• Journal of applied mathematics & informatics
• /
• v.27 no.1_2
• /
• pp.89-96
• /
• 2009

In this article, we show a generalization of Clement's theorem on the pair of primes. For any integers n and k, integers n and n + 2k are a pair of primes if and only if 2k(2k)![(n - 1)! + 1] + ((2k)! - 1)n ${\equiv}$ 0 (mod n(n + 2k)) whenever (n, (2k)!) = (n + 2k, (2k)!) = 1. Especially, n or n + 2k is a composite number, a pair (n, n + 2k), for which 2k(2k)![(n - 1)! + 1] + ((2k)! - 1)n ${\equiv}$ 0 (mod n(n + 2k)) is called a pair of pseudoprimes for any positive integer k. We have pairs of pseudorimes (n, n + 2k) with $n{\leq}5{\times}10^4$ for each positive integer $k(4{\leq}k{\leq}10)$.

• Journal of The Korea Internet of Things Society
• /
• v.6 no.4
• /
• pp.49-57
• /
• 2020

In this paper, I provided an approximation function Li*2,10(x) using logarithm integral for the counting function π*2,10(x) of consecutive deca primes. Several personal computers and Mathematica were used to validate the approximation function Li*2,10(x). I found the real value of π*2,10(x) and approximate value of Li*2,10(x) for various x ≤ 1011. By the result of theses calculations, most of the error rates are margins of error of 0.005%. Also, I proved that the sum C2,10(∞) of reciprocals of all primes with difference 10 between primes is finite. To find C2,10(∞), I computed the sum C2,10(x) of reciprocals of all consecutive deca primes for various x ≤ 1011 and I estimate that C2,10(∞) probably lies in the range C2,10(∞)=0.4176±2.1×10-3.

• Journal of the Korea Society of Computer and Information
• /
• v.17 no.5
• /
• pp.59-70
• /
• 2012

RSA-CRT is one of the commonly used techniques to speedup RSA operation. Since RSA-CRT performs its operations based on the modulus of two private primes, it is about four times faster than RSA. In RSA, the two primes are normally thrown away after generating the public key pair. However, in RSA-CRT, the two primes are directly used in RSA operations. This led to hardware fault attacks which can be used to factor the public modulus. The most common way to counter these attacks is based on error propagation. In these schemes, all the outputs of RSA are affected by the infected error which makes it difficult for an adversary to use the output to factor the public modulus. However, the error propagation has sequentialized the RSA operation. Moreover, these schemes have been found to be still vulnerable to hardware fault attacks. In this paper, we propose two new RSA-CRT schemes which are both resistant to hardware fault attack and support parallel execution: one uses common modulus and the other one perform operations in each prime modulus. Both proposed schemes takes about a time equal to two exponentiations to complete the RSA operation if parallel execution is fully used and can protect the two private primes from hardware fault attacks.

• Kyungpook Mathematical Journal
• /
• v.56 no.3
• /
• pp.737-743
• /
• 2016

Let a and b be two ideals of a commutative Noetherian ring R, M a finitely generated R-module and i an integer. In this paper we study formal local cohomology modules with respect to a pair of ideals. We denote the i-th a-formal local cohomology module M with respect to b by ${\mathfrak{F}}^i_{a,b}(M)$. We show that if ${\mathfrak{F}}^i_{a,b}(M)$ is artinian, then $a{\subseteq}{\sqrt{(0:{\mathfrak{F}}^i_{a,b}(M))$. Also, we show that ${\mathfrak{F}}^{\text{dim }M}_{a,b}(M)$ is artinian and we determine the set $Att_R\;{\mathfrak{F}}^{\text{dim }M}_{a,b}(M)$.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
• /
• v.26 no.5
• /
• pp.1089-1097
• /
• 2016

It is well-known that, if additional information other than a plaintext-ciphertext pair is available, breaking the RSA cryptosystem may be much easier than factorizing the RSA modulus. For example, Coppersmith showed that, given the 1/2 fraction of the least or most significant bits of one of two RSA primes, the RSA modulus can be factorized in a polynomial time. More recently, Henecka et. al showed that the RSA private key of the form (p, q, d, $d_p$, $d_q$) can efficiently be recovered whenever the bits of the private key are erroneous with error rate less than 23.7%. It is notable that their algorithm is based on counting the matching bits between the candidate key bit string and the given decayed RSA private key bit string. And, extending the algorithm, this paper proposes a new RSA private key recovery algorithm using a generalized probabilistic measure for measuring the consistency between the candidate key bits and the given decayed RSA private key bits.