Dewey's Pragmatic Conception of Value

듀이의 실용주의적 가치 개념

  • Received : 2016.01.15
  • Accepted : 2016.02.21
  • Published : 2016.03.30


The aim of this paper is to put forward the significance that Dewey's naturalistic theory of value has today in examining how value arises from experience. This is a necessary discussion as logical-positivists bring about the problem of fact/value dichotomy and further deny the possibility of intellectual discussion on value judgments. In this situation, the task that the discussion on value must be resolved is to go beyond the problem of fact/value dichotomy and to confer objectivity upon value judgments. In the stream of analytic philosophy, the significance of Dewey's theory of value is revealed by how Putnam and Johnson receive it. To overcome the problem of dichotomy, Putnam asserts that they are entangled because the value arises from a criticism through scientific inquiry. Also Johnson proves that Dewey's moral deliberation as valuation is wedded with cognition, feeling, and imagination by the research on cognitive science and shows that Dewey's theory of value is un-relativistic because it is on the basis of shared experience. So, if the absolute value is not given to us, Dewey's theory of value shows us how value is made by open inquiry. It has the significance of proposing the direction that the theory of value orients itself today.


Supported by : 한국연구재단