Abstract

The increase in applying IT to vehicles has given birth to smart cars or connected cars. As smarts cars become connected with external network systems, threats to communication security are on the rise. With simulation test results supporting such threats to Convergence security in vehicular communication, concerns are raised over relevant vulnerabilities, while an increasing number of studies on secure vehicular communication are published. Hacking attacks against vehicles are more dangerous than other types of hacking attempts because such attacks may threaten drivers' lives and cause social instability. This paper designed a Convergence security protocol for inter-vehicle and intra-vehicle communication using a hash function, nonce, public keys, time stamps and passwords. The proposed protocol was tested with a formal verification tool, Casper/FDR, and found secure and safe against external attacks.

Keywords

v2v Security protocol;Vehicular Convergence Security System;Vehicular Authentication protocol;Casper;Security authentication;Convergence Model Checking

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References

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