCs are used but the EPs are not inherited since the presupposition is not from the current speaker but from the previous speaker or whoever. In the following examples, (24a) and (24b) include the PCs, '... kesul alkoissta' and 'tampay kkuntta' respectively, but they don't satisfy (CSP) and so cannot become the presuppositions of the whole sentence.

- (24) a. nay ka Yunsoo ka ttenan kesul alkoisstamyun,  
ne eykey malha keyssci.  
'If I know that Yunsoo left, I will tell you.'
- b. ku ka tampay lul kkunesstamyun, taytanhan iliciman,  
ku nun wellay tampay an piweyo.  
'If he stopped smoking, it would be wonderful, but he never smoked.'

Now, consider the following (25B) in which the EP is overtly denied. Actually the EP is from the previous speaker A not from the current speaker B. Normally in the context prior to the B's utterance, the EP is supposed to be added to construct a new common ground. However, since it is denied by the continuing utterance the EP cannot be admitted into the common ground. In this case the previous speaker A should reconstruct his context, facing objection from the speaker B. Consequently the EP does not satisfy CPS, and it cannot have the presuppositional reading.

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<sup>11</sup>Noh (1996) mentions that metarepresentation involves the interpretive or descriptive use of one representation to represent another representation which it resembles in content or in form.

- (25) A: ku ka kulekhey casanghata myun, ku uy anay nun  
hayngpokha l kesita.  
'If he is so considerate, his wife must be happy.'  
B: ku nun mihoni lase, anay ka epsseyo.  
'Since he is single, he doesn't have his wife.'

## 5. Concluding Remarks

So far, I have discussed the PI in conditionals. Normally, the EP is satisfied in the associated world and functions as background information in the given world and is inherited by the higher clause. In conditionals the EP is sometimes put under the scope of hypothesis to the truth of which the speaker is noncommittal. Many scholars have regarded these cases as presupposition failure in which presupposition is lost away. I took a functional discourse view of presupposition and attempted to offer a presupposition interpretation rule, focusing on the way the discourse participants make use of the contrast between presupposition and assertion for the efficiency of conversation. I contended that the problematic cases of PI in conditionals usually involved with hypothetical protasis are not to be explained as the cases of simple cancellation but of which the functional mechanism should be accounted for.



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