The Effects of Information and Predisposition on Individual Responses to Hypothetical Survey Questions

  • Published : 2015.02.28


This study investigates the effects of information and predisposition on individual responses to hypothetical questions. By employing the empirical implications of theoretical models (EITM) framework, I confirm that information and predisposition have positive effects on individual substantive responses to the hypothetical questions about the independence-unification issue in Taiwan. Respondents with higher levels of information and predisposition are more likely to provide substantive responses. More importantly, information and predisposition exert a negative interaction effect on individual responses to hypothetical questions, which implies that when an individual counts more on information to respond to hypothetical questions, her predisposition plays a less important role in her responses and vice versa. Finally, this study suggests that hypothetical questions are effective to probe individual opinion on specific issues under hypothetical conditions.



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