

Additional Protocols and Regional Cooperation on Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy in Northeast Asia

Kwan-Kyoo Choe

Min Su Kim

KAERIKAERI

harim@kaeri.re.kr

wifiki@kaeri.re.kr

1. Introduction

The main object of this article is to clarify the relations between the implementation of the Protocols Additional to Safeguards Agreement (hereinafter referred to as the Additional Protocols) and the feasibility of the regional cooperation on peaceful uses of nuclear energy in Northeast Asia (NEA). The regionalism has a strong tendency to be based in advance on regional cooperation. The regionalism has three main structural elements in its definition: geographical proximity, cultural resemblance, and cooperative attitudes among all the countries concerned [1]. The Additional Protocols allow the IAEA to access to more detailed information and nuclear activities of a State party. The aspect that the Additional Protocols could increase the nuclear transparency will result in ultimately promoting the confidence among the regional nations concerned.

2. Status of the Additional Protocols in NEA

The Additional Protocols are entered in force in Australia, Japan, China and the Republic of Korea as of the end of August, 2004, while they are waiting the national constitutional procedures in Russia and the U.S.A. However, in the sense that Russia and USA are nuclear countries, the unique country which is out of the track of the Additional Protocols is North Korea. The nuclear question of North Korea, being a reason for launching the development of the Additional Protocols in the beginning of the 1990s[2], is still causing trouble to the implementation of the comprehensive safeguards agreement of INFCIRC/153. However, the fact that the Additional Protocols are prepared to overcome the incompleteness of the INFCIRC/153, particularly via-avis Iraq and North Korea, is implicitly forcing North Korea to be joined to the Additional Protocols. In this sense, the ultimate solution of the nuclear question on North Korea implies naturally the signature of the Additional Protocols by North Korea and its early entry into force.

3. Regional cooperation on nuclear energy and its scope

Regional cooperation on nuclear energy requires two prerequisites to regional countries. The first prerequisite is to share a common vision for the cooperation among the participants. As shown in the case of European atomic energy community (EURATOM), the participant must have a clear and evident aim, which was marked

by the regional security and economic prosperity. The second is to define clearly a privilege and a compensation according to the status of nuclear technology among the participants. While the China, the Russia and the USA are nuclear country, the two Koreas, the Japan and the Australia are non-nuclear countries. The latter countries are also showing their differences in nuclear technology related directly to nuclear fuel cycle. So, the regional countries are in advance to form a "loosen" commitment on nuclear cooperation and to start to operate a working group for the regional cooperation.

4. Additional protocols and regional cooperation in NEA

The Additional Protocols allow the IAEA to have a strengthened system of safeguards, which enables it to increase and fortify its access to nuclear information and activities for a State party. The advanced technology of the IAEA in detecting eventually undeclared nuclear materials and activities could increase the nuclear transparency in the regional nuclear cooperation. That's why the main focus of the regional countries, having intention for nuclear cooperation, is to be driven to nuclear controls and finally to disarmament. Without assurance of the disarmament from the nuclear countries, the discussion on regional cooperation could be characterized by the one-sided play and by the political tensions.

5. Conclusion

The Additional Protocols must certainly strengthen the nuclear transparency. However, without the conscience of universality[3] from the part of nuclear countries, the dependency of nuclear technologies could be deepen. To tide over this aspect in the real politics of international relations, the regional countries are to promote regional cooperation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. As the technological gap among the regional countries becomes more and more widening, the regional cooperation comes to an end to regional conflicts and tensions. That's why the implementation of the Additional Protocols is to be developed to matured cooperation among regional countries in the field of nuclear technologies and expanded peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

REFERENCES

[1] Jeong, Kap-Young & Kwan-Kyoo Choe, "Northeast Asian Economic Regionalism: A Korean View", *Global Economic Review*, Yonsei University, Vol. 30, No. 1, 2001, pp. 103-119.

[2] IAEA, IAEA, Korean Interpretation for 'The Evolution of IAEA Safeguards' International Nuclear Verification Series No. 2, KAERI/TS-80/99, (1995.5), pp. 18-24.

[3] Ibid., p. 59. The universality means the nuclear countries should take measures identical or corresponding to those of non-nuclear countries for the Additional Protocols.