Guest Editorial
The Third Round of Migrant Incorporation in East Asia: An Introduction to the Special Issue on Friends and Foes of Multicultural East Asia

Yuki Asahina and Naoto Higuchi

Trends toward an influx of new migrants have been pronounced in East Asia through a development we call the third round of migrant incorporation. At the same time, other features of East Asian societies, such as strong levels of ethnic nationalism, have changed little, posing challenges to multiculturalism. In this introduction to this special issue, we review the latest research trends broadly concerning multiculturalism, migrant groups that have received little attention, racism and xenophobia. We first discuss the state of migrant incorporation in East Asia and the limits of multiculturalism in this region, where various features of the developmental state persist. We then introduce research on voices opposing multiculturalism in East Asia. This introduction highlights what is peculiar—and ordinary—about migrant incorporation and the associated challenges in East Asia.

Keywords: migration, East Asia, developmental state, far right, multiculturalism

1. Introduction

In this century, the economic growth of East Asian countries has brought about a third wave of migration to the region. The first round started at the beginning of the last century and continued to the end of World War II. While East Asia was a region of emigration to North and South America, it experienced intraregional migration under Japan’s imperial rule. On the one hand, a considerable number of Koreans and Chinese migrated to Japan as colonial citizens. On the other hand, Koreans and Japanese settlers moved to Manchuria from 1931 to 1945. Although these

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migration flows stopped with Japan’s defeat in WWII in 1945, they have had a lasting influence on migration issues in the region.

The influx of migrant workers to Japan spurred the second round in the late 1980s, which was soon followed by flows to South Korea and Taiwan. With a labor shortage occurring in the economic boom period of the 1960s, Japan had many reasons to accept foreign workers (Bartram, 2000), but it avoided accepting blue-collar migrant workers until it reluctantly opened the side door and back door in 1990. While South Korea and Taiwan were countries of emigration to the 1980s, rapid economic growth transformed them into labor importing economies from the 1990s. These newly emerging migrant destinations largely adhered to a policy of importing temporary guest workers with a limited period of stay and rights to family reunification (Chung, 2014, 2020). As we argue below, this is the basic feature of developmental states, under which an individual’s rights are often sacrificed for the sake of economic growth and social order (Seol & Skrentny, 2009b).

At the same time, the countries took divergent courses to accept coethnic migrants. Japan opened its doors for descendants of Japanese emigrants living in Latin America and China: these individuals are granted a special visa that allows long-term settlement and family reunification (Kajita et al., 2005). South Korea also favored Korean migrants from China and the former Soviet Union over other migrant workers, but the government neither granted citizenship nor paved the way for permanent residency for these coethnics except for marriage migrants (Seol & Skrentny, 2009a). In contrast, the Taiwanese government did not allow mainland Chinese to work as unskilled workers, although employers overwhelmingly preferred to hire mainland Chinese over workers from other countries (Friedman, 2015). This policy is at least partly based on concerns of the Taiwanese government regarding sudden population growth, national security and social stability (Skrentny et al., 2007).

The third round of migration wave has, first and foremost, been characterized by the emergence of China as a new destination of migrants (Lehmann & Leonard, 2019). With the notable exception of Hong Kong, which has been attracting migrants, especially Southeast Asian domestic workers, for decades (Athukorala, 1999; Constable, 2007; Wong, 2007), China has been one of the top sending countries. Although China is still a net emigration country, its booming economy has attracted migrants such as African entrepreneurs and brides from neighboring countries (Barabantseva & Grillot, 2019; Matthews, 2017).

Other receiving countries have also experienced an increasing number of migrants and the diversification of migrant populations in the last decade. The countries have begun to adopt multiculturalism, although somehow reluctantly, as a policy solution to integrate migrants since the late 2000s (Iwabuchi, Kim & Hsia, 2016; N.-K. Kim, 2016; Kim & Oh, 2012). The countries have also adopted more proactive policies to attract highly skilled migrants. These ‘East Asian’ policy initiatives are also strongly influenced by the principles of developmental states (Kim,
In addition, geopolitical conflicts, a legacy of colonialism and the Cold War, still have strong effects on the migration policies of these countries.

We have also seen the rise of xenophobia and the radical right, which have attracted little scholarly attention in the region. On the one hand, a growing number of works have shed light on racism against African migrants in China (Abebayo & Omololu, 2017; Matthews, 2017). On the other hand, South Korea and Taiwan have experienced compressed modernization, a rapid social change that these countries have achieved over a mere few decades while the same process took two or three centuries to occur in the West (Chang, 1999, p. 31). What has brought about the salience of the radical right in South Korea and Taiwan is resistance to compressed modernity rather than simply the influx of migrants. Likewise, new migration flows from the 1980s have not caused the emergence organized racism in Japan. Instead, Zainichi Koreans, with a century-long history of living in Japan, are the primary target of Japan’s nativist movement, which has been active since the late 2000s (Higuchi, 2021).

In this introduction, we highlight the diversity of migrant incorporation and its discontents in East Asia. A considerable amount of research has already focused on gendered aspects of migration in this region with case studies of marriage migrants and foreign domestic/care workers in East Asia (e.g., Choo, 2016; Constable, 2007; Faier, 2009; Freeman, 2011; Kim, 2018; Lan, 2006; Newendorp, 2008; Yang & Lu, 2010). There are also a variety of recent studies on the coethnic international migration of Japanese, Chinese and Koreans (Brubaker & Kim, 2011; Friedman, 2015; Han, Han & Lee, 2020; Suzuki, 2016; von Baeyer, 2020). As there is already a comprehensive review of migration in East Asia (Fong & Shibuya, 2020), we instead focus on newly emerging phenomena and the latest research trends for this region: multiculturalism, atypical migrants and racism and xenophobia.

2. Friends of multicultural East Asia?

2.1. Multiculturalism in developmental states

Advanced East Asian economies have regarded themselves as homogeneous nation states but have come to promote multicultural policies since the 1990s with the exception of Hong Kong. However, the reality is exactly what Sookyung Kim (2015) describes as a “reversed” gap in migration policies. The gap hypothesis in migration research usually refers to a situation whereby severe rhetoric is employed by the state to regulate migration, but this does not stop actual migration flows. In the case of East Asian multiculturalism, policies proclaim benevolent and generous goals, but their actual implementation is restrictive (Kim, 2015, p. 74).

Taiwan was the first to recognize itself as a multicultural nation in 1997, but this move was not associated with the rights of migrants but with those of aborigines (Kim & Oh, 2012). While policies of the Taiwanese government pertaining to migrants were previously assimilative, they have shifted to promoting multiculturalism. However, the promotion of multiculturalism has been based on “neoliberal” motives to maximize economic gains from incorporating migrants. Cultural
plurality is desirable only insofar as it contributes to economic growth. In fact, children of marital migrants have been expected to serve as cultural and linguistic bridges to strengthen economic relations with Southeast Asian countries because most of their mothers come from Southeast Asian countries such as Vietnam, the Philippines and Indonesia (Lan, 2019).

In contrast, Japan’s idea of multicultural coexistence is rooted in grassroots civic activities, not in an initiative imposed from above. The Great Hanshin Earthquake of 1995 spread the notion of multicultural coexistence throughout the country (Shiobara, 2020). Unlike after the Great Kanto Earthquake of 1923, when panicked Japanese massacred thousands of Koreans, migrants and Japanese are said to have helped each other in 1995. Since then, the notion has been widely used by NGOs and has diffused to local governments. In Japan, migrant organizations generally remain weak except for those of Zainichi Koreans, but promigrant organizations have been actively providing services such as consultation, language courses, lobbying and protest actions (Shipper, 2008). The national government finally published a report on the promotion of multicultural coexistence at the local level in 2006. When the Japanese government formally decided to accept unskilled migrant workers in 2018, the cabinet released guidelines for the acceptance of and coexistence with foreign workers (Takaya, 2019).

The introduction of policies, however, did not mean significant changes in the government’s stance toward promoting the integration of migrants. Critiques of multicultural coexistence have pointed out the following issues (Kajita et al., 2005; Takaya, 2019). First, the notion of multicultural coexistence takes for granted that the government is not responsible for taking the initiative to promote equal and harmonious relationships between culturally different groups, as it is citizens who are responsible for achieving such goals. Indeed, none of the abovementioned policy documents refer to the protection of the human rights of foreign residents as the government’s responsibility (Shiobara, 2020). Second, the idea of multicultural coexistence emphasizes that migrants are local residents rather than (temporary) foreign laborers, which has two negative implications: 1) local governments tend to exclude temporary contract laborers (mostly technical interns) from their policies to promote cultural diversity because they do not consider it necessary to care for those in the country for working for a relatively short period of time and 2) the notion of multicultural coexistence only intends to further mutual understandings of cultural differences between the Japanese and migrants and to negate socioeconomic inequalities between the two groups.

Third, the policies associated with multicultural coexistence are reluctant to address the rights of Zainichi Koreans surrounding colonial settlement (Higuchi, 2016). Local governments avoid making reference to the history of former colonial citizens except for a few instances in which they acknowledged the social movements led by Koreans. In this context, Kyung Hee Ha (2020, in this issue) sheds light on the dilemma of multicultural coexistence that the Korean minority population faces in Japan, analyzing political strategies employed by Korean schools and their supporters to pursue recognition from the Japanese government. According to her, in their efforts to gain recognition as deserving and sympathetic subjects, Korean schools are trapped in
what political theorist Patchen Markell calls a “permanent temptation” to pursue “recognition.” Although administrators and supporters of these schools understand the hypocritical nature of multicultural coexistence, they have little choice but to rely on the very idea of which they are highly critical.

Multiculturalism in South Korea has followed a different track. Similar to Japan, South Korea is a country with weak migrant organizations except for Korean Chinese (J. Kim, 2016) and strong promigrant organizations. In the 1990s, migrant-supporting NGOs were keen to learn from their Japanese counterparts and imported the idea of multiculturalism from Japan (Kim, 2015). The NGOs then gained leverage to become a driving force behind the abolition of the industrial trainee system in 2004 during the progressive Roh Moo Hyun administration. In this period, South Korean migration policy made remarkable progress: the Diet passed the Act on Treatment of Foreigners in Korea in 2007 and the Act on Support for Multicultural Families in 2008. This reflects substantial progress relative to trends in Japan and Taiwan, as both countries still lack basic laws to promote the inclusion of migrants.

However, Korean policies around multiculturalism are either segregationist (vis-à-vis unskilled migrant workers) or assimilationist (vis-à-vis foreign spouses of Koreans) (Kim, 2015). The policies solely target migrants who have familial or blood ties with Koreans. On the one hand, foreign spouses can access citizenship only once they understand Korean culture and thus are assimilated. On the other hand, Korean Chinese are favored because they are thought to be more easily integrated into Korean society than non-Korean unskilled workers.

These examples clearly demonstrate the limits of multiculturalism in East Asia. Multicultural policies are adopted so far as they are beneficial to the goals of developmental states. Taiwanese multiculturalism is used to promote economic connections with Southeast Asian countries; the Japanese government promotes multicultural coexistence because it evades rights-based arguments on migration; and in South Korea, multiculturalism is used to strengthen the reproduction of the Korean nation. Overall, soft talk on multiculturalism is used as a cover story for hard policies (Kim, 2015).

2.2. Beyond guest worker programs: diverse experiences of migrant incorporation

A unique feature of migration policies in East Asia has involved the recruitment of temporary migrant workers who are denied basic human rights such as family reunification and freedom of choice in employment (Seol & Skrentny, 2009). Although their permitted period of stay has been extended little by little, migrant workers are generally banned from permanent settlement. These guest worker programs are typical of migration policies found in developmental states. Meanwhile, decades-long migration to the region has drawn researchers’ attention to the diverse experiences of migrants, including but not limited to those who come to the host country under guest workers programs. In this special issue, we feature the studies of three understudied groups in Japan.
A pioneering trend in East Asian guest worker programs has involved the importation of Filipino entertainers to Japan. Although the number of Filipino entertainers has decreased dramatically since the mid-2000s, these individuals work in Japan’s nightlife industry as contract workers for three to six months. Most work as temporary migrants, and only approximately 10 percent of them subsequently earn long-term permanent residency by marrying their customers or having a child with a Japanese national (Parreñas, 2010). Although Filipina entertainers have been stigmatized as sex workers both in Japan and the Philippines, they experience ‘indentured mobility’ (Parreñas, 2011) by constructing intimate relationships with their customers.

Tricia Okada (2020, in this issue) clearly illustrates how indentured mobility is achieved. She sheds light on an understudied subgroup of Filipino entertainers: she conducted fieldwork on transgender women entertainers in Japan, whose experiences differ from and are more positive than those of cisgender women entertainers. Transgender Filipinas gain not only financial rewards but also a sense of safety because they are less stigmatized in Japan than they are in the Philippines. Their professional skills, which provide wholesome (not erotic) entertainment, make them appealing and marketable to Japanese clients.

Although Japan is often categorized as a reluctant host of migrants with poor integration policies, it has been willing to attract highly skilled migrants. In fact, the Japanese government has been quite open to highly skilled immigration schemes that apply no labor market tests and no list of shortage occupations (Oishi, 2012). However, the new privileged status for the highly skilled, launched in 2012, has attracted a limited number of migrants, most of whom are Chinese.

Adriana Miladinović (2020, in this issue) clarifies some reasons for the failure of the Japanese government to attract high-skilled cosmopolitan workers. She examines the occupational and sociocultural integration of highly skilled Caucasian migrants working in Japan. On the one hand, while Caucasian migrants’ whiteness grants advantages in entering the Japanese labor market, they continue to be sidelined as “foreigners” and “guest workers” in Japan, be it for reasons of dissimilarity between their own culture and Japanese culture or their obvious physical differences. On the other hand, European professionals do not feel accepted by Japanese society and abandon efforts to integrate into Japanese communities, retreating into ‘cosmopolitan islets’ wherein they renegotiate their White European identities. Her research suggests that race matters more than social class in the sense that ‘passive whiteness’ (Hof, 2020) serves as a symbolization of cultural capital or as tokenism. Caucasian migrants, therefore, face more obstacles to occupational and sociocultural integration than their East Asian counterparts, such as highly skilled migrants from China.

Studies of labor migration in East Asia tend to ignore North Korea, which has employed an isolationist policy except for a relatively small number of contract workers to the Russian far east (Malakhov, 2014). However, there is a nonnegligible number of defectors with documented and undocumented legal status. While most undocumented defectors live in China, their primary destination is South Korea, where they are treated as nationals (Lee, 2015; Won, 2020).
In addition, Japan also has reason to accept some defectors: quite a few Zainichi Koreans and their Japanese families moved to North Korea from 1959 to 1984 with behind-the-scenes support from the Japanese government (Morris-Suzuki, 2007). The Japanese government informally admitted members of these groups when they ‘repatriated’ from North Korea as defectors. Yujin Han’s article (2020, in this issue) provides a rare analysis of their migration trajectories. She argues that the migration pathways of North Korean defectors are greatly influenced by international relations in East Asia. While they had been able to use their connections with Japan when Japan and China had maintained amicable relationships, they had to rely on informal transnational networks once relationships between the two countries worsened. In addition, defectors’ situations vary due to inconsistencies in administrative proceedings in Japan.

3. Foes of Multiculturalism in East Asia

The third round of migrant incorporation in East Asia has coincided with the rise of xenophobic discourses and conservative mobilizations. In Japan and South Korea, violent attacks on ethnic and sexual minority groups have become known as part of a “hate speech” phenomenon. This development has led researchers to study “new” forms of racism and right-wing politics in the region. In Taiwan, conservative groups have started gaining visibility as a vocal voice countering the move toward a more inclusive society initiated by a vigorous civil society. Racism against Africans and refugees has become increasingly salient in China. Nevertheless, the existing studies on challenges to multiculturalism from the right are dominated by European and North American cases. Although there are emerging collective efforts to grasp the accurate portrayal of right-wing politics in East Asia (Chiavacci et al., 2020; M. Kang, Rivé-Lasan, et al., 2020), our understanding of the recent rise of right-wing politics in this region is still fragmented.

We should be cautious in interpreting these developments simply as a response to the influx of migrants in the region. While some scholars see the rise of right-wing politics as a byproduct of globalization reflecting discontent toward the elite’s inability to address political and economic instability emerging from neoliberal market reforms (Jayasuriya, 2018), case studies have found that factors specific to each context also matter greatly in shaping burgeoning right-wing politics. Due to the specific political and historical trajectories of each society, right-wing groups and netizens in East Asia attack a wide array of targets from sexual minorities to former colonial subjects. Furthermore, while sometimes right wing groups in each East Asian society challenge multiculturalism directly, this is not always the case. This complexity has complicated researchers’ attempts to define the nature of right-wing or conservative politics in simple terms. Rather, the papers included in this special issue discuss how backlash from right-wing politicians, groups, and citizens reveals the complexities of challenges to multiculturalism in the region.

Meanwhile, some notable commonalities are illustrated by existing studies and the contributions included in this volume. First, at least in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, new right-wing groups have emerged as a reaction to threats perceived from the increasing visibility of progressive values to which they are antithetical (Chiavacci & Grano, 2020). Second, unlike their counterparts in Europe and the US, where far-right groups explicitly oppose “the establishment,”
new right-wing movements in this region often maintain ideological proximity with the established conservative groups. Thus, Ming-sho Ho (2020) argues that the rise and fall of emerging conservative civil society actors in Taiwan are closely linked to the ups and downs of the established conservative political parties. Finally, conservative or right-wing groups in this region have used the internet as a crucial site of information exchange and as a vehicle for mobilization. Now, let us take a brief look at what we already know about challenges to multiculturalism presented by right-wing actors in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and China.

3.1 Japan

Among East Asian societies, Japan offers the richest body of literature broadly concerning emerging right-wing politics. What is peculiar about Japan is that earlier migrants such as Zainichi Koreans have been the primary targets of right-wing violence (Higuchi, 2016) instead of newcomer migrants who tend to be more isolated from, and to a lesser extent integrated into, mainstream society.

In much of the postwar period, right-wing activism has remained small in scale, organized by core groups of dedicated, experienced activists (Smith, 2011, 2018). They are far from popular. Ideologies central to the Japanese right have focused on heredity to the Japanese emperor and strong opposition to communism. They have also relied on logic akin to that of Pan-Asianism, emphasizing the unity of Asian nations under Japan's leadership with the Japanese emperor acting as the father of the “great family of Asians.” Certainly, prejudices against other Asians have persisted in Japanese society (Robillard-Martel and Laurent 2020). At the same time, Nathaniel Smith (2018) argues that older right-wing activists active in the pre-Internet era often reject the nativist view of Japanese society embraced by the recent cohort of xenophobic activism.

The situation changed in the 1990s when the wartime wrongdoings of the Japanese empire became a major topic of concern for both the left and right. Both domestic and global social movements in East Asia demanded apologies from the Japanese government on such issues as the comfort women problem (Alvarez, 2020). Through this process, an intellectual movement led by right-wing intellectuals such as the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform made concerted efforts to win the masses over. The movement aimed at promoting revisionist views of history regarding atrocities the Japanese empire committed before and during the two world wars. Tomomi Yamaguchi (2013; 2018)’s works detail how these right-wing intellectuals fought against left-wing intellectuals and grassroots movements in both Japan and abroad.

Then, in the early 2000s, a group of xenophobic far-right movements calling themselves Action Conservative drew the attention of the public. Organizations forming the Action Conservative Movement are small in scale except for the largest group, Zaitokukai. The group started with only a few hundred members, but its xenophobic activism soon gathered public attention, and the group eventually claimed to have more than 16,000 members. Zaitokukai directly attacks Chinese and Koreans through a number of high-profile demonstrations. For
example, in 2009, members of the ultranationalist group gathered in front of the Kyoto No. 1 Korean elementary school, taunting students with racial slurs. Their messages reflect a combination of historical revisionism through which they deny Japan’s wrongdoings before and during the two world wars and a particular form of xenophobia according to which Koreans and Chinese are deemed threats to the Japanese nation. The group’s emergence has drawn broad attention to the question of how Japan should deal with hate speech (Bruno, 2020; Kitayama 2018; Kim-Wachutka, 2020). Observers also caution that rampant hate speech polarizes media discourses and public opinion (Fuchs & Schäfer, 2020; Merklejn & Wiślicki 2020; Schäfer, Evert & Heinrich 2017). It is in reference to this context that Kyung Hee Ha (2020, in this issue) analyzed Korean schools’ struggle for recognition and autonomy.

Scholars have also carefully examined the ideologies and histories of this group (Gill, 2018; Shibuichi, 2015; Smith, 2018) and factors that underlie their mobilization using various methods (Asahina, 2019; Higuchi, 2020a). Higuchi (2021) argued that Koreans in Japan have become the target of right-wing violence due to the unique historical circumstances of East Asia where states and citizens still try to grapple with memories and legacies of the atrocities of Japan’s colonization and where geopolitical configurations of power have changed significantly in the last few decades with China and South Korea’s rapid rise as economic and political powers. Earlier migrants such as Chinese and Koreans have been perceived as advocates of China and South/North Korea and thus deemed threats to national security. Higuchi (2016) also argues that the internet and the political context of Japan in the 2000s helped these groups enable levels of mobilization unprecedented in the postwar history of right-wing politics. In analyzing originally constructed data, Koo (2020) confirms the importance of the political environment and a combination of political opportunities and threats, especially to conservative mobilization.

The groups’ radical tactics helped them grow quickly as a movement, but this also had serious repercussions. An increasing number of studies have documented the development of antiracist "countermovement" groups in Japan (Hatano, 2020; Shaw, 2020b, 2020a; Shibuichi, 2016) and coping strategies employed by Zainichi Koreans themselves (Lim, 2018). Owing partly to these activists' efforts and increasing pressures from outside of Japan, such as the United Nations' Committee on Human Rights and Antidiscrimination Convention’s recommendations to address hate speech problems, legislation to ban hate speech was enacted in 2016. Scholars have investigated how this process has evolved and limitations of the current legal framework in curbing hate speech since there is no sanction to be imposed even if one violates the law (Hatano, 2018; Higuchi, 2020b). Through this process, Zaitokukai has come to be recognized as a hallmark of racism among the public. When the group’s activism stalled, the leader of Zaitokukai turned his attention to the world of electoral politics and founded the Japan First Party, although its influence in this arena has been limited.

Yoshida (2020, in this issue) examines the worldview of a committed supporter of this new right-wing political party. Via an in-depth psychosocial analysis, Yoshida identifies the roles that masculinity plays in the process through which an ordinary “salary man” developed strong hostilities toward Koreans and Chinese. Yoshida’s informant saw himself as coming up short of
living as a respectable man and was ashamed of his self-recognized timidity. This longing for masculinity, Yoshida argues, is an important component of phycological dynamics that led this informant to respect the leader of the nativist party profoundly. Pointing to the role of sexuality and prevailing social norms, Yoshida offers useful insights into the dimensions of right-wing politics that have received little attention so far, not only in Japan but also in other countries.

3.2 South Korea

South Korea has seen the largest mobilization of right-wing citizens in the region. This has occurred as a reaction to the Candlelight protest, which mobilized a total of 16 million people in a country of 51 million demanding the impeachment of former president Park Geun Hye. Older conservative citizens perceived these peaceful rallies for the impeachment of the corrupt president as a threat to the liberal democracy that they are proud of. Hundreds and thousands of them took to the streets in “anti-impeachment” rallies. In a rare empirical study of this T’aegeukki (the South Korean national flag) protest, Yang (2020) argues that right-wing intellectuals appealed to collective memories of successful anticommunist nation building shared among older citizens. Historically, right-wing mobilization in Korea has shared anticommunism as an ideology with its Japanese peers, reflecting the enduring impacts of Cold War geopolitics.

The right-wing politics in Korea, however, differ in a number of significant ways from those in Japan. First, as Yang’s (2020) analysis illustrates, age, along with the place of residence, remains central to the cleavage structure of Korean politics, in which the right appeals primarily to older generations that experienced authoritarian rule under Park Chung-hee. Japan’s new right, in contrast, has appealed to a wide array of citizens both young and old, although their supporters are predominantly male.

Second, Christianity provides the crucial moral principle through which conservative Korean citizens interpret ongoing social changes and value transformations. This is unlike what is found in postwar Japan, where Buddhist and Shinto conservative groups have played prominent roles in advocating traditional gender roles and family values and in pursuing the revisionist view of history. Conservative protestant groups such as the Christian Council of Korea have posed vocal critiques of progressive values concerning gay rights and multiculturalism (Cho, 2014; Ryu, 2017). The most symbolic manifestation of this are groups of committed Christians who waved Israeli frags during the T’aegeukki rallies. In analyzing this puzzling phenomenon, Cho and Lee (2020) argue that the Israeli frag symbolically equated Korean nation building to that of Israel, and this symbol appealed to a large Christian audience in Korea in demonstrating that the anti-impeachment rallies were consistent with the “will of God” (2020, p. 16). Gowoon Jung’s (2020) interview-based study found that young Korean mothers draw on evangelical ethics and biblical messages to interpret multiculturalism, although whether they are for or against this also depends on their experience of living abroad. Wondong Lee and Joseph Yi’s (2020) analysis of a major Christian newspaper suggests that gays are increasingly becoming the target of attacks from Christian conservatives along with their typical “enemies,” communists and North Koreans.
Third, right-wing and conservative citizens in Korea seem to be more directly concerned with multiculturalism than their Japanese peers. This situation reflects the increasing visibility of migrants in Korean society outlined in the earlier part of this introduction. Jiyeoun Kang even notes that multiculturalism (damunhwa in Korean) “had become a symbol of discrimination in South Korea” (2020, p. 87). The strong push back against multiculturalism is represented by public outcry surrounding the rejection of approximately 500 Yemeni refugees who fled civil war and arrived in Korea in 2018. By examining conservative citizens’ opposition to the acceptance of refugees and migrants in the name of public safety, EuyRyung Jun (2019) argues that discourses of antimulticulturalism do not simply employ overtly racist vocabularies but make use of neoliberal tropes of fairness and equality, rendering migrants immoral “freeloaders” consuming Korea’s public goods without contributing to them.

The Korean online forums became a hotbed of hateful messages vehemently opposing multiculturalism (Jeong & Cho, 2020; Kang, Lee & Park, 2020). Kang’s (2020) analysis of two major online bulletin boards found that right-wing netizens, in response to multiculturalism, target low-skilled workers from South and Southeast Asia and children of multicultural families and often refer to ethnic and racial tensions found in Europe and the US to make a case for why Korea should not accept these migrants. Similarly, Yi and Jung’s (2015) extensive analysis of major news portals and nonmainstream websites shows that these two groups—low skilled migrants and multicultural families—are blamed for threatening homogeneous and virtuous Korean nations. Their analysis also identifies a deep-rooted public distrust of coethnics from China (Joseonjok) and North Korean defectors (Talbukja). Thus, migrant workers from other Asian societies are increasingly framed as economic and cultural threats to the lives of ordinary Koreans.

3.3 Taiwan

Compared to that observed in Japan and Korea, backlash from right-wing or conservative political groups in Taiwan has received little attention, especially in the literature written in English. Ming-sho Ho (2020) analyses the development of conservative countermovements in Taiwan that defend traditional family values and gender roles. In closely examining the three interrelated campaigns of antiabortion and opposition to same-sex marriage and gender equity education launched in the 2000s, Ho attributes the origin of the country’s countermovement to ecological changes occurring in Christian communities. Through this process, conservative evangelicals became a dominant force, and these conservative groups, in turn, led the aforementioned campaigns. Thus, Ho argues that “the conservative movement in Taiwan does not originate from a society-wide value change, nor does it represent a mainstream voice” (2020, p. 161).

3.4 China

Mainland China is distinct from the three consolidated East Asian democracies discussed above. In China, migrants from sub-Saharan Africa are often the target of verbal and other forms of attacks. However, anti-Black racism in China is not a new phenomenon. Barry Sautman (1994) chronicled high-profile public confrontations between Chinese and international students since the
1970s. Chinese students’ discontents emerging from low living standards underlined these conflicts, resulting in injuries of many participants, but it was the widespread prejudice against Africans that made them the target of attacks. Racial tensions between Chinese locals and migrants heightened through the 1970s and 1980s, culminating in massive anti-African protests in 1988 and 1989 in Nanjing.

Increasing labor migration from African countries discussed earlier in this introduction, along with the development of the internet, added a new twist to old forms of racism. Scholars thus argue that racism in China has evolved from the “campus racism” of the 1980s to current patterns of “cyber racism” (Cheng, 2011; Sullivan, 1994). Scholars have investigated the manifestations of hatred in online forums (Miao, 2020; Pfafman, Carpenter & Tang, 2015; Zhang, 2020). Jing Wang (2020, in this issue) and Guangzhi Huang (2020, in this issue)’s articles offer novel insights into this burgeoning area of the literature.

Jing Wang’s article investigates the tensions between emerging multicultural imaginations of the Chinese public and deep-rooted prejudices against ethnic and racial minorities. Wang delves deeper into what lies behind heated online controversy emanating from a message that Chinese actress Yao Chen posted on her Weibo account in support of the United Nations Refugee Agency. Building on an analysis of online forums and interviews, Wang identifies both global and locally specific factors giving rise to anti-Muslim sentiment in China. Entanglements of global right-wing populism and existing anti-Muslim sentiments in China, a lack of legal frameworks to protect refugees, and historical narratives of Han-centric nationalism, which legitimize the exclusion of the other, culminated the widespread online castigation of a popular Chinese actress.

Migrants often lack access to various forms of social protection provided by the state, leaving them particularly vulnerable in times of crisis. The ongoing global pandemic has laid this reality bare. Recently, students, workers, and expatriates from countries in Africa have reportedly been evicted from their homes. The most notorious cases have occurred in the city of Guangzhou, an industrial city of 12 million people. Huang’s ethnographic study of the village of Dengfeng, a large African enclave near Guangzhou, offers important insights into the conditions under which migrants are excluded from basic human rights and the logics that underlie such exclusions. Huang details the history of the city’s urban renewal, which preconditioned the local state’s motivations to remove migrant populations for the sake of real estate development. Long before the pandemic occurred, local state officials had already capitalized on existing prejudices against rural areas and their residents, most notably focused on their lack of self-discipline and cultural biases connecting Africans to prejudices about rural areas. When the pandemic hit, it provided an almost perfect opportunity for the local state to embark on a heavy-handed plan to evict African communities, which are seen as a symbol of social illness.
4. Conclusion

In this introduction, we have reviewed studies of the third round of migrant incorporation and exclusion in East Asia. While the articles included in this special issue are the result of the latest fieldwork conducted in the region, some also provide vivid examples of the influence of the first wave of migration in East Asia. Still persistent conflicts surrounding colonial settlement and the Cold War in East Asia have brought about different policies on coethnic migrants as well as Japan’s radical right. Ha’s paper addresses the relationship between multiculturalism and nativism through the case of Korean schools in Japan. Yoshida’s psychosocial analysis also finds nativists’ hate for South Korea to be fueled by historical revisionism, which justifies Japanese imperialism.

Likewise, the second round of migration waves to East Asia shaped the basic form of policy responses in the region. The region’s swift economic growth has accompanied skewed migration policies that prioritize developmental goals over other issues. This process has also been related to the rise of xenophobia and the radical right in South Korea, Taiwan and China. Huang’s article reveals that racism is embedded in the urban development policies of Chinese local governments.

This is not, however, the whole story. While the works by Han, Okada and Miladinović remain to some extent descriptive, they open new avenues of empirical inquiry on refugees, gender and race in East Asia. Okada’s research on transpinays suggests limits of conventional views that treat gender based on dichotomous, bivariate views of male and female. Such understandings were already being criticized in the United States at the turn of the century (Donato et al., 2006). Although studies on migration in East Asia are said to be descriptive (Fong & Shibuya, 2020), we can see signs of elaborate analyses enabled by a more mature understanding of migration in the region.
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