Acknowledgement
본 논문은 2024 년도 산업통상자원부 및 한국산업기술진흥원의 산업혁신인재성장지원사업 (RS-2024-00415520)과 과학기술정보통신부 및 정보통신기획평가원의 ICT 혁신인재 4.0 사업의 연구결과로 수행되었음 (No. IITP-2022-RS-2022-00156310)
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