An Analysis of Imports by Domestic Producers of Competing Goods

메이커에 의한 수입(輸入)의 문제점(問題點)과 대응방안(對應方案)

At the outset of import liberalization, most economists expected a significant drop in the prices of domestic goods that faced foreign competition. However, it is now generally acknowledge that a significant drop in prices of those goods has not occurred. A common claim is that the prices did not drop significantly because the major importers of many imported goods were also the domestic producers of competing goods. The objective of this paper is to analyze the welfare effect of importation by domestic firms that produce competing goods, to identify the factors that facilitate such business practices, and to formulate a policy that could improve the welfare. We proved that importation by competing domestic firms definitely raises the prices of both imported and domestic goods compared to the situation where foreign goods are imported by non-producers, ceteris paribus. The intuition behind this result is that since a producer-importer is essentially a cartel, its overall profit maximization requires reduced competition between the products that it sells. On the other hand, if a producer-importer is more efficient at distrinbution than a simple importer, the comparison between the two cases is a priori indeterminate. We also find that the industries in which domestic producers are actively involved in importing competing goods are the ones in which the distribution channels are tightly controlled by importer-producers. This finding suggests that exclusive dealing contracts, which work as an entry barrier, may be the source of importing by domestic producers. We argue that in a country such as Korea, where financial market is highly incomplete, tight control of the distribution channels by oligopolistic manufacturers is likely to be an effective entry barrier that leads to importing by domestic producers of similar goods. We further argue that seemingly superior distribution costs of importer-producers is likely to be a result of market foreclosure which would disappear once the entry barrier of exclusive dealing contracts is removed. Above findings suggest that market imperfections are the source of importation by domestic competitors, which in turn constitutes a market imperfection in itself and reduces consumer welfare. As potential remedies, we considered three alternatives; direct price control by the government over the imported goods sold by major domestic producers, regulation of trade itself between major producers, and regulation of exclusive dealing contracts. For reasons both theoretical and pratical, we find that the last alternative is the most attrative. Prohibiting exclusive contracts between manufacturers and dealers in industries where exclusive dealing contracts are a significant entry barrier is expected to break up the importer-producer cartel and improve the welfare.

본(本) 연구(硏究)는 국내 메이커에 의한 동종상품수입(同種商品輸入)의 원인을 구명(究明)하고 그 경제적(經濟的) 효과(效果)를 분석하며 후생증진(厚生增進)을 유도할 수 있는 정책대안(政策代案)을 검토하고 있다. 국내(國內) 메이커에 의한 동종상품수입(同種商品輸入)은 상품간의 경쟁을 제한하며, 그 결과 수입상품(輸入商品)뿐 아니라 이와 경쟁하는 국산상품(國産商品)의 가격(價格)도 높이는 부정적인 효과를 가지고 있다. 반면(反面) 국내(國內) 메이커가 일반수입상(一般輸入商)에 비해 효율적(效率的)인 유통구조(流通構造)를 가지고 있는 경우 메이커의 의한 수입(輸入)은 후생(厚生)을 증진시키는 측면이 있으며, 메이커에 의한 수입의 순효과(純效果)는 공동판매(共同販賣)에 따른 경쟁제한효과(競爭制限效果)와 효율적인 유통구조(流通構造)에 의한 후생증진효과(厚生贈進效果)의 상대적인 크기에 달려 있다. 메이커에 의한 동종상품수입(同種商品輸入)이 이루어지는 가장 큰 이유는 메이커에 의한 유통계열화(流通系列化)이다. 메이커의 유통계열화(流通系列化)의 결과 일반수입상(一般輸入商)은 수입(輸入) 판매(販賣)에 앞서 자신의 유통망(流通網)을 조직하여야 하며, 우리나라와 같이 자본시장(資本市場)의 불완전(不完全)이 심각한 나라에서는 이는 중요한 진입장벽(進入障壁)이 될 수 있다. 본고(本稿)에서는 메이커에 의한 수입의 규제방안으로서 시장지배적사업자(市場支配的事業者)에 대한 가격규제(價格規制), 시장점유율(市場占有率)이 높은 기업간의 거래에 대한 규제(規制), 그리고 유통계열화(流通系列化)에 대한 규제(規制) 등 세가지 정책대안(政策代案)을 검토하였다.