Kripke vs. Wittgenstein on the Notion of Rule-Following and Semantic Contextualism

규칙 따르기에 관한 크립키와 비트겐슈타인의 상반된 견해와 맥락주의적 의미론

  • Oh, Onyoung (Sogang University (Research Institute for Philosophy))
  • 오은영 (서강대학교 철학연구소)
  • Received : 2015.09.01
  • Accepted : 2016.02.12
  • Published : 2016.02.28

Abstract

In this paper, I argue that it is Kripke's Tractarian notion of rule-following that prevents him from giving a non-skeptical (straight) solution to Wittgenstein's paradox. I characterize the Tractarian notion of rule-following as the 'determinate/infinistic' notion of rule-following. The later Wittgenstein, however, advocates an opposite notion of rule-following: the 'indeterminate/finistic' notion. Considering the later Wittgenstein's context-sensitive, pragmatics-oriented approach to meaning and rule-following, the later Wittgenstein could not have endorsed the determinate/infinistic notion of rule-following. To the contrary, a motive behind Wittgenstein's skeptical paradox was to blame the Tractarian notion of rule-following as the major culprit giving rise to the paradox. At the end, I argue that Kripke's adherence to the Tractarian-correspondence theory of truth also contributes to his failure to offer a non-skeptical solution to the paradox. If Kripke had noticed that the later Wittgenstein was a deflationist about truth, he could have avoided his skeptical conclusion.

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