Cyber Threat and a Mitigation Method for the Power Systems in the Smart Grid

  • Kim, Myongsoo (Distribution Lab., Korea Electric Power Co. Research Institute) ;
  • Kim, Younghyun (Distribution Lab., Korea Electric Power Co. Research Institute) ;
  • Jeon, Kyungseok (Distribution Lab., Korea Electric Power Co. Research Institute)
  • Received : 2013.08.08
  • Accepted : 2013.12.30
  • Published : 2014.05.01


Obsolescent control systems for power systems are evolving into intelligent systems and connecting with smart devices to give intelligence to the power systems. As networks of the control system are growing, vulnerability is also increasing. The communication network of distribution areas in the power system connects closely to vulnerable environments. Many cyber-attacks have been founded in the power system, and they could be more critical as the power system becomes more intelligent. From these environment, new communication network architecture and mitigation method against cyber-attacks are needed. Availability and Fault Tree analysis used to show that the proposed system enhances performance of current control systems.


Cyber attack;Smart grid;Network architecture;Availability;Fault tree;Self-healing;Isolation


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