The Effect of Management Forecast Precision on CEO Compensation-Accounting Performance

경영자 이익예측 정확성이 성과-보상에 미치는 영향

  • Lee, Eun-Ju (Business School, Pusan National University) ;
  • Kim, Jeong-Kyo (Business School, Pusan Natiional University)
  • 이은주 (부산대학교 경영학과) ;
  • 심원미 (부산과학기술대학교 경영과) ;
  • 김정교 (부산대학교 경영학과)
  • Received : 2018.08.03
  • Accepted : 2018.10.20
  • Published : 2018.10.28


The purpose of this study is to analyze the effect of managerial predictive accuracy on managerial performance-compensation. In this study, we compared managerial performance with managerial performance, And to analyze the relationship between manager compensation and manager compensation using managerial profit prediction accuracy. As a result of this study, there is a significant positive relationship between profit prediction accuracy and manager compensation, which can be interpreted as a result of manager's ability to compensate manager's ability to predict the future well. In this paper, we propose a new methodology that can be used to analyze the effects of managerial compensation on managerial compensation. This is because there is a difference in that it is proved to be a factor. Therefore, it is important to note that the prediction of the future of the company also identifies the additional determinants that affect manager compensation contracts with the key managerial capabilities.


CEO Compensation;Future Performance;Earning Forecast;Forecast Precision;Performance-Compensaion


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