Gab Theory and Minimal Intuition on Truth

간극이론과 진리에 대한 최소직관

  • Received : 2016.05.08
  • Accepted : 2016.06.13
  • Published : 2016.06.30


Williamson(1994) proved incompatibility of Gab Theory and Tarski T-schema. But this does not means that Gab Theory could not involve intuition on truth that is expressed by T-schema. I will show that Gab Theory and mutual entailment of 'p' and 'it is true that p'(p⊨T

and T

⊨p) are compatible. It will draw that Gab Theory can involve minimal intuition on truth. After all what I want to reveal is logical space for Gab Theory through the compatibility of the mutual entailment and negation of the Principle of Bivalence. To prove the compatibility, I will present a consequent relation which should be accepted whenever we accept Gab Theory and demonstrate Gab Theory and the mutual entailment imply following two thesis; 1) not-T

and T are not equivalent. 2) p entails T

but not-T

does not entails not-p.


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