- Volume 26 Issue 3
The aim of this paper is to model North Korea and USA relationship since past until now. To this end, we have used game theory. The weakness of the existing models is that they have a static nature and can't analyze the changes of processes, strategies and results. The dynamic system of strategic games of which we have used in this article is a proper method to solve this problem. We have shown that South Korea and China play an important role in resolving the crisis.
north Korean nuclear crisis;game theory;dynamic system of strategic games;Nash equilibrium;game-maker games
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