전략적(戰略的) 기술경쟁(技術競爭)과 산업(産業)·무역정책(貿易政策)

Effects of Trade and Industrial Policies in the Presence of Strategic Technology Competition

기술경쟁과 생산경쟁에 범위(範圍)의 경제(經濟)가 존재하고, 두 기업이 생산경쟁에서 전략적(戰略的) 대체관계(代替關係)에 있는 경우 경쟁기업간의 기술경쟁(技術競爭)은 적극적인 양상을 띠게 된다. 생산단계의 경쟁자를 견제하기 위환 전략적 대응으로 기술경쟁단계(技術競爭段階)에서 과잉된 기술투자(技術投資)와 기술이전(技術移轉)이 유발되는 것이다. 또한 과잉된 기술경쟁은 제품가격(製品價格)의 급속한 하락(下落)으로 연결된다. 이와 같은 맥락에서 최근 보도 된 바 있는 국산화 신제품에 대한 외국기업의 저가공세(低價攻勢)는 과점적(寡占的) 시장(市場)에서 나타나는 자연스런 현상으로 이해할 수 있다. 또한 기술경쟁단계에서 기술개발투자(技術開發投資)와 기술이전(技術移轉)은 전략적(戰略的) 대체관계(代替關係)뿐만 아니라 전략적(戰略的) 보완관계(補完關係)를 가질 수 있다. 이와 같이 대조적인 전략적 대응관계가 가능하기 때문에 국산화(國産化) 노력(努力)을 견제하고 국내시장(國內市場) 점유율(占有率)을 유지하기 위해 저가공세를 취하는 외국기업에 대한 대응방안(對應方案)으로 검토되고 있는 수입품에 대한 조정관세(調整關稅), 국산화 신제품에 대한 수요창출(需要創出), 기술투자의 채산성 보장을 위한 보조금지급(補助金支給) 등과 같은 정책변수(政策變數) 활용(活用)이 바람직한가를 사전적으로 규정하기는 어렵다. 즉 전략적 무역(산업)정책이론에서 주장하는 것처럼 관세부과(關稅賦課)나 보조금지급(補助金支給)이 국내기업의 시장점유율(市場占有率)과 기술투자규모(技術投資規模)를 향상 증대시키는 것은 아니라는 것이다.

By localizing the production of core parts and intermediate goods previously imported from Japan, Korean firms have been striving to increase their market share and profit in the final goods market in which Japanese firms are dominating. Korean producers' efforts, however, have often been thwarted by Japanese suppliers' "strategic" behavior. This competitive strategy involves Japanese exporters supplying parts and intermediate goods at very high prices until Korean firms must locally develop them, and then setting the prices far below the previous level so that the profitability of localization is dramatically reduced, or even means a loss for the Korean manufacturer. This paper intends to explain the strategic behavior of Japanese firms through the concepts of strategic interactions and joint economies. Strategic interactions can be aggressive or accommodating depending on whether competitors are dealing with strategic substitutes or complements. Joint economies exist in multi-stage competition when competition in the previous state favorably influences "profits" of the ensuing stage. Competiton between Korean and Japanese firms (a two-stage game involving production and technology rivalries) can be characterized by joint economies and strategic substitutes: joint economies since technological improvement results in more profits in the production stage; and strategic substitutes since an increase in marginal profits of one firm brings about a decrease in marginal profits of the other in a duopolitic production stage. This implies that the flood of "low price" Japense substitutes is an almost "natural" phenomenon in the context of the duopolistic market described in this paper. In the technology competition stage, on the other hand, technology development and technology transfer can be either strategic complements or substitutes. This implies that, in typical comparative static analyses, the effect of changes in exogenous variables cannot be expected a priori. Thus it becomes very difficult to determine the desirability of applying various policy measures such as countervailing duties, R&D subsidies, and creating demand for localized products. For these reasons, it is indeed likely that the measures suggested as means of circumventing the strategic behavior of Japanese firms (and enhancing technological development of Korean firms) may not work.