

# SOMEONE'S SPEECH AND SPEAKER'S THOUGHT : THE SENTENCE-FINAL PARTICLE '-KO' IN KOREAN

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요약

이 논문은 한국어 간접인용조사 '고'가 종결표지로 사용될 때 발생하는 화용적 기능을 설명한다. [묘출발화/사고](RST)의 관점에서 1인칭 화자와 3인칭 인물 사이의 관계 개념에 근거하여, 인용 정보에 대한 화자의 반응이 언어적으로 수용되는 과정에 대한 표상의 문제를 취급한다. 인용 명제에 대해 화자가 취하는 주관적 관점을 평가하기 위해 필요한 요인들을 변별하여 주고, 1인칭 화자의 내적 판단 영역이 인용의 정보 상태와 대응하기 위해 필요한 제약들을 파악한다.

## 1. Introduction

This paper is an attempt to explain the pragmatic and communicative functions of Korean sentence-final particle '-ko' (SFP-KO), a colloquial form being '-kwu,' which shares an identity of form with sentence-medial complementizer. The data to be considered are limited to declarative sentence types, ending in the particle '-ko/-kwu' (and at the same weight, '-koyo/ -kwuyo' with the speech level marker '-yo').

There are some reasons why the sentence-final uses of the particle should be treated as more than a stylistic variant in the suffixal system of sentence endings, being differentiated from the complementizer-like uses: SFP-KO invites the speaker's thoughts, beliefs, or opinions, being associated with the shifting of subjectivity between a speaker and someone else, and it is one type of evidentiality marker in the sense of Palmer (1986) and Chafe & Nichols (1986).<sup>1</sup> This particle, in particular, imports different connota-

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<sup>1</sup> The definition of evidentiality is nothing new in linguistics, and as mentioned in Chafe and Nichols (1986), among others, the direct form is used when the speaker has adequate evidence for asserting

tions of speaker's evidential authority, which seem to be wearing on hearsay information. I try to explain what properties must take place within the proper estimation of the multi-functions and contextual meanings of SFP-KO.

Our discussion will address three major issues. First, it is proposed that the speaker's stance to previously prepared information comes from the epistemic modification of facts between someone's speech and speaker's thought. Second, the epistemic modification by SFP-KO will be tested by tracing back to the embedding of 1st person speaker as 'I,' enough to show that the mechanism of SFP-KO use is consistent with the general idea that the correlation between factuality and subjectivity is on a par with the distinction between proposition and modality. Third, in the absence of someone's articulated speech, SFP-KO is shown to represent speaker's thought, which comes from a consideration of one's own experience or inner consciousness. From this observation, the notions of hearsay and evidentiality are to be reconsidered in terms of bridging the discrepancy between speech and thought.

Referring to the dichotomy of someone's speech and speaker's thought, I presuppose the category of Banfield(1982, 1993)'s 'Represented Speech and Thought(RST),' which comes from the combination of free indirect speech and psycho-narration.<sup>2</sup> A representative narrative function arises in cases where one speaker translates someone else's speech into one's own words and evokes a special type of double-voiced discourse, while "expressing simultaneously two different intentions: the direct intention of the character who is speaking, and the refracted intention of 'someone else' (Bakhtin 1981:324)." In this light, our examination of SFP-KO concerns the way in which some extralinguistic characterizations are reflected in a linguistic dimension of indirectly quoted information.

Viewed in connection with indirect quotation, there is little reason to doubt that, by the uses of SFP-KO, the ownership of the evidence of hearsay information is likely indicated to lie elsewhere than the speaker himself/herself, while the speaker attributes certain degree of responsibility to the reliability of the conveyed information. In some cases, however, even without recourse to the hearsay nature, SFP-KO can be used in company with the speaker's subjectivity entertained, mostly taking the connotations of emphasis or assertion. Though it is seemingly difficult to define a unitary, invariable meaning of the particle, one common characteristic, underlying the difference of

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something, while the non-direct form is used when the speaker's evidence is more or less insufficient. Knowledge may be regarded by a speaker as more or less RELIABLE (or VALID), with a suggestion of a continuum from the most reliable knowledge to the least reliable. (Chafe 1986:262)

<sup>2</sup> The terminology 'free indirect discourse/speech' has been also named as *style indirect libre*, *erlebte Rede*, *represented speech*, *quasi-direct speech*, and so on. For an exposition of these notions, see Sternberg (1982), Banfield(1993), and more exhaustively, Fludernik(1993).

contextual meanings, appears to be that the speaker imports some feature of modality, which indicates the degree of his/her own commitment. In the discussion, I will ascertain that 1st-person speaker's authority over an epistemic modification bears a resolving influence on the choice between different degrees of speaker commitment to the evidential status of second-hand information.

## 2. Speaker's Thought: From a Fact to an Opinion

I begin in this section by raising a question about the multi-functional nature of the particle 'ko,' based on the observation that the main uses of the particle at sentence-final seem to be highly dependent on the presence of speaker's reaction to hearsay information, the source of which is from someone else. As is well-known, '-ko' can be appended to all four basic sentence types, i.e. declarative, interrogative, imperative and exclamative, but our discussion are restricted to declarative sentences.<sup>3</sup> In the data to be considered, '-tako/-takwu' (or '-takoyo/ -takwuyo' with the polite speech level marker '-yo') will be reserved as a unit, even though it is actually merged from two constituents: One is the declarative sentence ending '-ta' and the other is the quotative particle '-ko.' In the annotations of the examples, I will continue to label '-tako' (or infrequently '-lako')<sup>4</sup> as SFP, in much the same way as the particle '-ko.'

First of all, let us consider two major types of functions for the particle '-ko': For the first type, consider the following examples in (1) and (2). In a sentence-medial position like (1a), and even in a sentence-final position like (1b) and (2), the particle '-ko' seems to behave as a complementizer, maintaining the meaning of indirect quotation, based on the recoverability of the 'saying' verb and the embedding of the subject. In these cases, the particle is used not for showing the subjectivity of the speaker, but merely for reporting what is said by someone else.<sup>5</sup>

- (1) a. Meyttwukitte-ka cinakan kess kassta-kwu nwuga  
 someone-NOM went-by seemingly be-like-COMP someone-NOM  
 keleteyyo.  
 say-PAST-DEC  
 "Someone said that a swarm of locusts seem to have went by."

<sup>3</sup> Güntner(1999) points out that, in contrast to literary texts, 'polyphonic layering of voices' in everyday reported dialogues is achieved by means of prosody, thereby communicating the speaker's perspective towards the quoted utterance as concordant or discordant. However, in this paper, I do not go into the contextualization of polyphonic voices by prosodic qualities, but merely assume the forms and functions of 'double-voiced' quotation.

<sup>4</sup> When immediately preceded by the copula '-i,' '-tako' goes into '-lako.'

<sup>5</sup> Some examples have been extracted from the novel 'Thoci,' completed during the last decades by the honorable writer 'Park, Kyungrhee.'

b. Nwuga keleteyyo. Meyttwukitte-ka cinakan kess  
 someone-NOM say-PAST-DEC. locusts-NOM went-by seemingly  
 kass-takwu-yo. (iThoci<sub>i</sub> 10:367)  
 be-like-DEC-SFP  
 "Someone said." "A swarm of locusts seem to have went by."

(2) A: Ke saram-i mwue-lako kulayssni?  
 the man-NOM what-DECL-COMP say-PAST-INTER  
 "What did the man say?"

B: Nayil-kkaci ton-ul ponay-lakwu-yo.  
 tomorrow-until money-ACC send-IMPER-SFP-SL  
 "(He told me that) Send the money until tomorrow."

On the other hand, another function of SFP-KO is exemplified by the following ones, which do not have the recoverability of performative meaning, such as " 'someone'-ka 'I'-eke malhayssta", and hence do not have immediate connection with indirect quotation. Instead, the speaker appears to show an assertive attitude, by incorporating an affective part of his emotion.

Referring to information that is known, or previously prepared, to the speaker, the particle takes a persuasive role of revealing the speaker's wish for the conveyed message to be accepted. Here, the speaker appears to bring the connotation of emphasis, possibly being used to assert the speaker's opinion that modifies a factual state of hearsay information.

(3) Ce casik-i celay poyto cwumek-un sey-takwu. (iThoci<sub>i</sub> 9:349)  
 that boy that appear-but fist-TOP strong-DEC-SFP  
 "(I am sure) That boy is good at fist-fight, despite his appearance."

(4) Nampyen sarang-un-yo, yeca haki nalum-i-lakwu-yo.  
 husband love-TOP-SL woman doing depending-be-SFP-SL  
 "Love from husband depends on woman's doing."

Continuing with the examples just considered, it has to be also noted that, in the following (5) and (6), a speaker's subjectivity can be reflected in the absence of the speech articulated by someone else. Instead, what is said by the speaker comes from a consideration of his/her own experience or inner consciousness. This may be seen extraneous to the dichotomy of someone's speech and speaker's thought, insofar as we stand in a position of presupposing the existence of previous utterance by someone else. With regard to this, I have argued in J. Kim(1999) that, in the context of echo questions, speaker's inner consciousness can be a surrogate of previous utterance.<sup>6</sup> In this vein,

<sup>6</sup> On the other hand, Noh (1998)'s meta-representational explanation seems to draw a parallel con-

by ascribing the status of previous utterance to speaker's stream of consciousness or ongoing experience, we can rely on speaker's authority that regulates the subjective meaning of SFP-KO, in the context of declarative statements, in addition to the context of echo questions.

- (5) Kong-ipali, ike elmana mekko sipess-tako!  
 Bean-leaves, this how-much eat like-to-PAST-SFP  
 "Bean leaves, how much did I like to eat this!"
- (6) Na-nun ku salam-i sil-takwu-yo.  
 I-TOP that man-NOM dislike-SFP-SL  
 "I really dislike that man."

Namely, by subjecting some direct access to one's own narrative viewpoint to a foreground of speaker's utterance, it seems possible to deal with the above (3) and (4), in parallel with (5) and (6). It is accordingly sensible to take all these examples under the class of one type of SFP-KO function, without collapsing the dichotomy between 'Speech' and 'Thought'<sup>7</sup>

Now, let's turn to considering the following, in which the dialogue text signals that the speaker is to express a sense of subjectivity, possibly in a voice of assertion. An earlier suggestion for this use was once given by Sohn (1996). In a position to take this particle as a product from 'the grammaticalization of speakers' subjective attitudes and opinions' (Palmer 1986), she pointed out that the functional change has developed in the directionality from quotative particle to reinforcement marker, bringing about an increase in the speaker involvement.

- (7) Ney, kuken an toyyo.  
 yes that-YOP NEG-be-good
- Swulcip-pota naul kess han phwun eps-takwu-yo. (<Thoci>  
 wine-bar-than be-better not a bite NOT-be-DECL-SFP-SL  
 7:234)

"Yeah, that is no good. It is, even in a bite, no better than being in a wine-bar."

- (8) "Pelmokkkwun kachi hemhan peli-ga eti tto issul-lako."  
 tree-laborer like tough job anywhere again be-DECL-SFP  
 "Could there be a tough job like forest-laborer anywhere?"

nection between unexpressed speech and articulated thought, by extending the notion of echoicness to 'unspoken but attributed thoughts' of the speaker.

<sup>7</sup> But little more is examined here about some probable difficulties: For example, if we have to deal with speech, in connection with thought, there will be a lot of complexity in tracking point of view.

"Hemhakilong koangpwu-to kulessci. Ku patak-un te  
for-toughness mine-laborer-also be-as-such that field-TOP more  
hemha-takwu." (<Thoci> 6:278)  
be-tough-SFP

"Working as mine-laborer is also tough. It's more tough in that field."

As the examples imply, the reinforced meaning is encoded from the activation of the speaker's subjectivity. Then, accounting for the degree of assertion or involvement of the speaker must concentrate on the property of epistemic markers, about which Bybee, Perkins, and Pagliuca (1994:179) noted, "markers of epistemic modality indicate something less than a total commitment by the speaker to the truth of the proposition."<sup>8</sup> A basic issue in this respect is to decide whether the reinforcement function of SFP-KO is derived from the quotative function of a complementizer. Then, if this is indeed the case, how can we capture the correlation between different uses of 'ko,' and clarify the reason why they emerge to interact with each other?

First of all, it is necessary to notice that the meaning of indirect quotation has been derived from the information obtained somehow from the source of someone's utterance, thereby suggesting that the report of the propositional content is presumably factual. Meanwhile, given that a speaker obtains the information from second-hand source, his reaction to the information must be encoded with his attitudinal judgement attuned to the evidentiality, which reflects the reliability of knowledge, the mode of knowing, and the source of knowledge, in the sense of Chafe (1986) and others.

In the literature, such as Palmer (1986), Chafe (1986), and recently in Itani (1998) for Japanese '-tte,' the main function of a hearsay particle is said to indicate diminished speaker commitment to the truth of the proposition expressed.<sup>9</sup> In this characterization, the notion 'commitment' gives us a tricky problem, in that their ideas are not clear about the contiguity of different degrees and would have a limitation in uniformly explaining a representative function of SFP-KO.

Thus, there immediately arise some problems: (1) how to determine which properties are wearing through a contiguity along different degrees of speaker commitment,

<sup>8</sup> In Traugott(1989)'s account, on the other hand, semantic development is driven by the rules of conversation with meaning becoming more and more situated in the "speaker's attempt to regulate communication with others," that is, in the conventionalization of subjectivized meaning, or what she calls 'pragmatic strengthening.'

<sup>9</sup> In Japanese linguistics, the evidential property of the sentence-final particle 'tte,' having very similar function with Korean SFP 'ko,' has been explained by Itani (1998), Okamoto (1995), and Suzuki (1998), while the form and function of Korean 'ko' is not isomorphic with the ones of Japanese 'tte,' a colloquial version of 'to.' Itani (1998) noted that different degrees of speaker commitment are contextually inferred with the help of 'tte' indicating that the proposition expressed is second-hand information, in that the speaker says what he has heard and might not have direct evidence for.

and (2) how to capture the constraints between strong and weak commitment. Prior to answering these questions, let's consider another piece of evidence, in the following, to show that '-*tako*' imports more subjectivity than other sentence-ending suffixes. As the turn of the speech goes on, the speaker employs '-*tako*' at A2 and then '-*tanikka*' at A3. The replacement in this sequence exemplifies that '-*tako*' has the meanings of reinforcement markers, which are stronger than that of the suffix '-*e*' at A1.

- (9) A1: Ai, chwuwe. ("Oh, it's cold!")  
 B: Mwe? ("What?")  
 A2: Chwup-takwu. ("So cold.")  
 B: Chwuwe? ("Are you cold?")  
 A3: Kulay, chwup-tanikka. ("Yes, So much cold.")  
 B: Alkeysse. Mwun tatulke. ("OK. I will close the door.")

At this dialogue, the choice of the suffixes seems to show different types of speech events, by which different degrees of reinforcement need to be distinguished. At the turn of A1, the suffix '-*e*' represents that, as suggested by H. Lee(1993), the speaker is acclimated to the information. Going further from this stance, with the replacement by '-*tako*' and '-*tanikka*,' the speaker shows such an increasing gradation of subjective meanings that the speaker adheres to the credibility of the conveyed propositional content.

As we have considered so far, the use of SFP-KO is closely related with the subjectivity of a speaker, mostly undertaken by the 1st-person pronoun 'I.' Sohn (1996) also noted that the most frequent subject of the sentence-final '-*ko*' is 1st person. As can be seen in (10), this observation is worthy of being accepted as general tendency. However, I set out to point out that this tendency is not fully general, and I rather show an alternative observation that the subjectivity of 1st person speaker is usually intervened, though the subject is not 1st person. This implies that '-*ko*' is used to assert the speaker's own opinion, and reinforce the message.

- (10) Meypwu        kekceng mallanikka! Na cincakpwuthe alko  
 brother-in-law worry    not-do-SFP I    already        know-PROG-DEC-SFP  
 issess-**tako**.

"Brother, don't worry." "I have already known (the fact)."

Cincwu patakesse kukell nwuga    molla? (<Thoci> 9:310)  
 'Cincwu' city        area    that-ACC who    not-know

"Who doesn't know that in this narrow area of Cincwu?"

The speaker's commitment appears to be embedded in all cases of the uses of SFP-KO, whereas in the non-final uses, the complementizer 'ko' does not introduce the speaker's commitment. Another piece of evidence in favour of maintaining this distinction can be obtained by testing the cancellability of the propositional content driven by the particle 'ko.' In (11), for example, where the particle 'ko' is used as a complementizer, the information of the embedded clause can be denied by the negative predication of the matrix clause. The observation of this cancellability shows that the complement clause does include the attitudinal meaning of 3rd person speaker, but not 1st person 'I.'

- (11) Kot cungkwen-i olul ke-lako kuleciman kulessci anhul keya.  
 soon stocks-NOM rise it-be-SFP. hey-say-but such not it-be-DECL  
 "someone think/say that stock prices will rise soon, but (I think) it will not rise."

In contrast to (11), the following (12), taking the particle 'ko' at the final, has the recoverability of the modal parenthetical with the placement of the 1st person speaker 'I,' i.e. '*I think*', unlike the '*someone think*' for (11). It follows from this property that the sentence with SFP-KO in (12) cannot be denied in the subsequent follow-up by the same speaker. This contrast of denial between (11) and (12) is a good piece of evidence to support the conception that SFP-KO invites the speaker's commitment in all cases, either strong or weak, whereas sentence-medial particle (or complementizer) does not.<sup>10</sup>

- (12) Kot cungkwen-i olul ke-lako. \*kulessci anhul keya.  
 soon stocks-NOM rise it-be-SFP. such not it-be-DECL  
 "I think that stock prices will rise soon. \*but (I think) it will not rise."

However, in the context of interrogatives as in the following (13), what is said by the

<sup>10</sup> There is also a similar example to show the relationship between the two factors: Frajzyniec(1985:245) observes that Czech and Polish have dubitative particles to indicate the reduced factual status of a proposition that is spoken by someone else. For example, in Polish, as in (1), the dubitative particle 'niby' attributes the content of the proposition to a person other than the speaker.

- (1) Powiedział ze niby jest chory.  
 he said that Dub is sick  
 He said that he was sick, but that may not be true.
- (2) ?Powiedziałem ze niby jestem chory  
 I said that Dub I am sick  
 ?I said that I was sick, but I lied.



preceding clause of echo question can be denied in the follow-up. This observation confirms that, compared to (12), 1st person speaker's commitment is not necessarily relevant to the credibility of the clause in interrogatives.

- (13) Kot cungkwen-i olul ke-lako? kulessci anhul keya.  
 "Does someone/you think/say that stock prices will rise soon? But (I think) it will not rise.

On the basis of our discussion so far, it seems clear that contextual meanings of SFP-KO are closely related with the emergence of the 1st-person speaker's recognition. Thus, the most essential ingredient for the invariant meaning of SFP-KO is the emergence of the speaking self at the center of perceiving (non-)hearsay information.

### 3. Epistemic Stance of Modality

This section suggests that the contextual meaning of SFP 'ko' is sensitive to the distinction between proposition and modality. We note that the proposition to which SFP-KO contributes must be constructed relative to the scale of epistemic strength: more than simply adding information to a proposition, rather, they situate a proposition within a sort of information exchange, at one extreme of which is the indication of the speaker's confidence, insistence, or degree of commitment to the proposition. Thus, the proposition to which the particle 'ko' is appended must be situated within the epistemic version of alternatives between speaker's and hearer's stances, further making it possible to express the interpersonal relationship between the speaker's thought and someone else's speech.

Take a close look at the following example, in which the sentence with SFP-KO reflects a private state of perception of the speaker. Based on this observation, it is possible to say that, in the absence of someone's utterance, only the speaker's thought can be attributed to the epistemic modality, the commitment strength of which would be occasionally ambiguous as to the degree of commitment to the assertion. This utterance can be the object of the private perception of the current speaker, and the attitudinal meaning is implicitly situated between the proposition and the modality.<sup>11</sup>

- (14) a. Am, Am, kuken tullimepnun il-i-lakwu. (iThoci<sub>i</sub> 5:105)  
           that clear           thing-be-SFP  
           "OK, OK, that is perfectly clear thing."

<sup>11</sup> In this respect, it is very close to the class of subjective sentences to be called "represented thoughts" by Banfield (1982).

- b. *Nam-uy* mansek sallim samkhessta-myen  
 others-GEN plenty wealth intercept-past-DECL-if  
*ku swuwan-to alapwa cwueya han-takwu.* (<Thoci>5:104<sub>i</sub>)  
 the skill-DEL note worth deserve-SFP  
 "As he ate up other person's plenty wealth,  
 his skill deserves worth drawing attention."

But it also seems that, if the speaker's thought may have been supported or consolidated by someone's utterance, the private idea of the speaking self is likely to be shadowed by the public ideas of someone else. In this respect, I adopt two kinds of epistemic agents, one is called 'Self(S)' and the other is called 'Other or Other-than-the-Self/Speaker(OTS)'. Before we proceed, let us be clear about the ambivalent notions 'Self' and 'Other,' since these will be the central notions for judging the second-hand nature of hearsay information. Frawley(1992) noted that the source of knowledge can be assessed from the viewpoint of epistemic center, including the distinction of the 'self' (as in judgements) and the 'other' (= non-self) (as in hearsay). This distinction lays out the epistemic stance by providing the grounds for the source of the modality itself. Regarding the data we have considered so far, it is possible to admit two kinds of perceptive spaces taking the recoverability of epistemic verb, as well as the 'saying' verb, as in (15a) for 'self' and (15b) for 'other.' In this parenthetical formulation, the epistemic verb that takes 1st-person pronoun 'I' has its counterpart in the 'saying' verb with 3rd person pronoun, as if they are two sides of a coin in the exchange of communication. An epistemic verb, such as 'think', 'suppose', and 'believe,' indicates a private state of perception of the speaker, in proportion to the strength of speaker commitment.

- (15) a. [S-ka [...]-(la/ta)ko [epistemic verb]]  
 b. [OTS-ka [...]-(la/ta)ko [epistemic verb]]

Moreover, it should be noted here that the source of the information may lie in different starting points of perception; one is from someone's utterance, and the other is speaker's thought. Given that a speaker respects the evidential authority of the information by way of someone's utterance, the speaker's utterance with SFP-KO can incorporate affective commitment, which comes from the combination between someone's utterance and speaker's thought. As pointed out by Aijmer (1996), epistemic modality can be analysed in terms of the type and strength of evidence and who 'owns' the evidence. For example, parenthetical expressions such as 'I believe,' 'I think,' can be regarded as evidentials with unspecified evidence. That is, evidential markers may refer to the person who is responsible for the reliability of knowledge. The speaker has direct (or indirect) access to someone else's informing about the proposition, in a

style like (16a). Then, his report of the information takes implicitly the recovery of 'according to (OTS=someone)' as in (16b).

- (16) a. [OTS-ka S-eke [...]-]-(la)ko malhayssta]  
 b. a report by S: "According to OTS, [...]"

That is, a construction like (16a) provides the ground for the speaker 'S' to report a piece of information from the source of 'OTS.' In case the characters of 'OTS' are unspeakable at on-the-floor situation, they can be implicitly paraphrased by 'according to [X]' phrase, which presupposes that someone's utterance was given to the speaker in the past, and is reported in the present state of the speaker's utterance. Thus, while paraphrasing the modal part into 'according to [X]' phrase, the [X] takes the indefinite role of someone who provided the information source in the past and hence retains the reliability of hearsay information. Even if the current speaker cannot commit himself to the responsibility for the truthfulness of the information, there can be various kinds of information status, pictured by Chafe (1986) in the mode of (17).

- (17) a. belief: I think, I guess, I suppose  
 b. induction: must, obvious, seem to, evidently  
 c. sensory evidence: I see, I hear, I feel  
 d. hearsay evidence: people say, they say, I've been told  
 e. deduction: presumably, should, would, could

If the evidence is wholly from the speaker's inner consciousness, it has no connection with the OTS origin, despite the speaker's desire to emphasize the factuality of the information. In some cases, on the other hand, if the propositional content concerns only the speaker's perception, the function of reinforcement marker can be fulfilled without recourse to the enhanced acceptance based on the OTS's evidential authority. As support for this idea, the following examples show that the speaker in (18a) reports his inner stream of consciousness, and the speaker in (18b) reports the emotional evaluation towards some past experience. A minor difference is that (18a) is a monologue excluding the presence of speech level marker 'yo,' whereas (18b) is not.

- (18) a. Chenha-e cwukil nyen kathuni-lakwu/\*lakwu-yo. (<Thoci 9:415>)  
 that dammed woman be-like-DECL-SFP  
 "She is like a dammed woman."  
 b. Acessiye, apeci-ka elmana kitaless-tako-yo. (<Thoci  
 uncle father-NOM how-long wait-PST-DECL-SFP-SL  
 10:22>)

"Uncle! (You know) How long have father waited for?"

It is noted in Palmer (1986:76) that some languages force their speakers to modulate their assertions by the speaker "projecting to the hearer." As mentioned earlier, Frawley (1992:412) suggests that a simple and unified account of epistemic modality is possible by taking the categories of source/direction of knowledge and the scale of strength of knowledge. By applying directionality to the source of knowledge, the scaling of epistemic modality has been categorized as follows.

Source of Knowledge	Strength of Knowledge
<u>from</u> the Self	necessary > possible (scaled categories of inference)
<u>to</u> the Self	visual > auditory > other senses > feel (scaled categories of sensation)
<u>from</u> the Other	quote > report > hearsay > other (scaled categories of external information)
<u>to</u> the Other	other > all else (scaled categories of participants)

This conception of scalar strength of knowledge suggests the degree of the speaker's dependence on the source of the information, and it should be noted that the directionality 'from' the other 'to' the other, or conversely, can be characterized in terms of where the evidence of the information is located. Since the channels for the speaker to gain access to external information can be scalarized in analogy with the above ones, the cognitive framework for deciding the authoritative or responsible characters as the source of previously established information may be simulated in terms of the above conceptions of scales. Then, there remains a necessity of developing a unified notion of knowledge, in terms of evidentiality.

#### 4. Subjectivity and Factuality

We have seen that the parentheticals such as "*I think ...*" or "*I believe ...*," presuppose the embedding of the subjectivity of current speaker as 'I' at a center of the perception. The discussion of subjectivity continues in this chapter, in which we turn our attention to these two points: (1) Reliability of knowledge can be determined in connection with the exchange of information between someone's utterance and speaker's thought, and (2) Speaker's Subjectivity is created by presupposing the presence of this character's active consciousness, based on the judgement of the factuality.

By factuality, I mean a speaker is in a position to identify the information that has been previously prepared and assimilated to the speaker's thought. So far, we limited our attention only to epistemic modality, the source indicator of which is linked to the current speaker, but not to deontic modality.<sup>12</sup> However, SFP-KO seems to partly express deontic modality, given that a report associates the propositional information with some socio-physical force. For example, frequent cooccurrences with the retrospective suffix '-te-', as in the below, indicate that the speaker is only an inactive observer and minimally involved in an event that is underlain by socio-physical force. We will return to this issue later in section 6.

- (20) Kulen cwul alassnuntey, alko            poni kukey  
 such as know-CON, know-ASP that not-the-case-RETRO-DEC-SFP  
 ani-te-lakwu.

"At first I took it for granted, but later I noticed that it's not really the case."

There are also some cases where the particle 'ko' represents the meaning of causal relation, which seem to be more directed towards the deontic modality. In the following examples, the occurrence of '-(ta)ko' conveys the meaning of subordinate or causal connectives, such as '-nikka' or '-se.' Hence, the subordinate clause with '-tako' has the subjective meaning in its own right and indicates that the basis of the speaker's claim owes to some socio-physical force. These uses, annotated as QP(= quotative particle) in the glossing, seem to be derived through the development of sentence-final use, while keeping the recoverability of the matrix verb '-ha.' What can be claimed about all these examples is that the strengthened meaning for the validation of the information took part in the establishment of this causal meaning.

- (21) Mikkulecin kim-e swiekan-tako, wuri-to yekise han swum toliko kapsita.  
 be-slipped happen rest-QP            we-DEL here one breath relax go-PROP  
 "As the proverb says, once slipped for rest, let's take a break here for a breath."

- (22) Nayil il-ul al swu ep-tako,  
 tomorrow thing-ACC know-NEG-QP until-today-TOP all

<sup>12</sup> Palmer (1986) made a distinction between evidentials and judgements, of which epistemic modality is composed, as depicted as follows. However, Aijmer(1996) points out that this distinction is somewhat fuzzy in that a modal element may be a combination of judgement and evidence.

- (1) epistemic modality  
 a. judgements: opinion, degree of knowledge  
 b. evidentials: hearsay, perceptual evidence

onulkkaci-nun ta kethnayya han-tako hapnita.  
 finish do-QP say-DECL

"As being unable to know tomorrow's things, we should finish all things today."

(23) Ipen Kyewul-e nalssi-ka chwuwuess-tako, kaynali-ka nucke pintayyo.  
 this winter weather-NOM be-cold-PST-QP Forsythia late blossom


"It is heard that, as the weather was cold this winter, the flower 'Forsythia' shall blossom late."

As mentioned earlier, an important point is that speaker's subjectivity is created by presupposing the presence of the speaker's evaluation towards the proposition. Here I assume that an ordinary speaker may seek for interpersonal relationship with the characters that participate in the process of the utterance or representation of the information. At the same weight, I assume that a speaker has no intention of maligning or distorting the information provided by someone else. Here, we can admit that reporting external information is the exchange of facts. Given this, we further assume that the speaker may have an opinion, taking the force of belief, without being supported by external information, i.e. by the facts provided by others. In this case, the subjectivity of the speaker is more likely based on the judgement of the factuality. Here, the speaker's stance toward the outer source of information can be classified in two ways: as in (24a) and (24b), respectively. An obvious distinction between these two is that an epistemic parenthetical '*I believe*' takes place only as in (24b), but not as in (24a).

(24) a. "This would be fully supported or acknowledged by others."

b. "This is naturally evident, I believe, regardless of the outer evidence."

Our discussion is intended to confirm that the correlation between factuality and subjectivity is on a par with the distinction between proposition and modality. An important idea for supporting this view is given by Sanders and Spooren (1996), i.e. the notion 'subjectification' was presented as in the picture of (25). Among the three states of 'subjectification,' the shifting of a speaker's viewpoint as 'I' triggers the modification of the proposition. From this modification, it follows that the subjectivity is encoded. Thus, as exemplified in (26), different degrees of subjectification are highly sensitive to embedding 1st-person speaker into the proposition modified.



- (26) a. 'no' subjectification: John is at home.  
 b. 'some' subjectification: John must be/must stay at home.  
 c. 'full' subjectification: I think John is at home.

Sanders and Spooren (1996) is very suggestive of the importance of the speaking person 'I' for defining the notion of 'self.' Here, the speaker's territory of information needs to incorporate the scale of the extended 'self' consciousness. This can be seen more clearly in the following (27). Here, assuming that an average Korean have the right to defend the nation's exclusive ownership of the island in the East Sea, this position is to be supported by anyone within the social atmosphere surrounding the speaker, possibly close to the 'inter-dependently motivated self' if they can be uni-vocal in a movement for insisting the ownership. Suppose that someone is positively committed to the ownership of the island. If the certainty of the factuality is not accepted, contrary to speaker's expectation, he/she will defend that positive commitment by asserting the illocution like (28a), not (28b). In this sense, (29) has an assertive illocution similar to the one by the rhetorical question in (29).

- (27) Tokto-nun nwu-ka mwue-layto hankwuk ttang-i-lakwu.  
 island-TOP anyone-NOM whatever-say Korean territory.  
 "Whatever to say, the island 'Tokto' must be Korean territory.
- (28) a. It is absolutely true that the island 'Tokto' pertains to the territory of Korea.  
 b. I don't know if it is true or not that the island 'Tokto' pertains to the territory of Korea.
- (29) Tokto-ka Hankwuk ttang-i-ci Ilpon ttang-inya?  
 'Tokto Island'-NOM Korean land-COP-CONN Japanese  
 land-COP-INTER

"The island 'Tokto' is surely Korean territory, and how come it is Japanese territory?"

Given that the speaker may set out an attitudinal force between two types of presumptive statements, i.e. "It is true that ..." versus "I don't know it is true or not that ...," what are meant by (2) conveys a piece of previously prepared information that has been already acclimated to the speaker. In the sense of Suzuki (1998), an illustration of underlying meta-message, possibly in (2), as well as in (1), concerning the evidential status of hearsay information, may be something like 'somebody else would be saying this, too: this is an unbiased, objective piece of information,' which signifies that the speaker's conception of psychological distance must incorporate the ones of other-than-the-speaker, i.e. somebody else.<sup>13</sup>

More striking evidence can be afforded by comparing the difference of meanings that are associated with '-kun' and '-(ta)ko'. Lee (1983) attempted to characterize discourse-pragmatic factors, such as factuality and informativeness, differentiating epistemic modal suffixes in Korean. While accepting the cognitive bifurcation between newly acquired information and previously prepared information, he noted that the information conveyed by the suffix '-kun' has the nature of 'non-factual' and 'non-informative', and also characterized '-kun' as expressing "consciously known but unasimilated" information. The unavailability of '-kwuna' versus '-takwu/tako' provides a piece of evidence in support of the idea that the relevant distinction between these two suffixes is based on the speaker's judgement of the factuality.

(30) A: Pyeng-i nase yakkapsi ep-takwu.

B: Um, kuke cham ttakhake tway-kwuna. (<Thoci> 6:376)

To make this point clearer, it is worth noting Guillemin-Flescher (1999:169)'s idea, such that exclamations are compatible with intensive degree only. Comparing from (31a) thorough (31c), intensive degree marked by an adverb 'how' suggests that the informational status is newly perceived. Likewise, in (32), taking the adverb 'elmana' (which means 'how much') as being only consistent with previously prepared information, among the three potential suffixal endings in (32), only the '-tako' in (32a) can be cooccurrent with the adverb 'elmana.' This observation suggests that SFP-KO is used on the basis of the factuality of previously prepared information, but not of newly perceived information.

<sup>13</sup> It will be also worth examining that the second-hand nature of hearsay information is supplied by the speaker's evaluative processes in such a way that the perceptual categories of the discourse participants' psychological distances fall somewhere within a continuum of commitment, possibly in terms of Kamio (1997)'s theory of information.



- (31) a. Qualification of a subject: He is rich.  
 b. Qualification with intensity of degree: He is so rich.  
 c. Predication restricted to evaluating degree: How rich he is!
- (32) a. Ku saram-i elmana ton-i manh-takwu.  
 the man-NOM how-much money-NOM have  
 "(I know) How rich the man is!"  
 b. \*Ku saram-i elmana ton-i manh-kwuna.  
 c. \*Ku saram-i elmana ton-i manh-a.

## 5. '-tako', '-tay': Evidentials with Different Authority

'-tay' is mostly used to refer to the information whose evidence is not fully certain, but '-tako' can refer the information, the evidence of which is comparatively certain to a speaker. One major difference in their forms is that '-tay' has already underwent the cliticization process with the verb '-ha' (i.e. '-tako' + '-ha-' → '-tay'), whereas '-tako' is associated with the recoverability of elliptical '-ha.' With respect to the degree of certainty, the evidential status between these two items are distinguishable, which is likely open to the development of independent stability in their uses. However, (33) illustrates the case where the suffix '-tay' can be interchangeable with '-tako,' whereas (34) cannot. Since the propositional content of (34) concerns the perception of the speaker, as signified from the use of the adverb 'cham' (= 'very') representing the intervention of the speaker's subjectivity, the speaker uttering (34) poses a glimpse of his emotion. Thus, '-tay' cannot be used appropriately in (34), in that it does not encode the speaker subjective reaction, but merely reports the speech event from the past, with regard to the validation of evidentiality.

- (33) Ce nyesok-i kulayto cwumek-un {sey-takwu, sey-tay}.  
 that boy that appear-but fist-TOP strong-DEC-SFP  
 "That boy is good at fist-fight, despite his appearance."
- (34) Canayn cham {taytanha-takwu, ??\*taytanha-tay}.  
 you really be-great-DEC-SFP  
 "You are really great!"

Let's note in this connection that a sentence with '-tay' takes 3rd-person indefinite character (also labelled 'OTS') as the subject of narrative parenthetical performative, whereas a sentence with '-tako' ending tends to have 1st-person subject. and its recoverable performative meaning is the epistemic one that takes the predicate comparable

to the 1st-person subject. These two suffixes, '-tay' and 'tako,' can be distinguished in terms of degrees of evidential status of the conveyed information. What is encoded by '-tay' is that the speaker does not have direct experience, but obtained the information through hearsay. Thus the evidence for the information, as being uncertain or unvalidated, do not have to be committed to the speaker's direct perception. On the other hand, the use of '-tako' tends to import an increased commitment of the speaker to the validation of the information, since the speaker signals that the evidence for the information is not determined wholly from outside source, but placed within the speaker's responsibility to validate the adequacy of the information.

For these reasons, the distinction between '-tay' and '-tako' is sensitive to the degree of speaker's responsibility on evidentiality. This characterization, however, comes as nothing insightful, as each language has its own elaborated marking device of evidential categories. For a better understanding of different meanings of evidential suffixes, another clear example, seemingly being on a par with different suffixes '-tay' and '-tako' for Korean, can be taken from the Quechua tripartite paradigm, as observed in Weber(1986). In this language, the speaker must exercise caution in the amount of responsibility he assumes for information, given the three evidential suffixes '-mi', '-shi', and '-chi.' These items have been characterized as follows, i.e., with '-mi' the speaker assumes responsibility, with '-shi' he defers it to someone else, and with '-chi' he does not defer the responsibility to any one.

- (35) a. '-mi' indicates that the speaker is convinced about what he is saying.  
 b. '-shi' indicates that the speaker has obtained the information that he is supplying through hearsay.  
 c. '-chi' indicates that the speaker's statement is a conjecture.

As annotated in Weber(1986:139) for (36), in a situation that a diviner has chewed coca and predicts death, the use of '-mi' brings the force of meaning in (37a), whereas the uses of '-shi' and '-chi' bring the ones in (37b) and (37c), respectively. It appears, then, that degrees of speaker commitment are lexicalized distinctively by taking the assumed placement of the responsibility as an important ingredient of evidentiality.

- (36) Wanu-nqa-paq-mi, shi, chi  
 die-3FUT-FUT  
 'It will die.'

- (37) a. witness by '-mi': said by the diviner  
 "(I assert that) it will die."  
 b. report by '-shi': said by someone who brings the diviner's prediction  
 "(I was told that) it will die."

- c. conjecture by '-chi': said in response to the diviner/messenger  
 "(Perhaps) it will die."

Likewise, Korean '-tay' and '-tako' may be conceived of being distinctively hosted with adequate validation of speaker's commitment or responsibility, but very often they do not. Rather, they tend to be interchangeable, as in the above (33), though not in cases like (34). '-tako' does not have the characteristic of non-direct quotation, in contrast to the direct form '-tay,' since the evidence is likely to be adequate, rather than being insufficient.

Finally, it is useful to review the activation of 'self' identity between '-tako' and '-tay' by examining their cooccurrences with the suffix '-te-,' which has been known to take the combined senses of retrospection and report. Let's recall that, when employing '-te-,' a speaker's commitment to the described situation stays apart from immediate responsibility, and despite a participatory role as an observer, the speaker does not go further than a realm of 'observationally accessible location,' which was labelled by K. Lee (1993). Based on this idea, I have noted in J. Kim(2000) that the speaker commitment by '-te-' is essentially fixed in a single mode of inactivity, free from speaker's intention.

With this in mind, a final observation worth noting is that '-te-' is neutral with respect to the distinction between speaker's thought and someone's speech. Given that '-tako' reports what the speaker have in mind, '-telakwu' in (38a) necessarily introduces the embedding of the speaker. On the contrary, given that '-tay' introduces the embedding of someone else, '-telay' in (38b) does report what was said by someone else, without the intervention of 'I.' Based on the property of neutrality of '-te-' between the distinction of epistemic modification, we have the items for retrospection, as in (39a) and (39b).

- (38) a. Sihem-i acwu elyep-te-lakwu.  
 exam-NOM very be-difficult-retro-SFP.  
 "I think/say, the exam was very difficult."  
 b. Sihem-i koingcanghi elyep-te-lay.  
 "someone said, the exam was very difficult."
- (39) a. [+speaker]: -telako = '-te-' + '-tako'  
 b. [+someone else]: -telay = '-te-' + '-tay' (= '-tako' + '-ha')

However, despite the distinction in (39), a large portion of Korean speakers tend to interchangeably use '-tay' and '-tako.' Admitting that this is indeed the case, we may advance a reason for that, by considering some factors in terms of ethnical or cultural

background. We continue to discuss this idea in the next section, concentrating on a view that Korean speakers are more likely to undertake the identify of 'self' in connection with the utterances or opinions of someone else.

## 6. 'Self' Identity on Cultural Background

We noticed in the discussion so far that the use of SFP-KO situates the proposition within a sort of evidential information. I end in this section by suggesting an alternative view of 'self' identity, which seems to be reinforcing with the interpersonal relation between speaker and someone else. Behind this approach is the assumption that we may define the speaker's subjectivity in terms of cultural relativity. Markus & Kitayama (1991) differentiated two types of construals of the self, as follows.

- (40) a. Independent View of Self  
b. Inter-dependent View of Self

They noted that people in different cultures have strikingly different construals of the self, of others, and of the independence between self and others, which can influence on the nature of individual experience, including cognition, emotion, and motivation. They also noted that, in eastern countries, the identity of 'self' includes a sense of interdependence and of one's status as a participant in a larger social unit. On this view, one may conceive a man of being likely to prefer expressing one's own narrative point-of-view with the consciousness of 'inter-dependently motivated self'.

- (41) Mean perceived similarity of Self-to-Other and Other-to-Self by subjects with Eastern and Western cultural backgrounds.  
a. Eastern: Self-to-Other > Other-to-Self  
b. Western: Self-to-Other < Other-to-Self

The representation of the speaker's thought can be seen in terms of two aspects: Thinking as a mental state, which is not addressee-oriented, and thinking as a quasi-communicative act, which is addressee-oriented (Hirose 1995). If the speaker wants to consolidate his/her addressee-oriented communicative act, he will be likely to lean towards the consciousness of 'inter-dependently motivated self.'

On the other hand, we need to understand the way in which the second-hand hearsay information could be situated in the consciousness of the 1st-person speaker. There are two kinds of directionality of the processing of the information, one of which is that if the completion of the knowledge acclimation is done and then brings the subjectivity of the speaker, what is conveyed by the speaker has the illocution of assertion, whereas

the other directionality is that if the speech merely reports a piece of information in a state of incomplete processing within the consciousness of the speaker, it is to be understood as a euphemistic way, i.e. in such a way which the information is not fully situated as to be supported by the belief or confidence of the speaker.

## 7. Conclusion

We have seen that the particle 'ko' at sentence-final retains the property of double-voiced discourse, simultaneously expressing two different intentions. Our discussion explained the narrative function of the particle in pursuit of the ideas as follows.

First, the evidentiality of second-hand information develops from the epistemically articulated evaluation between self-source and other-than-self source, i.e. on-the-floor speech vs. someone else's authority. As support for the double-voiced nature from the combination of speaker's thought and someone's utterance, I proposed an alternative view to resolve the indeterminacy between self-quotation and hearsay, by subjecting degrees of speaker commitment to the sensitivity between proposition and modality.

In particular, the articulation of the social force of someone else's (= other than the speaker's) second-hand information leads us to convincingly explain the polysemic nature of the hearsay SFP 'ko,' i.e. the perceived similarity in communicative functions. Furthermore, by showing that the speaker's thought draws on incorporating a scalar representation of self-consciousness, I made a refined assessment of speaker commitment, i.e. the modality between someone's speech and speaker's thought is activated from the combination of interjecting an interdependently-motivated speaker's subjectivity and redeeming the socio-physical force of other-than-the-speaker. It is quite likely that different degrees of commitment reflects the speaker's spontaneous reaction to previously prepared information, on the basis of the evidential nature of speaker narration.

In proportion to the speaker's perception scale, with or without the role of 'someone else,' varying degrees of speaker commitment, being either strong or weak, turn out to take the function of reinforcement, being a product of interjecting the social force of 3rd person characters. This implies that the polysemic or multifunctional nature of SFP 'ko' is derived from the cognitive framework for deciding the authoritative or responsible characters as the source of previously prepared information. What emerges from this paper is the conception that the complexity for the combination of speaker's thought and someone's speech can be resolved mainly by tracing back to the location of subjectivity of the speaker as 'I.'

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