1980년대 주요산업정책(主要産業政策) 결정(決定)과 경쟁정책(競爭政策): 역할(役割)과 한계(限界)

The Competition Policy and Major Industrial Policy-Making in the 1980's

본고(本稿)의 목적(目的)은 지난 1980년대의 주요산업정책(主要産業政策) 결정과정(決定過程)에서 나타난 경쟁정책(競爭政策)의 역할(役割)과 역할한계(役割限界)의 원인(原因)을 고찰함에 있다. 1980년대의 주요산업정책 결정인 1986년의 공업발전법제정(工業發展法制定), 1986~87년 기간중 동법(同法)에 근거한 합리화업종지정(合理化業種指定), 그리고 1986~88년 기간중 조세감면규제법(租稅減免規制法)에 근거한 부실기업정리(不實企業整理)의 세 과정에서 경쟁정책(競爭政策)은 극히 제한된 역할밖에 하지 못하였다. 경쟁정책(競爭政策)의 역할한계(役割限界)의 원인(原因)에 대하여 본(本) 연구(硏究)는 정책집행론(政策執行論)의 다섯가지 가설(假說) - 법령상(法令上)의 문제(問題), 자원부족(資源不足), 직무태도(職務態度) 및 동기상(動機上)의 문제(問題), 전문성(專門性) 부족(不足), 그리고 불리(不利)한 정책집행환경(政策執行環境) - 을 중심으로 살펴보았다. 분석결과(分析結果), 경쟁정책(競爭政策) 담당기관(擔當機關)의 제한(制限)된 전문성(專門性)과 경쟁정책(競爭政策)의 효율적인 집행을 저해하는 정책환경상(政策環境上)의 요인(要因)이 가장 의미 있는 변수로 나타났다. 이러한 경쟁정책(競爭政策)의 역할한계(役割限界)의 원인(原因)에 대한 분석(分析)을 토대로, 본고(本稿)는 현재 논의가 진행중인 우리나라 공정거래제도(公正去來制度)의 제도개선방안(制度改善方案)을 평가(評價)한 후, 불리(不利)한 정책집행환경(政策執行環境)의 개선(改善)을 위한 제도적(制度的) 조치(措置)와 전문성제고(專門性提高)를 위한 경제기획원(經濟企劃院)의 순환보직제도(循環補職制度)의 합리적(合理的) 조정방안(調整方案) 및 공정거래위원회(公正去來委員會)의 내부조직(內部組織) 개편방안(改編方案)을 제시(提示)하였다.

This paper investigates the roles and the limitations of the Korean antitrust agencies-the Office of Fair Trade (OFT) and the Fair Trade Commission (FTC) during the making of the major industrial policies of the 1980's. The Korean antitrust agencies played only a minimal role in three major industrial policy-making issues in the 1980's- the enactment of the Industrial Development Act (IDA), the Industrial Rationalization Measures according to the IDA, and the Industrial Readjustment Measures on Consolidation of Large Insolvent Enterprises based on the revised Tax Exemption and Reduction Control Act. As causes for this performance bias in the Korean antitrust system, this paper considers five factors according to the current literature on implementation failure: ambiguous and insufficient statutory provisions of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (MRFTA); lack of resources; biased attitudes and motivations of the staff of the OFT and the FTC; bureaucratic incapability; and widespread misunderstanding about the roles and functions of the antitrust system in Korea. Among these five factors, bureaucratic incompetence and lack of understanding in various policy implementation environments about the roles and functions of the antitrust system have been regarded as the most important ones. Most staff members did not have enough educational training during their school years to engage in antitrust and fair trade policy-making. Furthermore, the high rate of staff turnover due to a mandatory personnel transfer system has prohibited the accumulation of knowledge and skills required for pursuing complicated structural antitrust enforcement. The limited capability of the OFT has put the agency in a disadvantaged position in negotiating with other economic ministries. The OFT has not provided plausible counter-arguments based on sound economic theories against other economic ministries' intensive market interventions in the name of rationalization and readjustment of industries. If the staff members of antitrust agencies have lacked substantive understanding of the antitrust and fair trade policy, the rest of government agencies must have had serious problems in understanding the correst roles and functions of the antitrust system. The policy environment of the Korean antitrust system, including other economic ministries, the Deputy Prime Minister, and President Chun, have tended to conceptualize the OFT more as an agency aiming only at fair trade policy and less as an agency that should enforce structural monopoly regulation as well. Based on this assessment of the performance of the Korean antitrust system, this paper evaluate current reform proposals for the MRFT A. The inclusion of the regulation of conglomerate mergers and of business divestiture orders may be a desirable revision, giving the MRFTA more complete provisions. However, given deficient staff experties and the unfavorable policy environments, it would be too optimistic and naive to expect that the inclusion of these provisions alone could improve the performance of the Korean antitrust system. In its conclusion, this paper suggests several policy recommendations for the Korean antitrust system, which would secure the stable development and accumulation of antitrust expertise for its staff members and enough understanding and conformity from its environments about its antitrust goals and functions.