

The Relationship between Migration and Development in the ESCAP Region

Ronald Skeldon

(Professor, University of Hong Kong)

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I. Introduction

One of the major difficulties in any discussion of the relationship between migration and development lies in the nature of the two terms "development" and "migration". Both are multifaceted terms and are difficult to define. In a discussion of development should the focus be primarily on economic variables such as GNP per capita, rate of growth of GNP per capita, or proportion of the labour force in non-agricultural activities? Or should more social indicators

such as those used in the construction of the United Nations Human Development Index—adult literacy rate, mean years of schooling or life expectancy at birth—be considered? Development tends to imply an advancement, a progress towards a better state of well-being. If we consider the situation in which many people find themselves today in the developing world, it would appear that little real "development" has taken place. Some analysts might argue that policies designed to promote development have benefited very few and have led to the pauperization of many. Hence, we have the paradox

* Prepared for ESCAP Pre-Conference Seminar on Migration and Urbanization: Inter-relationships with Socio-economic Development and Evolving Policy Issues, 21–25 January 1992, Seoul, Korea. The seminar was co-organized by ESCAP, KIHASA, and PAK.

that development can create a state of non-development. To try to seek a way out of this semantic impasse, I will restrict development to signify change, an evolution to a state of greater complexity without implying whether conditions are actually improving for the majority of the population. Despite all the limitations, I will assume the ranking of countries along the development continuum, on the basis of per capita GNP as provided by the World Bank to identify specific levels of development.¹

Migration, too, is a term that conveys an apparently simple idea but one that has proved extremely difficult to measure in practice. A "migration" signifies a more or less permanent move to another place over considerable distances but, in an examination of the whole issue of population movement and development, both short-term and long term as well as local and international moves should be considered. To cover this range of different types of movement "population mobility" may be a better term. However, given the wide acceptance of the word "migration", it will still be used in this paper, although its use will be restricted as much as possible to more permanent moves. That is, migration is a subset of mobility.

It is the fundamental premise of this paper that there can be no development without the creation of new forms of spatial mobility. Population mobility is thus an integral part of the development process; it both causes and is caused by changes in the economic and social structure of an area. It is thus incorrect to see migration as either positive or negative for development but as part of the whole process of change that is implied in the term "development". There can

be no development without migration and no significant redistribution of population without development.

At a very simple level, there is a clear relationship between economic development and demographic variables. The most developed countries have the highest levels of urbanization (generally more than 70 percent of the total population), they tend to be characterized by urban-to-urban population movements and by a tendency towards the spatial deconcentration of population, and they have low fertility and low rates of infant mortality. The least developed countries, however, have low levels of urbanization (generally less than 20 percent of the total population), they tend to be characterized by circular rural-to-rural population movements with a slight trend towards population concentration, and they have high fertility and high rates of infant mortality. In Asia, Japan and the Republic of Korea are examples of the most developed countries and Bangladesh, the Lao People's Democratic Republic and Nepal are among the least developed countries, on the basis of ranking by the World Bank. Basic data are included in table 1. Between these development extremes lie a whole range of countries which usually show increasing levels of population concentration with their World Bank development ranking, and decreasing fertility and infant mortality rates.

Governments and policy-makers are often alarmed by the volumes of population movement within a country or by the amount of emigration from a country. However, as these are as much a product of the very same development goals that governments are seeking to promote

as they are due to other factors, governments must learn to accommodate rather than restrict the flows. The available evidence suggests that there is little that governments can do over more than the short term to reverse or modify profoundly the direction of population flows through direct policy intervention on how or to where people should move. There are, nevertheless, other types of policies that governments can implement that will influence the way in which the migration system evolves and these will be discussed in the conclusion of this paper. They are also the subject of a separate paper at this meeting.

II. The mobility transition

The principal trends of these long-term shifts revolve around a period of marked concentration of population in urban centres, followed by a period of deconcentration once the proportion of urban population is about 70 percent of the total population of a country. The changing patterns of population movements have been conceptualized into a developmental path called the "mobility transition", the core of which is that there are "patterned regularities in the growth of personal mobility through space-time during recent history, and these regularities comprise an essential component of the modernization process".² The mobility transition in both its original and its modified forms is a systematic sequence of change in the spatial pattern of population movements over time (figure 1). Fundamental to the transition is the relative balance between short-term mobility and long-term movements as urbanization proceeds.

From a fluctuating pattern of various types of mostly short-term circular mobility, there is a gradual increase in the volume of circulation as development proceeds, mainly over short distances to local urban centres at first, then over longer distances, until the volume is massive and mainly directed towards the largest cities. There is then a progressive reduction in turnover of mobility as migrants spend longer and longer at urban destinations until a stage of predominantly permanent migration is reached. Later, the volume of this long-term and permanent migration declines, more short-term circulation in the form of commuting once again becomes dominant, and there is a trend towards a deconcentration of urban population through permanent moves to intermediate or smaller urban areas and the establishment of urban enclaves in villages. As societies undergo this transition in mobility pattern, the urban and rural sectors are completely transformed.

Mobility change does not follow an identical path in every society in the way originally conceptualized by Zelinsky. Forms of mobility and the rate at which they change are modified by local cultural factors, by the type of settlement systems and by the directions of government policy. However, as population mobility represents interaction between origin and destination areas, it is the timing of the linking of each origin area to the global system that is all important. Hence, the most important modifications to the way in which the mobility system develops are caused by the time at which the mobility sequence commences. The rate of change of mobility types will be different in a society only recently linked to a dynamic growth area com-

Table 1. Basic Developmental Characteristics in the Main Areas of Asia and the Pacific, 1989

Country	Total population in mid-1989 (millions)	1989 GNP per capita (\$US)	Life expectancy 1989	Total fertility rate 1989	Urbanization %		Proportion of GDP generated from:		Services			
					1965	1989	Agriculture 1965	1989	Industry 1965	1989	1965	1989
Japan	123.1	23,810	79	1.7	67	77	10	3	44	41	46	56
Singapore	2.7	10,450	74	1.9	100	100	3	0	24	37	74	63
Hong Kong	5.7	10,350	78	1.6	90	100	2	0	40	28	58	72
Taiwan	20	6,389	73	1.7	50*	71	—	5	—	41**	—	54**
Republic of Korea	42.4	4,400	70	1.8	32	71	38	10	25	44	37	46
Malaysia	17.4	2,160	70	3.7	26	41	28	23	25	30	47	47
Thailand	55.4	1,220	66	2.5	13	22	32	15	23	38	45	47
Philippines	60.0	710	64	3.9	32	41	26	24	28	33	46	43
Indonesia	178.2	500	61	3.3	16	30	56	23	13	37	31	39
Sri Lanka	16.8	430	71	2.5	20	21	28	26	21	27	51	47
Pakistan	109.9	370	550	6.6	24	32	40	27	20	24	40	49
China	1,113.9	350	70	2.5	18	53	44	32	39	48	17	20
India	832.5	340	59	4.1	19	27	44	30	22	29	34	41
Nepal	18.4	180	51	5.7	4	9	65	58	11	14	23	28
Bangladesh	110.7	180	51	4.9	6	16	53	44	11	14	5	7
Laos People's Democratic Rep.	4.1	180	49	6.7	8	18	—	—	—	—	—	—
Viet Nam	64.8	—	66	4.0	—	22	—	—	—	—	—	—
Papua New Guinea	3.8	890	54	5.1	5	16	42	28	18	30	41	42
Solomon Islands	0.313	580	64	6.8	—	11	—	—	—	—	—	—
Kiribati	0.069	700	55	4.0	—	36	—	—	—	—	—	—
Samoa	0.163	700	66	4.5	—	23	—	—	—	—	—	—
Vanuatu	0.152	860	64	6.0	—	30	—	—	—	—	—	—
Tonga	0.098	910	67	3.8	—	21	—	—	—	—	—	—
Fiji	0.740	1,650	67	3.0	—	44	—	—	—	—	—	—

Sources: *World Development Report 1991*, Oxford University Press, 1991; *Asia 1990, Yearbook*, Hong Kong, Review Publishing Company, 1990; *1990 ESCAP Population Datasheet*, Bangkok, 1991.

* Estimate for 1970

** Estimate for 1989

pared with mobility change in areas where initial contact was many decades ago. The later the linking, the faster the rate of change from one mobility type to another will occur and the greater the probability that there will be telescoping of the various phases. For example, the rate of economic change has clearly been accelerating over the last two hundred years. The United Kingdom took 58 years to double its output per person starting in 1780, Japan took 34 years to do so starting in 1885, but the Republic of Korea has taken only 11 years from 1966 and China 10 years from 1977.³

The systematic shift in mobility can thus be conceptualized as a diffusion system based around the expansion of activities out of core developed countries in Europe and North America into developing areas. The core expands spatially as clear regional divisions of activity emerge the new international division of labour. The boundaries between these regions are constantly changing as the capitalist system penetrates the hinterland to produce ultimately a "global system". Many analysts already argue that the era of the global system has already arrived and, unquestionably, many corporations now operate on a global scale. Nevertheless, many large parts of the world are still tenuously linked to a global system either because of inaccessibility to core areas, lack of appropriate resources or deliberate political decision. The mobility transition has thus a considerable way to go in several parts of the developing world, including Asia. Not that the transition ever ends: with advanced levels of development new forms of mobility can be expected to evolve.

In Asia, Japan is clearly the core develop-

ment area. It is the second wealthiest country in the world after Switzerland in terms of GNP per capita and the second largest industrial nation in the world after the United States of America in terms of value added in manufacturing. Moving away from Japan in level of development we find a series of zones, not in any neat concentric spatial pattern but in avenues of penetration in the Asian hinterland. The first zone is made up of the four Asian "tigers": the Republic of Korea, Taiwan Province of China, Hong Kong and Singapore. Inland from these is a third zone consisting of part of coastal China, Malaysia, Indonesia, and also to some extent the Philippines as an outlier to the system. Inland again from the mainland zones is a fourth zone consisting of most of the interior of China, and Viet Nam, Lao People's Democratic Republic and Cambodia. The South Asian region forms another outlier with its own series of irregular concentric zones; there is no single dynamic core area here such as Japan, and there is no major diffusion of capital out from the most developed part of this region towards the periphery. National economies there are evolving more in isolation from each other and are more the product of indigenous factors than they are in East and South-East Asia. Nevertheless, there are development gradients away from a series of urban regions in India and Pakistan towards Bangladesh, Myanmar, Nepal and northern and western Pakistan.

The use of the nation state to define the various zones is of course deceptive as there are clear development gradients within countries, and these gradients are greater in the largest countries. It might therefore be better to identi-

fy a series of urban-industrial regions that channel investment, knowledge and people among themselves in a hierarchical system. However, the data needed to delineate such a system are difficult to find and government policy operates primarily at the level of the state. Hence, a balance between state policy and hierarchical penetration must be maintained in the analysis of development and migration. Linking these two levels will be a major challenge in any analysis of development and migration.

The advantage of conceptualizing mobility within the core-to-periphery diffusion framework outlined above is that both international and internal migration can be incorporated within the same system. These are often considered quite different types of mobility controlled by different forces but in this paper it is argued that they are part of an integrated system. A global urban hierarchy is evolving around a series of global or world cities down through regional centres, national capitals, provincial centres, towns and villages. It will be argued that the mobility transition—the evolution of spatial forms of mobility—diffuses down through urban and social hierarchies so that relatively wealthier groups in each settlement class initiate or engage in new forms of movement before poorer groups, and larger settlements are affected before smaller settlements.

The focus on diffusion also raises linkages between mobility and the other two demographic variables, fertility and mortality, but particularly with fertility. The apparent lack of any direct relationship between fertility decline and economic variables has caused some investigators to seek an explanation in "ideational shift" or a

shift in ideas that favour smaller numbers of children and the adoption of contraception.⁴ The change in ideas is a result of a diffusion process and it may be that population mobility plays a key role in transmitting these ideas into the region of origin. There is some evidence for fertility decline diffusing down a social hierarchy as well, although an exact congruence between the demographic transition and the mobility transition is not necessarily to be expected.

The essence of the above argument is that, if we are to understand migration, attention has to be directed towards the spatial and temporal dimensions of the macro-level institutional factors operating an economy and society and away from an individualistic decision-making interpretation of mobility. While there is no single rigid sequence of mobility change that all societies must follow, there is enough of a common theme to justify a transitional model. And the core of that model must be the transition to an urban society that can be seen to a greater or lesser extent in all societies.

III. Origin and destination factors

This transition reflects a shift from a village-based economy, which through circulation initially absorbs the urban sector as an additional resource niche in the peasant household economy. This is logical with a system of peasant household farming that seeks to minimize risk through utilizing land in different ecological niches. Much of this circulation will be seasonal in the slack period between harvest and planting and is, in the first instance, often dominated by males. The issue of female migration is to be

considered in another paper at this meeting. Let it suffice to say here that one important factor in influencing the sex composition of the migrant flow is whether the communities of origin are male or female farming areas;⁵ that is, areas where subsistence farming is carried out mainly by males or by females. If the latter is the case, as in Papua New Guinea and in much of sub-Saharan Africa, then males may be "freer" to move and, where males play a key role in agriculture, then women may quickly enter the migrant flows. Not only does the circulation give access to another resource base, hence decreasing risk, but it also allows a more optimal use of labour throughout the year. Rural household heads may seek to have more long-term access to the urban areas through designating family members whose labour is surplus to local requirements to more permanent urban jobs.

This transition cannot be understood entirely with reference to the peasant household economy. The changing nature of labour demand in the destination areas also need to be considered. Where this is essentially for unskilled male workers as in the construction industry, for example, this will favour short-term circulation. A demand for unskilled or semi-skilled female labour which can easily be dismissed in times of recession or when women wish to marry may encourage long-term circular movements. However, once industrialization becomes more capital-intensive, there is a demand for more highly trained manpower and a labour force that is not continuously turning over. The cost of training manpower becomes a more important consideration. This is a factor favouring an evolution to-

wards more permanent migration from other urban centres or from rural areas of origin where the population has sufficient levels of education. Hence, the nature of industrialization in the various parts of the region conditions to some extent the patterns of migration.

IV. Changing patterns of mobility in Asia consequent upon development

1. Internal movements

It must be emphasized at the outset that data allowing direct comparison from one country to another do not exist. Different definitions of "urban" and different ways of measuring migration complicate any analysis. Rather than retreating into a national isolationism at a time when global influences are growing, we must make an attempt at comparison. The actual numbers, however, cannot be compared and must be seen as indicative of general trends only.

Population mobility can usefully be seen within the context of national and international divisions of labour consequent upon the penetration of a frontier of industrial development, as described above, forming a series of discontinuous bands. In Asia, the core region of Japan embarked upon its industrialization from the second half of the nineteenth century. The proportion of urban population as defined by those in "densely inhabited districts: had reached 30 per cent by 1920, was about 34 per cent after the devastation of the Second World War but had grown to 76 per cent in 1980, since when the proportion has remained virtually constant.⁶ Migration from non-metropolitan

to metropolitan areas accounted for around one third of total movement by the mid-1950s and reached its greatest relative importance in the early 1960s (table 2). As Japan became increasingly urban, the movement to that sector declined proportionately (after 1961) and absolutely (after 1970), with movement among metropolitan centres increasing. The proportion of movements within the non-metropolitan sector decreased slightly over the period 1954-1980, while that from metropolitan to non-metropolitan sectors increased. Defining these movements in terms of whether they were intraprefectural or interprefectural, and assuming that the latter were more likely to be over longer distances, there was an increase in the proportion of long-distance movements from the mid-1950s to the early 1970s, since when short-distance moves again accounted for more than half of the total moves, probably reflecting the growing importance of suburbanization. Perhaps the most interesting feature of recent migration in Japan has been the continuous absolute decline in migration of all types since about 1973, which has been brought about at least partially by changes in the age composition of the Japanese population. With the aging of the population, there are fewer people in those groups most likely to migrate. However, necessary cycles and the urban residence of most of the population may also help to account for the decline.

Turning to the next zone, the newly industrializing economies (NIEs) of the Republic of Korea, Taiwan Province of China, Hong Kong and Singapore can be considered the second labour frontier in Asia. All four economies

have experienced extremely rapid growth, all four are oriented towards the international market and all four have moved from high to low levels of fertility. Not that their development paths have been entirely the same: the role of multinational capital in Singapore has been much greater than in the other three areas; import substitution industrialization was never a development phase in Hong Kong and Singapore have not; and Japanese and later American involvement have been much greater in the Republic of Korea and Taiwan Province of China, for example. However, all have undergone economic and social transformation over the last 30 years to attain levels of prosperity that will soon rival those of the developed countries. The Republic of Korea and Taiwan Province of China have clearly moved from labour-intensive industrialization and the production of cheap, low quality goods for the domestic market to a capital-intensive industrialization producing high quality products for export. Hong Kong has moved from labour-intensive industrialization to a service-based economy while Singapore has combined a transition to both capital-intensive industrialization and the creation of a service economy.

Both the Republic of Korea and Taiwan Province of China were essentially rural,⁷ unlike the two city territories of Hong Kong and Singapore. Strictly comparative data are available for only a brief period but, if we take the population in cities of 50,000 or more, both countries passed the threshold of 50 per cent of the total population living in such centres between 1970 and 1975. In 1990, 71 per cent of the populations of both the Republic of Korea and Tai-

Table 2. Annual Number of Migrants in Japan and the Republic of Korea

Year	Japan			Republic of Korea		
	Total	Intra-prefectural migration	Inter-prefectural migration	Total	Intra-prefectural migration	Intra-prefectural migration
1954	5,498	3,146	2,353			
1955	5,141	2,914	2,227			
1956	4,860	2,738	2,122			
1957	5,268	2,888	2,380			
1958	5,294	2,914	2,381			
1959	5,358	2,915	2,443			
1960	5,653	2,973	2,680			
1961	6,012	3,060	2,952			
1962	6,580	3,277	2,303			
1963	6,937	3,464	3,473			
1964	7,257	3,622	3,634			
1965	7,381	3,688	3,692			
1966	7,432	3,748	3,684			
1967	7,479	3,718	3,761			
1968	7,775	3,838	3,937			
1969	8,126	4,010	4,116			
1970	8,273	4,038	4,235			
1971	8,360	4,103	4,257			
1972	8,350	4,193	4,157	3,688	2,619	1,067
1973	8,539	4,304	4,234	4,860	3,436	1,425
1974	8,027	4,094	3,932	5,298	3,709	1,589
1975	7,544	3,846	3,698	9,011	6,143	2,868
1976	7,392	3,827	3,565	6,773	4,620	2,153
1977	7,395	3,828	3,568	7,398	5,234	2,163
1978	7,292	3,804	3,487	8,410	5,867	2,543
1979	7,295	3,826	3,469	7,324	4,975	2,350
1980	7,067	3,711	3,356	8,259	5,653	2,606
1981	6,901	3,583	3,318	8,195	5,401	2,793
1982	6,852	3,564	3,288	8,616	5,806	2,816
1983	6,674	3,478	3,196	9,796	6,585	3,211
1984	6,559	3,422	3,137	9,043	6,034	3,009
1985	6,482	3,365	3,117	8,679	5,754	2,925
1986	6,468	3,339	3,129	8,660	5,639	3,021
1987	6,536	3,365	3,171	9,309	6,065	3,243
1988	6,465	3,328	3,137	9,669	6,617	3,352
1989	6,618	3,359	3,159	9,316	6,127	3,190

Sources : (a) *Jpan Statistical Yearbook*, various years, and H. Kawabe, 1984, "Internal migration", in *Population of Japan*, United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, Bangkok, Country Monograph No.11, p. 126.

(b) *Korea Statistical Yearbook*, various years.

wan Province of China were classified as urban. The shift from rural-to rural migration to rural-to-urban movements from the 1930s to the early 1980s is clear from national sample survey data for the Republic of Korea. Until the second half of the 1950s, internal migration within the republic of Korea was dominated by rural-to-rural movements, even if urbanization had been given a boost in the late 1940s (compare India and Pakistan) by migrants returning from Japan and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea because of changed political circumstances. The period from the mid-1950s to the early 1980s was one of intense rural-to-urban movement, with only a slight trend towards a relative decline in the importance of these flows in the 1980-1983 period. The proportion of movement that is accounted for by rural-to-rural migration declined from about 30 per cent in the mid-1950s to 14 percent in 1980-1983 (table 3). Although there have been fluctuations in the total number of migrants from year to year in the Republic of Korea, there has as yet been no evidence of a sustained decline in total number of movers, as in the case of Japan (table 2). Migration appears to have stabilized at a fairly high rate, having increased from around 15 per cent of the total population moving annually in early 1970s to around 22 percent in the late 1980s. If we consider long-distance interprovincial flows only, between 3 and 4 per cent of the total population moved across provincial boundaries every year in the early 1970s and this rose to between 7 and 8 percent in the 1980s.

Comparable data do not appear to be readily available for Taiwan Province of China. That

area, too, has experienced intense urbanization and a transition to an urban manufacturing economy. However, the information available shows that movement to the largest cities intensified markedly during the 1963-1974 period and, although it has continued at significant levels the movement to the largest cities slowed after 1975 as satellited cities and suburbs emerged as major destinations. The establishment of industrial enterprises in rural areas also helped to slow urbanization throughout the transition to an advanced economy.

The third tier of the international division of labour comprises Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and, to a lesser extent, the Philippines. With the exception of the Philippines, economic growth rates have been moderate over the last 25 years, although accelerating in most cases over the last decade. Levels of urbanization are much lower than in the countries and areas previously discussed, ranging from a low of 22 per cent in Thailand to a high of 42 percent in the Philippines and Malaysia in 1989.⁵ Urban areas in Thailand have been seriously underbounded for some considerable time - in 1990, the urban population was perhaps about 20 percent lower than the "real" figure, for example - so that country may not be so very much more rural than the other countries in this group as might at first appear.

Interpretations of migration in Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia up to 1970 emphasized the importance of rural-to-rural movements, and of short-term circulation from village to village and village to town, and the relative unimportance of permanent rural-to-urban migration.⁸ The interpretations based on the 1980

clines (table 3). For example, in Thailand, total mobility appears actually to have declined from the period 1965-1970 to the period 1975-1980. Within this overall trend, there was a marked decrease of movement within the rural sector and an increase within the urban sector: only

round of censuses revealed that, although all forms of mobility were still important in these countries during the 1970s, there were marked increases in the proportion of urban-to-urban and rural-to-urban flows, while the rural-to-rural flows showed substantial proportional de-

Table 3. Time Series Data on Intersectoral Flows of Internal Migration: Various Countries, Various Years (percentages)

Country	Urban to urban	Rural to urban	Urban to rural	Rural to rural
Republic of Korea				
1) 1955-60	18.2	46.4	5.7	29.2
2) 1961-69	23.1	48.7	4.6	23.6
3) 1970-79	21.4	55.9	7.0	15.2
4) 1980-83	25.7	50.5	9.0	14.1
Peninsular Malaysia				
1) Before 1970	33.1	15.3	12.3	39.3
2) 1971-80	21	16	18	45
Thailand				
1) 1965-70	10	12	6	72
2) 1975-80	18	15	10	56
India				
A. Total migration				
1) 1961-71	13.6	16.5	7.9	62.0
2) 1971-81	15.2	19.5	7.9	57.4
B. Interstate migration				
1) 1961-71	32.6	27.5	10.2	29.7
2) 1971-81	31.8	31.1	9.7	27.4

Sources : Republic of Korea : *Internal Migration and Socio-Economic Development : Secondary Analysis of National Migration Survey*, Seoul, Korea Institute for Population and National Bureau of Statistics, 1986, p.106.

Malaysia : *General Report of the Population Census*, Kuala Lumpur Department of Statistics, 1983, p. 77.

Migration, Urbanization and Development in Malaysia, Bangkok, ESCAP, 1982, p.58.

Thailand : P. Chintana, S. Goldstein, and A. Goldstein, *Migration : 1980 Population and Housing Census*, Bangkok, National Statistical Office, 1984, P. 58 and table 5.

India : R. Skeldon, "On migration patterns in india during the 1970s", *Population and Development Review*, Vol. 12, 1986 : 765.

10 per cent of five-year migrants moved within the urban sector in 1970 but this proportion increased to 18 per cent in 1980. These figures and the fact that the proportion of rural-to-urban migration increased slightly over the period suggest that much of the concentration in large urban centres, essentially Bangkok, was due mainly to movements from smaller urban centres. Movements within the rural sector declined from 72 per cent in 1970 to account for only 56 per cent in 1980. In Malaysia, too, rural-to-urban movements up to 1980 were not particularly significant with urban-to-urban (suburbanization and movement up the hierarchy) and rural-to-rural (to land settlement schemes) migrations being much more important. Owing to respondent errors known to exist in both the 1970 and the 1980 censuses of Malaysia, little weight can be given to any trends that might be shown in the comparison of the two data sets (table 3).

Overall rates of mobility in these countries, and particularly Indonesia and Thailand, as derived from census data, are low. However, it is well known that the censuses cannot capture the types of population most typical of these areas and survey data and village-based studies have shown dramatic increases in human circulation since the early 1960s. One study from the central plains of Thailand showed a tripling in the number of seasonal movers from the late 1950s to the mid-1960s, with further substantial increases occurring over the succeeding decade. Most of this movement was directed towards Bangkok. This group of countries - a frontier for investment in the 1970s - were still by 1980 dominated by village based movement

and much lower levels of urbanization than the previous "four tigers" economies. That said, however, this region now appears to be embarked upon a period of more intense urbanization and industrial development, with the rapid growth of the large cities of Kuala Lumpur, Jakarta and Bangkok.

Beyond this third tier of countries in South-East Asia lies a labour frontier that has yet to be incorporated into the international division of labour. This is made up of a group of countries that have followed some form of central economic planning and often revolutionary socialist principles: Viet Nam, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Cambodia and Myanmar. Very little is known of the pattern of recent migration in these countries except that the state plays an important role in directing population movement. In Viet Nam, for example, there have been policies to move people away from the main urban areas, particularly in the south of the country (which had been swollen during the war), and away from the densely settled rural areas in the north-east towards new economic zones (NEZs) in the south and west. The numbers moved to NEZs have been substantial, although considerably less than targeted, and may have reached nearly 1.5 million during the last half of the 1970s with somewhat smaller but significant numbers being resettled since 1980.⁹ Numbers resettled can be deceptive as it is likely that there have been large return flows to the home areas from the NEZs but there are, as yet, no precise estimates of these numbers. Viet Nam and possibly the other three countries appear to be still dominated essentially by migration within and to the rural sector. It is from

this region, too, that most of the refugees in East and South-East Asia have moved, most going to neighbouring countries and areas, primarily Thailand, but also to China and Hong Kong.

Omitted from the discussion so far are the two demographic giants, China and India, and the countries surrounding India. These countries, together with those just discussed, encompass the poorest economies of Asia as defined by World Bank indicators. The huge areal extent and the internal variety of China and India make it hardly meaningful to draw national-level conclusions on migration and development. There exist within these countries highly developed niches while, at the same time, the hinterlands remain some of the poorest regions in Asia. China can be seen within the spatial tiered system outlined earlier to the extent that the coastal region is becoming a source of labour for industries that are "exported" from Japan and the other four Asian newly industrializing economies. For example, there are perhaps three times as many people employed in Hong Kong manufacturing enterprises around the Pearl River delta in China than there are in Hong Kong itself, whether companies wholly or partly owned by Hong Kong entrepreneurs or producing goods for Hong Kong companies. Investment from the Republic of Korea and Taiwan Province of China is also being funnelled into this region and also into Shandong and Fujian provinces. After several decades during which population movement was tightly controlled, the post-1978 reform period has been marked by increasing volumes of mobility of all types, but particularly short-term circulation to

coastal urban regions (forming the so-called "floating population").¹⁰ The introduction of the responsibility system in rural areas and the decline of the commune system have revealed rural labour surpluses as peasants have begun to respond to market forces; and the relaxation of policies limiting mobility and the acceptance of urbanization as an integral part of development have also contributed to the increased mobility. The most important factor, however, remains foreign investment and the demand created by the movements of labour-intensive industries out of the NIEs and Japan—a demand for both male (for example, in construction) and female (for example in textiles) labour.

The situation in South Asia is more complex. More distant from the core economies of East and South-East Asia, it is an outlier between these regions and Europe. In terms of value added in manufacturing, India ranks eleventh in the world. Four of the 28 urban agglomerations with a population projected to be 8 million by the year 2000 will be in India, with an additional two elsewhere in South Asia.¹¹ Yet, as in China, there are large areas and large populations that have been little influenced by modern development. Population mobility throughout the region is still dominated by rural-to-rural migration, the majority of which is local movement for marriage. In considering long-distance migration only (interstate in the context of India and interprovince in Pakistan), urban-to-urban moves are as important, if not more important, than rural-to-rural flows, showing the importance of movement up the hierarchy helping to account for the more rapid growth of the largest cities. Rural-to-urban moves in both

India and Pakistan were relatively small in the 1960s. However, during the 1970s, these movements, in India at least, became much more important with an upsurge of migration to local urban centres as well as to the largest cities. During this period, too, there was a drop in the relative importance of rural-to-rural movers, even if the absolute number of these migrants continued to increase. Away from the "core" regions of South Asia, in Sri Lanka (at least until the recent political unrest) and in Nepal, migration is dominated by rural-to-rural moves. Urbanization is still extremely low in Nepal (9 per cent in 1989) but, increasingly, population flows are developing to urban centres outside the country, mainly in India. Beyond these countries again lies an area which is relatively untouched by modern development in Afghanistan and western China (Tibet), areas that are primarily rural and that have been characterized by refugee movements.

2. International movement

While some of the movement discussed above has involved the crossing of international boundaries (particularly refugee movements), most has been internal. Migration out of Asian countries has a long tradition: the southern migration of the Chinese peoples into the Nanyang, for example, dates back centuries. During the era of modern nations, many the direct product of colonialism, the movement of labour within imperial and/or capitalist spheres assumed importance: Indians to South-East Asia, the Pacific, eastern Africa or the Caribbean, or the Chinese to South-East Asia and to

the Americas, for example.¹² This movement, the "coolie trade" of the second half of the nineteenth and the early years of the twentieth century, involved the migration of tens of thousands of people, and was theoretically essentially circular in nature and heavily biased towards males. By the 1930s, this movement had virtually ceased and, with the exception of refugee movements associated with war and decolonialism, there was little international migration until the late 1960s following the easing of restrictions on Asian immigration in North America and Australia in the middle of that decade. Since then, four different types of international migrant have developed: students, settlers, contract labourers, and skilled migrants.¹³ To these a fifth flow could be added: refugees. As with all typologies, the categories are not mutually exclusive. Many of the settlers are highly skilled, for example, but a major difference is that the "settler" category is the only one that implies a permanent move. The other three categories belong to essentially circular systems even if in practice there may be some "leakage" and students, for example, become permanent settlers.

These categories, too, could be identified in internal migration where there are clearly those who move for purposes of education or those who are sent by the government as skilled personnel to carry out particular tasks within the country or who are recruited to work on plantations as labourers. The data on internal moves are rarely collected in this way and international moves, with their particular visa categories, are more amenable to classification into types. The volume of international movement, unlike

internal movement, is much more controlled by policy, and, particularly the policies of potential destination countries, although the origin countries too can also influence who leaves and for how long. These differences between internal and international migration should not obscure the fact that the forces controlling both are essentially the same - the expansion of the various institutions of the capitalist system.

The principal destinations of student and settler migrations are in North America and Australasia. The destinations of contract migration are more various but have a clear bias towards the countries of western Asia or the Middle East. Skilled migration flows tend to originate in the more developed countries, with destinations throughout Asia. Not only is there migration away from Asia but there is increasing cross-national migration within the Asian region itself, and particularly towards the more developed NIEs and Japan.

As Asian students were not subject to the same ethnic restrictions as immigrants, they figured prominently in total foreign student numbers even before the Second World War. By the mid-1950s, students from China, Taiwan Province of China, Hong Kong, India, Japan, the Philippines and the Republic of Korea made up one quarter of the 21,410 foreign students in the United States at that time. In the late 1960s, Asian students accounted for over one third of over 80,000 foreign students and, by 1989, virtually half of the 219,090 foreign students in the United States were from Asia, with over 20,000 students from each of China, Taiwan Province of China, Japan, India and the Republic of Korea. There has been much discussion about

whether the loss of students to the developed world - or the "brain drain" - has a significant negative effect on a country's development. Over 10 percent of the high-level manpower of the Republic of Korea was lost to the United States during the 1970s and rarely did more than 25 percent of students return to Taiwan Province of China from any cohort of leavers. However, both of these areas experienced high levels of economic growth over the last 20 years and it is difficult to imagine them growing even faster. Hence, although many students undoubtedly fail to return or emigrate permanently after returning home, large numbers do return to bring the benefit of their training back home. For example, it has been estimated that between 20 and 30 per cent of professionals in the Republic of Korea were trained overseas, mainly in the United States but also in Japan.¹⁴ This transfer of experience is an important aspect of technology transfer and in the expansion of the capitalist system from core metropolitan countries. This population flow is being enhanced by the rapid expansion of skilled labour migration to be discussed below.

Settler migration from Asian countries began following the repeal of the exclusion acts on Asian immigrants in North America and Australia in the mid 1960s. Within 25 years, Asia had replaced Europe as the principal source of immigrants to Canada and Australia: 40.7 per cent of immigrants to Canada in 1990 and 42.3 per cent of settlers to Australia in 1990-1991 were from Asia. Latin America was the main source of immigrants to the United States, but migrants from Asia made up 24 per cent of the total compared with only 8.6 per cent from Eu-

rope. Family members make up the largest part of these Asian migrant flows, that is, accompanying dependants or relatives of migrants and citizens already established in these countries. The principal migrants themselves do not form a representative sample of the populations of the origin countries. They tend to be the best educated, to possess a special skill or to be the wealthier groups in these societies. The business immigration programmes and point system selection schemes of Canada and Australia emphasize this trend. The United States, which has traditionally emphasized family migration, made special provision to increase the proportion of "independent" (skilled) immigrants and introduced an entrepreneur immigration scheme in its 1990 Immigration Act. Not that family migration has been discounted—the absolute numbers entering under this category increased—but there has been a subtle switch in emphasis towards the more skilled.

All three main destination areas are aware of their future manpower needs in the face of persistent declines in fertility. All see increased immigration of the "best and the brightest" as at least a partial response to future needs and all, at present at least, appear to favour higher rather than lower immigration levels. Both Canada and the United States in 1990 revised their immigration laws to allow increased immigration. Barring a sudden upsurge in fertility in the core countries or a prolonged economic recession, these settler flows are likely to continue both through recruitment of the most highly trained and through the multiplier effect of these migrants "pulling" family members in later migrations.

At about the same time that settler migration was developing out of Asian countries, another important flow appeared: contract labour migration. This will be the topic of another specialized paper at this meeting and only the broadest outline will be given here. The principal component of this migration over the last 15 years has been to the oil-rich countries of western Asia. The main figures are given in table 4. It is still too early to have a clear picture of the Persian Gulf conflict in the labour flows but perhaps one can venture to say that it is unlikely to have a major permanent disruptive effect. Even before the conflict it was clear that labour movements from several countries had slowed considerably. Only those relatively late entrants into the contract migration system, Thailand and Indonesia, and also Bangladesh and the Philippines, showed sustained growth over the three five-year periods between 1975 and 1989. The movements from India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and the Republic of Korea were reduced markedly in the last five-year period - a cut-back caused mainly by restrictions in demand in western Asia ultimately as a consequence of the real decline in oil prices over the 1980s and the end of the economic boom there. A major factor in accounting for the continual growth in contract labour from the Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand is that women are increasingly participating in the flows from these countries. As the economies of western Asia have moved from a construction phase to a maintenance phase, the demand for labour has also changed: from unskilled male labourers (who came mainly from South Asian countries) to more skilled labour and for service workers. The wealth of families

Table 4. Average Annual Number of Migrant Workers Registered in the Main Labour Emigration Countries of Asia, 1975–1989 (thousands)

Country	1975–1979	1980–1984	1985–1989
Bangladesh	17.3	53.0	72.1
India	67.0	236.5	134.0
Pakistan	92.3	133.9	76.4
Sri Lanka	14.3	28.5	15.8
Indonesia	5.9	24.4	61.4
Republic of Korea	72.3	171.8	96.2
Philippines	75.9	330.9	460.3
Thailand	6.3	60.0	97.0

Source : *International Labour Migration from Asian Labour-Sending Countries, Statistical Report 1989 (RAS/88/029)*, Bangkok, ILO, Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific, 1989, Various tables.

in western Asia has stimulated a demand for domestic servants which the South-East Asian countries, with their greater relative autonomy for women compared with most South Asian societies, have been able to fill. The highly educated Philippines female population has also been able to respond to demand in such fields as medical personnel

With the downturn of the economies in western Asia, there has been a diversification in the destinations of contract labour, and particularly to destinations within the Asian and Pacific region. Like the core countries of Europe, North America and Australia, the core and its immediate extension in Asia have also experienced a precipitous decline in fertility over the last 25 years - much less in some cases. The labour markets of Japan, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan Province of China, Hong Kong and Singapore are all extremely tight and there are acute shortages in many fields. The governments of all these areas have been debating the issue of

foreign labour and, with the exception of Japan, all have accepted that some relaxation of restrictions on the importation of labour is necessary. The numbers involved vary from area to area but the relative importance is perhaps greatest in Singapore where 125,000 unskilled labourers, and up to 50,000 domestic servants, are working on contract. In Hong Kong, with the exception of domestic servants, of whom there are about 70,000, the amount of foreign labour working in unskilled or semi-skilled activities is small, less than 20,000. There is also much illegal migration, overstaying or working on visitor or student visas in the core Asian areas. In Taiwan Province of China, for example, there are several tens of thousands of illegal entrants from China and there were 40,000 overstayers in 1990. In Japan, there are somewhere between 100,000 and 300,000 people working illegally in the country. These are small numbers relative to the respective size of the labour forces but the numbers increased rapidly

over the last part of the 1980s. With the return of many labourers from the western Asian region to countries such as the Philippines or Thailand, the mobile labour force will be expanded, and we can expect both legal and illegal flows to increase from the south of the Asian region to Singapore and the prosperous northern Asian economies.

These contract labour flows have assumed a great importance for the economies of the region as they generate enormous flows of earnings back to the home countries in terms of remittances. Remittances from migrant workers accounted for over \$US1.5 billion to the Republic of Korea in 1982, over \$US 900 million to the Philippines in 1983 and almost \$US 700 million to Thailand in the same year.¹⁵ These figures are certainly underestimates as large amounts of money are returned through informal channels. Settler migrants, too, rarely cut off their ties with the home areas and they too remit large sums of money. Much has been written on the subject of remittances but there is still no consensus on the developmental impact of this capital. While extra money in villages can encourage consumerism and exacerbate wealth differentials, it is likely that remittances have generated more benefits than costs, although they will seldom be the principal factor in bringing development in an area.¹⁶

The relationship between internal and international movements has yet to be clearly established. I suggested earlier that there is a hierarchical pattern in the evolution of the mobility transition. The migration fields of the largest settlements gradually extend down through the urban hierarchy. International movements too

may diffuse down through the urban hierarchy. Cities such as Singapore and Hong Kong act as steps, drawing people in from local and regional countries who then leave for destinations in North America or Australia after spending perhaps some considerable time in these cities.¹⁷ There is evidence to suggest that, in the early stages of contract labour migration, most migrants come from the largest cities of countries and that, later, the recruiting fields become much more extensive. Hence, international movement can be linked to the evolution of mobility within the diffusion framework with the larger cities participating first and then diffusing down the hierarchy as the migration fields of progressively smaller and more isolated settlements become more extensive. Much more research is required on this aspect before more definite conclusions can be drawn. Areas with previous links to outside countries through an American military base, for example, also quickly become part of this international migration field. It is no accident that the main Asian sources of immigrants to the United States are, with the exception of China, those with which it has had close military and political ties, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, Thailand, Taiwan Province of China and Viet Nam. These political factors cannot be separated from the economic issues in the creation of the global system.

There have been three principal actors in the internationalization of capital and the creation of an international division of labour: transnational corporations, international banks and state governments.¹⁸ The expansion of their activities over the last few decades has given

rise to flows of skilled personnel. These flows are complex in their direction and in their duration. The majority are short-term and circular, consisting of business trips, but there are also significant movements of expatriates on contract for periods of several years. Much of this migration is in the reverse direction to that discussed earlier; that is, it is from core countries to the periphery as companies transfer experience to regional offices. However, there is also much skilled movement from places within the region as capital and personnel from Japan, the Republic of Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore expand in Asia.

The numbers of these migrants have increased dramatically since the mid-1970s. For example, the numbers assigned to overseas branches of companies from Japan increased sixfold between 1975 and 1988 and almost

three-fold from the Republic of Korea. Short stays overseas for business, government postings and overseas training as well as international tourism also showed significant increases over the period (table 5). In 1989, the main destinations for business trips from the Republic of Korea, one of the few countries to keep and publish such data, were Japan (172,000) the United States (37,000), Hong Kong (28,000) and Taiwan Province of China (13,600), with only 2,000 to 3,000 going to western Asian destinations. Business arrivals in Singapore increased by 130 percent between 1979 and 1989 and Hong Kong's total visitor arrivals from Japan, the Republic of Korea and Taiwan Province of China, including tourists, increased by 150,270 and 816 percent respectively between 1980 and 1989 to an annual total of over 2.33 million. There are also large numbers of skilled

Table 5. Departures, by Purpose, from Japan and the Republic of Korea, 1975 and 1988/89

Purpose	Japan		Republic of Korea	
	1975	1988	1975	1989
1. Diplomacy	4,266	7,849	1,796	1,148
2. Government	10,027	27,213	4,332	10,191
3. Short stay for business	349,399	1,024,764	23,177	314,418
4. Assignment to overseas branches	13,187	83,017	31,008	87,294
5. Scientific study and research, and conference attendance	5,594	28,924	—	14,070
6. Studying abroad, training and acquiring skills	10,826	84,708	214	50,225
7. Residing permanently	12,445	48,745	35,642	33,066
8. Sightseeing and visits	2,027,191	7,028,001	22,392	572,440
9. Other	33,391	93,616	10,817	129,959
Total	2,466,326	8,426,867	129,378	1,121,111

Source : *Statistical Yearbooks* of Japan and Republic of Korea, various years.

migrants on long-term contracts; some 25,000 in Singapore, plus their families, and almost 33,000 entered Hong Kong in 1990, up from around 12,000 in 1984.

The Pacific

It is in the small countries of the Pacific that the issues of migration and development have perhaps received their most detailed and critical attention. There are great differences from one Pacific island country to another and it may be this basic fact that can help to account for differences in interpretation which have arisen. For example, larger countries such as Papua New Guinea are characterized primarily by internal movements, increasingly directed towards the main towns of the country and there is as yet little international movement out of that country. Solomon Islands, with one of the lowest levels of development in the Pacific in terms of GNP per capita, is characterized primarily by various types of circular movements within the context of traditional networks, and there is virtually no movement overseas. Samoa, the Cook Islands, and increasingly Tonga, are characterized by pronounced movements to overseas destinations in New Zealand, Australia and the western United States. In the mid-1980s, two-thirds of the ethnic Cook Islands population was resident outside the islands in "core country". The proportion resident overseas for Niue was 78 percent, for Tokelau 62 percent, for Tonga 22 percent and for Samoa 36 percent.¹⁹

The results of two large-scale studies into the impact of this migration appear to have reached very different conclusions. The study coordinated by the South Pacific Commission and the In-

ternational Labour Organisation regarded migration as essentially destructive in removing the most dynamic elements of island populations. This led to labour shortages, declining local production and a trend towards individualism that undermined traditional social structures. Migration had not, however, relieved rural population pressures, which remained high because of persistent high fertility. An alternative view presented by researchers from New Zealand saw migration as essentially supportive for development. The only realistic way for islanders to achieve living standards approaching acceptable modern standards was to participate in labour markets in core countries. The subsequent remittance income to the islands supported those left behind. This, supplemented by official aid from the core countries, offset declines in local production. The home area society depended heavily on public service activities to build and maintain infrastructure and distribute aid and remittances. This type of economy has become known by the acronym MIRAB—Migration, Remittances, Aid and Bureaucracy.²⁰

The debate over the accuracy of these interpretations is reminiscent of that in France at the beginning of this century over whether circular movements from the provinces to the industrial cities were undermining or supporting rural village life.²¹ As in the case of France, it is likely that there will be considerable regional variations. Whether migration supports or undermines the community will depend upon how far through the mobility transition a particular area happens to be. Where migration is well advanced and the majority of young people,

both male and female, are spending most of their time living and working overseas, then the origin area is likely to be already in decline. Where only some of the young people are working overseas and these are mainly males, then emigration may act as a brake on permanent migration and support the home community. Given the increasing demand for labour in the core countries consequent upon fertility decline, it is likely that there will be an inexorable shift in the center of gravity away from the islands of the Pacific, although this may be exceedingly slow in those areas that have not yet developed a tradition of emigration.

It is not only emigration that must be considered but immigration too: immigration of a small number of wealthy outsiders and the "immigration of capital". Several Pacific island nations have actively encouraged outsiders to apply for passports, particularly Hong Kong Chinese, and this may be associated with the purchase of business interests. While on the one hand the Pacific is being incorporated into international business, on the other it is being "marginalized" to some extent by modern technology. For example, ships and aircraft now bypass the islands on their way between Australasia and the United States. However, the Pacific remains an attractive recreational area for the increasingly urban, industrial and wealthy societies around the rim. The immigration of these new transients will accelerate change and push the "recreation frontier" into farther and farther reaches of the Pacific as the area is transformed into a service niche of the core economies. Looking ahead one hundred years it is difficult to disagree with Ward when he sees the Pacific

as an "empty quarter", with the descendants of islanders living in cord country cities and the islands themselves essentially resource and recreational niches within the global economy.²²

The continued apparently vibrant societies of some of the islands less touched by outside forces have led some to question this interpretation, particularly when the forms of mobility that can be observed in the Pacific do not fit easily into the linguistic categories that are generally used to describe the phenomenon.²³ However, forms of mobility in the historical experience of Europe were and, in the present experience of most developing countries, are equally complex. We must be continually aware of the range of mobility types that are subsumed under the simple terms we use. The importance of the analysis of migration in the Pacific for comparative purposes, quite apart from its important intrinsic value, is to be able to see clearly in the context of the small scale a process which is also occurring but often less distinctly in the large scale and more complex societies and economies of Asia and elsewhere.

V. The future

Prediction is always a risky business as the direction of change in human societies, political systems and demography is always ready to move in unforeseen ways and to spring surprises upon the unwary analyst. With the assumption that the world is not about to descend an apocalyptic path, we can foresee a continued decline in fertility throughout most of the Asian and Pacific region over the next 20 years and the maintenance of low fertility in the devel-

oped core countries. This will cause labour force growth to be slow or to decline in the more developed countries and further deepen the international division of labour, with certain activities being pushed further into the "labour frontier". Secondly, fertility decline will accentuate the demand for labour in traditional core countries and in "neo-core" areas, or those places where the level of economic development has elevated them to core conditions, for example, the presents NIEs. Whether immigration itself can maintain population growth in the core countries is not the real issue for Asian and Pacific countries but the demand will be there and international movements are likely to increase markedly both to countries outside the region and to those within the region. Both of these flows will be directed at specific large urban complexes within destination countries rather than simply to the countries themselves. These cities are the key elements in the national and international migration system and can be arranged into a hierarchy with world cities at the top ranging down through regional cities (which will be the capitals of particular countries), other national capital or major centres, state or provincial centres, local centres and rural areas. How these cities are defined remains open for debate but the presence of financial institutions, headquarters of major transnational corporations, international institutions, and their position as major centres of services (including cultural life) and manufacturing and transportation are basic criteria.²⁴ The present world-city hierarchy as identified by Friedmann is given in table 6. Only two cities in Asia were identified in the mid-1980s as a primary node in

the world city hierarchy-Tokyo and Singapore, the former in a core country and the latter in the semi-periphery.

In terms of migration, Tokyo was quite different from the other core world cities such as London, Paris, New York or Los Angeles. These are all destinations for pronounced international movement and have or are evolving into polyethnic cities with a polarization between wealthy white collar, service occupations and lowly paid non-unionized mainly immigrant blue collar, service occupations. Tokyo, while still a target for migration within Japan, has not emerged as a destination for significant immigration because of restrictive government policy. In the future, these restrictive policies are likely to weaken as labour shortages deepen at all skill levels. Twenty years from now, large volumes of skilled immigration from South-East Asia and unskilled migration from China are more than a possibility and Japan will not be such a homogeneous nation, with all the social and cultural changes to that society that this implies.

Singapore is already heavily dependent upon foreign labour, with over 10 percent of the present labour force coming from outside the country. Continued labour shortages have encouraged the movement of manufacturing into neighbouring Malaysia and Indonesia to form the basis of a "growth triangle" with Singapore as the high technology and service motivating force in the complex. Internal migration within Malaysia to this evolving urban area in Johor State has created labour shortages within the rural sector that are filled by migrants (mostly illegal) from Indonesia, showing the clear rela-

Table 6. The World-City Hierarchy

Core countries				Semi-periphery countries			
Primary		secondary		Primary		Secondary	
Lodon ⁺	***	Brussels ⁺	*				
Paris ⁺	**	Milan	*				
Rotterdam	*	Vienna ⁺	*				
Frankfurt	*	Madrid ⁺					
Zurich	*					Johannesburg	*
New York	***	Toronto	*	Sao Paulo	*	Buenos Aires ⁺	***
Chicago	**	Miami	*			Rio de Janeiro	***
Los Angeles	***					Caracas ⁺	*
		San Francisco	*			Mexico City ⁺	***
Tokyo	***	Sydney	*	Singapore ⁺	*	Hong Kong	**
						Taipei ⁺	*
						Manila ⁺	**
						Bangkok ⁺	**
						Seoul ⁺	**

Source : J. Friedmann, 'The world city hypothesis', *Development and Change*, vol. 17(1), 1986 : 72.

Notes : Population size categories (recent estimates referring to metro-region)

* 1–5 million, ** 5–10 million, *** 10–20 million, + National capital.

tionships in this case between internal and international movements.

Other urban complexes are likely to emerge as primary cities within this region over the next 20 years : the Hong Kong/Guangzhou/Macau triangle around the Pearl River delta and Taipei and Seoul will almost certainly develop in a similar way as will possibly Kuala Lumpur. The migration fields of these city-regions will extend well into the hinterlands of other Asian countries, not just to the capital cities but down to the lowest levels of the hierarchies in specific cases. Below these international regional complexes will lie a series of national capitals such as Bangkok and Manila and national regional centres such as Shanghai, Bei-

jing and the larger cities of South Asia. The migration fields of these cities will be restricted primarily to their nation or region. Linking these cities to those at both higher and lower levels will be the flows of skilled international migrants that were described earlier flows that began during the colonial period but became numerically significant really only from the early 1970s and which are likely to be one of the major flows of the future. In this linking of cities and regions some areas will be marginalized and left as resource or recreational niches in the urban system. Much of the Pacific, the Himalayan kingdoms and the mountainous parts of northern South-East Asia and western China will fall into this category.²⁵

While it is the movement among city regions that will dominate future flows, it is government policy at the level of the nation state that will regulate the flows. Policies can restrict (as in the case of Japan now) or facilitate immigration. In the face of increasing labour shortages, immigration policy will politically and bureaucratically be one of the major challenges facing Asian countries over the next 20 years. However, these immigration policies will ultimately have to respond to demographic and economic forces and particularly the increasing international division of labour. Governments must decide the extent to which they are willing to sanction and regulate the activities of multinational corporations and banks in their countries. Where countries actively promote the establishment of these activities the linking to the international economy and the evolution of international migration will clearly be faster than in those countries which restrict multinational dealings. There is no single policy or group of policies to bring this about.²⁶ Hong Kong and Singapore are both open, export-oriented economies, yet they follow very different developmental paths. In Hong Kong, the company is the key actor, subject of course to the laws of the territory while in Singapore it is state planning and state direction which promote dealings with multinational firms. The state in Singapore is also important in direct ownership of business enterprise. But in Hong Kong, too, the government plays an important role in supplying key factors, power, transport, housing for workers and, not least, land.

Hence, the policies that are going to affect migration are those which are integral to na-

tional development planning and are the result of negotiations between the state and multinational enterprise in international law. It is not that the volume of movement can be precisely controlled from year to year by such policies but that the rate of change in the long-term evolutionary trends of migration will be so affected. Countries in the Asian and Pacific region will see continued concentration of population in the major urban centres over the next 20 years and increased mobility to overseas destinations. The rate at which this occurs is subject to policy intervention but, at least from a viewpoint in the early 1990s, it appears unlikely that the ultimate direction of mobility can be changed significantly.

End Notes

1. These data are provided in the annual *World Development Reports* published by Oxford University Press. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) began publishing an annual *Human Development Report* in 1990 using different indices to measure development. For a recent assessment of these indices, which emphasizes caution in the use of the latter, see Kelley (1991).
2. See Zelinsky (1971) and the modifications to the transition outlined in Skeldon (1990).
3. See World Bank (1991), pp. 12-13.
4. The concept of ideational shift is developed in Cleland and Wilson (1987).
5. The idea of "male" and "female" farming areas is examined in Boserup (1970).
6. On migration in Japan, see the section in Skeldon (1990), pp. 115-120, and the rele-

- vant chapters on migration and urbanization in ESCAP(1984).
7. For migration in the Republic of Korea, see Choe et al.(1986), ESCAP(1980) and the annual *Korea Statistical Yearbooks*. For Taiwan, see Speare et al.(1988) and Speare (1974).
 8. For information on migration : in Malaysia, see Malaysia(1983), pp. 57-87 and ESCAP (1982a);in Thailand, see Pejaranonda, Goldstein and Goldstein(1984), ESCAP (1982b) and Fuller et al.(1983);and in Indonesia, see Hugo(1988).
 9. An account of recent migration in Viet Nam is contained in Forbes and Thrift(1987).
 10. On recent migration in China, see Goldstein (1991), Goldstein(1990) and Goldstein and Goldstein(1985).
 11. The figures on urban agglomerations appear in United Nations(1991). Information on migration in India and south Asia will be found in Skeldon(1986) and Skeldon (1983).
 12. For a recent discussion of the evolution of the international labour system, see Potts (1990). The literature on the Chinese is vast. For three background accounts of the Chinese in the United States and Canada, see Tsai(1986), Daniels(1988) and Wickberg(1982). For accounts of Indian migration, see Tinker(1974), Tinker(1977) and Jensen(1988).
 13. The following section on international migration is modified from Skeldon(1992)and readers are referred to the detailed bibliography in that review.
 14. Information on students from the Republic of Korea is contained in Kuznets(1987).
 15. The figures are given in Stahl and Habib (1991), p. 177.
 16. See Stahl and Habib(1991), Stahl and Arnold(1986) and Russell(1986).
 17. For a useful review of the literature on the creation of a global economic system and the role of cities within this system, see King(1990).
 18. The figures are given in Hayes(1991), p. 5.
 19. The MIRAB interpretation was first presented by Bertram and Watters(1985) and the results of the ILO-SPC project are summarized in Connell(1987). A useful comparison and discussion of these studies is contained in Hayes(1991).
 20. See Chatelain(1976).
 21. Ward(1989).
 22. Chapman(1991).
 23. See Friedmann(1986) and King(1991).
 24. A comparison of such regions is contained in Skeldon(1985).
 25. For a discussion of the types of policy intervention open to governments in developing countries, see Dicken(1986), pp. 136-179.

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ZELINSKY'S TRANSITION

PHASE I . The Premodern Traditional Society

- (1) Little genuine residential migration and only such limited circulation as is sanctioned by customary practice in land utilization, social visits, commerce, warfare, or religious observations.

PHASE II . The Early Transitional Society

- (1) Massive movement from countryside to cities, old and new.
- (2) Significant movement of rural folk to colonization frontiers, if land suitable for pioneering is available within country.
- (3) Major outflows of emigrants to available and attractive foreign destinations.
- (4) Under certain circumstances, a small, but significant, immigration of skilled workers, technicians, and professionals from more advanced parts of the world.
- (5) Significant growth in various kinds of circulation.

PHASE III . The Late Transitional Society

- (1) Slackening, but still major, movement from

countryside to city.

- (2) Lessening flow of migrants to colonization frontiers.
- (3) Emigration on the decline or may have ceased altogether.
- (4) Further increases in circulation, with growth in structural complexity.

PHASE IV . The Advanced Society

- (1) Residential mobility has leveled off and oscillates at a high level.
- (2) Movement from countryside to city continues but is further reduced in absolute and relative terms.
- (3) Vigorous movement of migrants from city to city and within individual urban agglomerations.
- (4) If a settlement frontier has persisted, it is now stagnant or actually retreating.
- (5) Significant net immigration of unskilled and semiskilled workers from relatively underdeveloped land.
- (6) There may be a significant international migration or circulation of skilled and professional persons, but direction and volume of flow depend on specific conditions.
- (7) Vigorous accelerating circulation, particularly the economic and pleasure-oriented, but other varieties as well.

PHASE V . A Future Superadvanced Society

- (1) There may be a decline in level of residential migration and a deceleration in some forms of circulation as better communication and delivery systems are instituted.
- (2) Nearly all residential migration may be of the interurban and intraurban variety.

- (3) Some further immigration of relatively unskilled labor from less developed areas is possible.
- (4) Further acceleration in some current forms of circulation and perhaps the inception of new forms.
- (5) Strict political control of internal as well as international movements may be imposed.

MODIFIED TRANSITION

PHASE I . Pretransitional Society

- (1) Fluctuating levels of circulation, both long-distance (pilgrimages, warfare) and short-distance (to incorporate different ecological niches).
- (2) More permanent movement associated with slavery or the opening up of agricultural frontiers.

PHASE II . Early Transitional Society

- (1) Growth of circulation as urban destinations, plantations or mines are incorporated as niches in rural-based circulation. Mobility is a support for rural communities.
- (2) Long-distance urban-to-urban movements up the hierarchy.
- (3) Stagnation of intermediate and smaller towns.
- (4) Increasing movement to frontier areas.
- (5) Increasing complexity of mobility fields.
- (6) All movement dominated by males.

PHASE III . Intermediate Transitional Society

- (1) Long-term movement from areas close to the largest cities and the beginning of demographic stagnation in these areas.
- (2) Increasing lengths of stay at all urban desti-

nations resulting in the rapid growth of intermediate and smaller towns. Rural-based mobility begins to undermine rural community economies and life.

- (3) Continued urban-to-urban movement mainly up the hierarchy.
- (4) Decreasing movement to rural destinations.
- (5) Great complexity in mobility fields.
- (6) Pronounced participation of women in(1)

PHASE IV. Late Transitional Society

- (1) Massive rural-to-urban long-term movements with the largest cities the primary targets, the intermediate centres being short-circuited. The emergence of 'megacities'.
- (2) Increasing urban-to-urban movement.
- (3) Emigration, if this option is available.
- (4) Decreasing rural-based circulation and stagnation; decline of rural population.
- (5) Gradual simplification of mobility fields.

Figure 1. A modified mobility transition

Source : R. Skeldon, *Populaton Mobility in Developing Countries : A Reinterpretation*. London : Belhave, 1990, p.112.

- (6) Movements (1) and (2) are female-dominant while (3) is male-dominant.

PHASE V. Early Advanced Society

- (1) Slackening rural-to-urban movement as urbanization levels exceed 50 per cent.
- (2) Suburbanization and the beginnings of deconcentration of urban populations.
- (3) Increased commuting.
- (4) Movements (1) and (2) are sex-balanced while (3) is male-dominant.

PHASE VI. Late Advanced Society

- (1) Continued deconcentration of urbanization.
- (2) Immigrant flows from countries in phase IV, if this option is available.
- (3) Massive commuting.
- (4) Most flows are sex-balanced.

PHASE VII. Super Advanced Society

As proposed by Zelinsky?