Managerial Stock Ownership and Debt Maturity: Evidence from Chinese Firms

중국 상장기업의 경영자지분율과 부채만기

  • Choi, Young-Mok (College of Business Administration and Economics, Cheongju University)
  • 최영목 (청주대학교 경상대학 경영학과)
  • Received : 2014.10.12
  • Accepted : 2015.02.20
  • Published : 2015.02.28


Using a sample of publicly-traded Chinese firms, this study examines a relationship between managerial ownership and corporate debt maturity decisions. China has transformed dramatically into a market capitalist economy over the past decades. However, so far, little attention has been paid to the role of professional managers. In this situation, this study explores the effect of stock grants to managers as incentive system by providing evidence that managerial ownership affects corporate debt maturity decisions. The findings are as follows: First, I find that like US firms, managerial ownership is negatively related to the proportion of long-term debt. Second, I divide the entire sample into two subsamples of state-owned and privately owned firms. For the privately owned firms, I find that there is a negative relationship between managerial ownership and the proportion of long-term debt. In contrast, for the state-owned firms, the relationship is positive and insignificant.


Supported by : 청주대학교 경영경제연구소


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