Party Organizations in Multiethnic and Homogenous Societies: Comparing India and Japan

Vasabjit Banerjee 1

How do party organizations respond to newly evolving social groups? Research on Indian party organizations reveals that in multiethnic societies with uneven modernization between social groups, internally competitive parties respond better to newly evolving groups. Moreover, it is claimed: the same dynamic works vis-à-vis homogenous societies with cleavages based on economic differences; and, the pattern holds regardless of differences in electoral institutions. This study examines these claims by testing whether factional competition correlated with recruitment into Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party in 1972 and 1983. Japan had a single-nontransferable-vote system with multi-member districts, while the research on India assumes a first-past-the-post system with single-member districts. This study conducts a difference of means test on the population of new and old politicians in the LDP in 1972 and 1983 with a pooled variance adjustment to account for differences in populations’ size. The findings show that intra-party competition and recruitment are not correlated in Japan, thus tentatively rejecting both claims.

Keywords: Multiethnic, Party, Japan, India, Electoral Institutions

Introduction

Does a party’s organization affect its responsiveness to newly evolving social groups? This study attempts to test whether theories from differentially modernizing multi-ethnic societies apply to homogenous societies where the central political cleavages stem from economic interests. Kanchan Chandra, in the article Elite Incorporation in Multiethnic Societies, explains how party organization interacts with cleavage structures in differentially modernizing multi-ethnic societies (2000). This conception of how particular types of party organizations affect the degree of adaptability to changing social and economic cleavage structures is vital to comprehending the relationship of party organization to social cleavages. Chandra argues that parties that allow for internal competition are more responsive to new socioeconomic groups, as revealed by higher inclusion of new candidates. Unlike other scholars, who implicitly and explicitly argue that the politicization of social cleavages is detrimental to democracy (Varshney, 2002; Wilkinson, 2006),

1 Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Public Administration, and Nonprofit Management, University of Tennessee at Chattanooga; Research Associate, Department of Sociology, University of Pretoria.
Chandra’s counter-intuitive analysis reveals that democratic party competition can be enhanced by recognizing and integrating newly evolving social groups within parties (Chandra, 2007).

More importantly perhaps, Chandra claims that this explanation of intra-party competition and integration of elites should be applicable to ethnically homogenous societies. Specifically, Chandra states: “in societies where the processes of modernization are not ethnically specific, the same rules of intra-party competition should produce ethnically indifferent patterns of incorporation” (Chandra, 2000: 843-844). Such a study is more relevant because of two theses: first, ‘factional’ competition allows both the absorption of new candidates and, second, negates the contradiction between an infinitely expanding party and finite incentives (Chandra, 843-844). Consequently, a comparative test that controls for the social and economic effects, as well as the impact of a different electoral system, would test the validity of Chandra’s model.

There are two simple contributions of this article. First, this study applies a non-Western derived theory on legislative politics to another non-Western case that has proved difficult for Western theories to explain. Secondly, it applies this theory to Japan, a homogenous country with a dominant party – the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) – that is characterized factional disputes. Japan is an economically developed and ethnically homogenous society, and the LDP was the dominant party from 1958 to 1993 with a lower house elected by a single-nontransferable-vote (SNTV) system within multi-member districts (MMD). Few countries have employed SNTV for national level elections (e.g. Taiwan before 2008 and effectively Colombia before 2006) with Japan being the most notable case. Furthermore, SNTV traditionally encourages factions, and accounting for factions is important for understanding Chandra’s thesis.

In the same vein of Chandra’s thesis, this article conducts a case study of the LDP, comparing inter-factional competition across elections. Two elections from the LDP’s period of political dominance were selected. One election will be from the height of the inter-factional competition in 1972, during the Kaku-Fuku war; and another from 1983, the period after the end of such competition between the factions (Bouissou, 2001: 586). It is important to note here that this study does not use data from the post-1993 period because, although directly and indirectly retaining power until 2009, the LDP’s dominance became remarkably weaker after 1993. Using the two elections of 1972 and 1983, analysis is conducted on the amount of inter-factional competition and the number of new individuals brought into the party, in order to answer the central question: is the amount of inter-factional competition related to the level of new candidate integration in the party?

This study draws on two streams of literature, one on the different types of party systems and the other on party organizations. With regards to party systems, the literature can be subdivided into three types based on explanations offered for the emergence and sustenance of political parties. These theories explain the effects of social economic or constitutional systems on the types, numbers and representativeness of political parties. Based upon Marxian class analysis, the first stream was developed in the context of the rise and spread of democracies in Europe. This theory considers parties to be political instruments of embedded economic and social rela-

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2 Chandra uses the term ‘elite’ to refer to individuals that are incorporated into political parties by existing politicians, and then defines old and new classes of political elites. I find the use of ‘elite’ to be a problematic term, because there is not objective manner to categorize an individual as elite or not. Instead, I will use the terms ‘candidate’ and ‘political actor’, for the purpose of our investigation, a ‘candidate’ or ‘political actor’ is an individual running for election in the Japanese house of representatives (Lower House).

3 The within party competition between factions led by Tanaka Kakuei and Fukuda Takeo.
tions within the polity. The relative permanence of markers of economic identity is reflected in the ‘freezing’ of the party system (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967).

The second theory argues that the specific character of a party system is created by sociopsychological variables that are influenced by a person’s immediate social milieu during their formative years (Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes, 1960). However, more temporal variables, such as issue salience and candidates’ image, can be influenced by political campaigns. Consequently, whereas the first model underscores the structural influences on the party system, the second emphasizes the role of the individual.

The third theory considers electoral rules, such as the vote distribution system and district magnitudes, as structuring the incentives of political parties and consequently the degree of responsiveness of the political system to the polity (Duverger, 1964). An important addition to Duverger’s emphasis on electoral rules was Sartori’s (1976) conceptualization of how underlying cleavage structures affected social polarization that in turn created centripetal or centrifugal party systems.

Scholars have addressed the relevance of the three theories to the Japanese case. Some scholars claim that the Japanese party system does not center on social cleavages (Flanagan, Kohei, Miyake and Richardson, 1991; McAllister, 2007; Reed, 1994). Other scholars argue that the left-right ideological schema does not apply to party competition in Japan (Dalton and Weldon, 2007; Kabashima and Ishio, 1998). Similarly, while most of the research on electoral institutions evaluates single-member districts versus proportional-representation systems, Japan utilized the more complex single-nontransferable-vote system (SNTV) until 1993, which encouraged intra-party conflict and factions (Cox, Rosenbluth, and Thies, 1999 and 2000; Eisenstadt, 2004; Kraus and Pekkanen, 2011).

Consequently, the testing of Chandra’s model in the Japanese context makes the findings of this stream of literature more relevant. In the majoritarian Indian system, the implicit benefits of single-member districts (SMD) with plurality elections has increased systemic stability by over-representing winners and increased efficiency via stable governments. The drawbacks have been the under-representation of minorities other than those that are regionally based, as well as the policy drawbacks engendered by unrepresentative and unresponsive governments that ultimately lead to violent political mobilization and social and economic fragmentation. The SNTV System with MMD is considered closer to proportional systems that are more representative, but according to Norris, they remain within the majoritarian family “because candidates need a simple plurality of votes in their districts to be elected, and there is no quota or requirement for proportionality across districts” (Norris, 2004: 48; Lijphart, 1999). The pathologies of the SNTV system in Japan and beyond are well known, explaining in part why SNTV has not been widely adopted around the world. These pathologies include the proliferation of: candidates (Hsieh, 2009; Cox, 1997; Taagepera and Shugart, 1989; Fukui, 1988); intra-party factions (Kohno, 1992; Reed, 2007; Maisrikrod, 2002); and intra-party competition dominating interparty competition (Baerwald, 1986; Cox and Rosenbluth, 1993; Wang, 1996).

The research on party organization considers how aspects of the political system affect the structure of political parties. A detailed analysis of the LDP requires an understanding of the theoretical background of the organization of dominant parties and party systems. For example, Pempel’s operational definition (1990: 2-3) of Duverger’s ambiguous notion of dominant parties (1963-275-280, 308-309) describes these as: “dominant in number”; “enjoying a dominant bargaining position vis-à-vis other parties”; “dominant chronologically” or “over a substantial period of time”; and, “dominant governmentally”, in order to carry out “a historical project” involv-
ing a “series of interrelated and mutually supportive public policies that give particular shape to the national political agenda”.

However, the present study avoids getting into a direct comparison of the Indian National Congress (INC) and the LDP, though the former was a dominant party from 1947 till 1991, with an interregnum from 1977 to 1980. This is because of a lack of theoretical specification. The only essay delving into the theoretical underpinnings of dominance in Pempel’s compendium, offers a post facto definition that cannot be applied to multiple cases (Di Palma, 1990). There is also paucity of empirical evidence in the Indian case because data about party organization is restricted to three provinces in Chandra’s article and, moreover, there is no accurate empirical data on the INC factions (Chandra, 2000).

Therefore, a review of the literature on the LDP is vital to this study’s explication of its party organization. Scholars of intra-party competition, especially in factionalized political parties in developing societies, consider this competition to be based on cultural peculiarities and colonial legacies (Bogaards, 2004: 173-179). Other scholars consider it to be the effect of incentives provided by electoral rules and economic cleavages (Mainwaring and Scully, 1995).

In the Japanese case, cultural explanations deal with the feudal past of Japan, which created a tendency to structure organizations on lines of vertical and hierarchical rather than horizontal social networks (Richardson, 1997; Wolferen, 1990). Understanding the effects of electoral rules on Japanese politics requires consideration of two elements: the effects of the LDP’s intra-organization rules, and the rules of the SNTV electoral system.

First, under the LDP’s intra-organization rules, the competitive election for the position of party president (who also becomes the Prime Minister) creates incentives for actors to absorb new members into disciplined factions (Leiserson, 1967; Reed, 1999). Akin to Chandra’s thesis on candidate absorption, membership in a faction gives access to governmental posts and funding opportunities, while the faction’s leader benefits from an increased number of supporters. The second element is that the SNTV electoral system forces a party seeking a majority seat-share to get an average of two winning candidates in every district, which has a twofold result. First, it results in a competitive process for attaining party endorsement, and, second, it makes individual candidates from the same party compete against each other (Okimoto, 1988: 207; Ramseyer and Rosenbluth, 1993). Kanchan Chandra’s notion of candidate integration into parties attempts to bridge the divergent explanations. Chandra shows how party organizations can effectively adapt to social and demographic characteristics. Moreover, Chandra shows how the type of adaptation affects the further development of the cleavage structure on the basis of party lines.

In order to test Chandra’s hypothesis on the Japanese case, this article will be subdivided into three sections. The first section will be used to explicate Chandra’s theses and show how it may be applied to the LDP. The second will include limited quantitative analysis and the interpretation of the data. The third section suggests why Chandra’s thesis does not carry over to homogenous societies and introduces areas of further research.

Chandra’s Theory

Based on an analysis of party competition in three Indian provinces, Chandra presents two hypotheses. First, increased intra-party competition leads to increased absorption of candidates from newly modernizing/mobilizing ethnic groups. Conversely, decreased intra-party competi-
tion, implying hierarchic relations with the party, leads to decreased absorption of individuals from the same groups. The second thesis, considers the bloated nature of a party that continues to absorb all newly evolving candidates. It argues that Riker’s (1962) minimum winning coalition thesis is inapplicable, since internally competitive parties are not single coalitions but coalitions of ‘factions’; therefore, new members find themselves forming minimum winning coalitions within the party itself (Chandra, 2000: 845). In short, the effects of intra-party competition on absorption of new individuals should be positively correlated. The combination of the two theories implies that intra-party competition should be positively correlated with the absorption of new elites, the nature of the relationship being unaffected by the level of social and economic diversity.

Chandra argues: “the successful incorporation of elites by political parties, whether multiethnic, non-ethnic or ethnic, depends upon the internal organizational structure of the party” (Chandra, 2000: 837). Consequently, “parties with competitive rules for intra-party advancement are able to continually incorporate new elites, while keeping old ones acquiescent” (Chandra, 2000: 837). This intra-party competitiveness renders the party stable, allowing it “to retain the allegiance of the elites during lean periods when they are out of government” (Chandra, 2000: 837). On the other hand, “Parties with centralized rules of intra-party advancement…are closed to the entry of new elites…[rendering such parties]…unstable, deeply vulnerable to defections by old elites when [the party] is out of power” (Chandra, 2000: 837). This is because a competitive structure “promotes coexistence even between elites from warring” intra-party groups, while “centralized organizational structure” leads to “splits and defections by elites from initially harmonious categories or even from the same ethnic category” (Chandra, 2000: 837).

Chandra uses a simple rational choice model, which involves both structural and agency related aspects. The design follows three stages. The aim of all players during all stages is to get the highest possible share of offices for faction members. In the first stage, old actors bring in new candidates, in order to supplement their strength vis-à-vis other old political actors (Chandra, 2000: 840-841). This increases the strength of the old political actors, while giving the new candidates a foothold in the party (Chandra, 2000: 841). In the second stage, the combined factions of old members and new members, led by the old members compete against each other (Chandra, 2000: 842). In the third stage, three outcomes are possible. First, the numerically superior new members may displace the old members (Chandra, 2000: 843). Second, the new members can gain numerical parity with the old members. Third, the displaced or threatened old members, or the still subordinate new members, may absorb newer candidates to enhance their numerical strength vis-à-vis each other and restart the cycle of integration (Chandra, 2000: 844-845). Consequently, Chandra’s thesis and research design can be utilized for a comparative case study of a country without salient ethnic cleavages.

A more thorough test of the thesis should also test the corollary statement on the incentive structure for victorious factions. Chandra recognizes that fluid intra-party competition implies the creation of an over-sized party that does not adhere to the Minimum Winning Coalition theory and, consequently, should be prone to splits and defections. This is because while the number of office-seekers increase (for parliamentary and party positions), the number of available office remains finite based upon available material and policy resources. Therefore, the probability of winning office becomes lower as the party organization increases in size, which increases the likelihood of defection (Chandra, 2000: 844). However, according to Chandra, parties that have intra-party competition integrate their new members within existing factions, each fac-

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4 The explanation for using “old” instead of “incumbent” or “established” is provided on Page 14.
tion being “composed of some subset of the party membership as a whole”; which leads to the formation of intra-party minimum winning coalitions, “with each faction representing a single coalition aiming for office” (Chandra, 2000: 845). Therefore, a dominant party with a super-majority, in the legislature of a society without ethnic cleavages, would fulfill the most dissimilar criterion and provide a critical test of Chandra’s proposition. Further, if the thesis were vindicated, then it would provide a counterintuitive notion of party organization, which reveals that intra-party competition, not hierarchical organization, makes a party more representative of the polity.

Applying Chandra’s Theory to the Japanese LDP: Research Design and Methods

This article analyzes the LDP, which can be considered a hard or critical case for Chandra’s argument. This is due to theoretical and empirical peculiarities in the Japanese case. First, in terms of system design, the Indian electoral system is one of pluralities in SMDs, while the lower house of the Japanese Diet (House of Representatives) during the period analyzed employed a SNTV system. The empirical peculiarities are apparent in the relative power of the parties being compared. Chandra’s evaluation of intra-party competition, in both the Congress Party (INC) and the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) from 1972 to 1998, takes into consideration the threat and effects of being out of power (Chandra, 2000: 845). In contrast, the LDP in the time period of this study, mid 1970s to mid 1980s, was the dominant party in Japan, and as a result there was little threat of the LDP losing power, which should have mitigated both the rapid inclusion of new individuals and the probability of defection by old members. Finally, the economic variables in the two cases are significantly different: Japan is an OECD country, while India is a developing country. Thus, the dissimilar social cleavages, economic conditions, and electoral systems thoroughly test Chandra’s thesis.

Considering the aforementioned differences between the Indian and Japanese cases, this study tests whether Chandra’s thesis is applicable in the latter. The study posits that intra-party competition did take place within the Japanese LDP, through the organized intra-party ‘faction’ system. This competition allowed new social and economic candidates to join the party, while preventing their established counterparts from defecting from the LDP. However, in contrast to Chandra’s assertion, the competition did not take place in party caucuses or primaries, but within the SNTV in a MMD electoral arena.

Chandra’s pattern of modernization model assumes differential modernization between ethnic/caste groups in India. However, this may be replaced in the Japanese case with the differential rates of modernization between the urban, newly urban, and rural sections of the polity. For example, Tanaka Kakuei’s leadership of the underdeveloped Niigata region was based on pork-barrel projects and clientelist links with his koenkai or campaign and social network organization, the “Niigata Mountain Association” (Krauss and Pekkanen, 2004: 10-13; Schlesinger, 1999). Originally members of the Sato faction, the Tanaka-and-Fukuda-led factions’ competition within the LDP was called the ‘Kaku-Fuku’ war and ended with Tanaka’s outmaneuvering Fukuda and capturing the Prime Ministerial position with backing from the Nakasone and Ohira factions.

Also, during the period of LDP dominance, another important example was the New Komeito Party, an offshoot of the lay Buddhist ‘Sokka Gakai’ movement, which then catered to the newly urbanized segment of the Japanese population. Thus, the Japanese case exhibits different levels of modernization, plus factional rivalry within the dominant party.
However, there is an important difference between the research design presented here and Chandra’s method. Her qualitative research is done within the party organization itself, that is, intra-party warring takes place before the nomination of candidates (Chandra, 2000: 845). This study researches the electoral stage without the intermediate intra-party warring or decision-making stage. This is because of the intervening effects of the electoral systems in these countries: the Indian parliament’s Lower House has plurality elections in SMDs, and the Japanese Diet’s Lower House has SNTV elections in MMDs. Therefore, the period and arena of intra-party competition is inverted in the Japanese case: the inter-factional conflict takes place at the electoral level because of the SNTV and MMD system.

The quantitative data used here comes from Reed’s *Japan Election Data: House of Representatives, 1947-1990* published by the Center for Japanese Studies at University of Michigan (1992). It is a comprehensive compilation of the Japanese House of Representatives election data from 1947-1990. The data includes all of the candidates, with identification of the parties they represented, the factions that they represented or their status as independents, and each candidates’ vote share. This data was compiled into an electronic database. The database included district (number identification), candidate (number identification), if a candidate won or lost (dummy variable), faction (number identification), year of election (1972 or 1983), level of competition (dummy variable), and if the candidate was new or old (dummy variable).5

Four of these variables require further explanation. First, each faction was assigned a numerical identifier. However, over time factions evolved and/or broke off from each other. For example, when the Kishi faction ceased to exist, it did so by dividing its membership and resources into three different factions: the Fukuda faction, the Kawashima faction, and the Fujiyama faction (Baerwald, 1986: 26). A fact confirmed by Reed’s illustration of the factional lineage of the LDP, which shows the emergence of factions, and where their membership subsequently relocates to after the name of the original faction ceases to exist (Reed, 1992, Pg. 1, Fig. 2). Therefore, for the purpose of coding the dataset, each faction is given its own number, and no recognition is given to factional lineage.

The second variable that requires explanation is the election years 1972 and 1983, based on qualitative empirical evidence and supported by existing scholarship. This analysis proceeds from the fact that 1972 was a year of high inter-factional competition, as shown in the lack of consensus over the choice of candidates for the position of prime minister. The year 1972 was also part of the time period when the competition between the Tanaka Kakuei and the Fukuda Takeo factions was at its peak (Baerwald, 1986). In contrast, 1983 was a year of low inter-factional competition, perhaps due to the Tanaka faction’s overall dominance in the LDP as demonstrated by the less divisive prime ministerial appointment (Baerwald, 1983: 54-56). Cox and Rosenbluth (1993) also confirm lower levels of competition in 1983. However, they argue that this was due to the faction leaders having reached an implicit agreement regarding the distribution of funds, which mitigated the ‘funds and positions for loyalty’ structure that undergirded the LDP factional strife (Cox and Rosenbluth, 1993: 584-587).

The final variable that requires explanation is new politician or old politician. New/Old is a dichotomous dummy variable, for which each candidate was coded as either new or old. An individual was coded as new if the election being considered was the first in which the candidate was running under the LDP’s party label (meaning the candidate had the party’s support). In order to be new, a candidate did not have to win, but had to be running with the LDP’s support for the first time. An old politician was an individual who had previously run with the LDP’s sup-

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5 The explanation for using “old” instead of “incumbent” is provided in the following page.
port. To be classified as old, an individual did not need to have won in the past, but simply to have run with the LDP’s support. Prior factional affiliation was not taken into account for this variable because, as previously discussed, some factions changed names over time without substantial change in membership.

Table 1

LDP Factions in 1972 and 1983

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Politicians</th>
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<tr>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
<td>Old  New</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
<td>Old  New</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Miki</td>
<td>41  5</td>
<td>Tanaka</td>
<td>64  14</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tanaka</td>
<td>45  11</td>
<td>Suzuki</td>
<td>52  6</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Fukuda</td>
<td>66  7</td>
<td>Fukuda</td>
<td>49  10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nakasone</td>
<td>33  11</td>
<td>Nakasone</td>
<td>50  7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohira</td>
<td>36  8</td>
<td>Ohira</td>
<td>2  0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shiina</td>
<td>18  1</td>
<td>Komoto</td>
<td>29  2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mizuta</td>
<td>14  0</td>
<td>Nakagawa</td>
<td>5  2</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Funada</td>
<td>9  0</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>25  6</td>
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<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>11  11</td>
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<td>Ishii</td>
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This data allows us to gain valuable insight into the potential differences between the 1972 and 1983 elections. A difference of means test was conducted on the populations of the 1972 and 1983 new and old politicians. The population size in the two elections was not equal, so a pooled variance adjustment was used to account for the difference in the population size. Following standard procedure, the alpha was set at .05.

The null hypothesis is that there is no difference between the mean of new LDP candidates in 1972 and 1983. Rejection of the Null would mean that there is a statistically significant difference between the inclusion of new individuals in 1972 and 1983. Failure to reject the null would mean that there is no statistically significant difference between the amount of new individuals introduced into the LDP in 1972 and 1983.

The findings were confirmed via Pooled-Variance t-Tests for Differences in Two Means. The results showed that the differences in 1972 overall versus 1983 overall and the differences in the ratio of new/old in 1972 versus 1983 were both not significant. It also unsurprisingly confirmed that the mean of new recruits differs from faction veterans.

I find that we Fail to Reject the Null. The t-statistic is .607, which is not statistically significant at alpha = .05. Thus, we must conclude that there is no statistically significant difference between the number of new candidates introduced into the LDP in 1972 and 1983.

These findings raise another question. Was there a difference in the way that the new politicians entered the LDP in 1972 and 1983? Were the new politicians being recruited into various factions in different concentrations in the two elections? To answer these questions, the data was isolated by election year. Then the variables for faction and New/Old politician were compared against each other. Each faction’s quantity of new politicians was taken in relation to the number of new politicians that were incorporated into the LDP that year. This process was completed for
all of the factions in the 1972 election; the entire process was then repeated for the factions present in the 1983 election. The results for the two elections were then compared against each other.

From this comparison, it can be concluded that there is no evidence of a change in manner of new politician inclusion. The same basic pattern of inclusion that existed in 1972 was present in 1983. This pattern is characterized by a few large factions dominating the new candidate inclusion with approximately 20% of the new candidates, a similar number of factions accounting for approximately 10% of the inclusion, and a couple of factions having no new candidates introduced. There is no evidence that the process of inclusion became more concentrated in a particularly small group of factions, or that it became incredibly diffuse across all of the factions. These findings might be the result of the basic method used, which is unable to account for how the makeup of the factions changed over time, (since some factions that existed in 1972 no longer existed in 1983). Thus, the analysis of descriptive statistics does not definitively reveal the lack of change in the factions’ pattern of inclusion of new candidates. However, this study’s findings do suggest that, at the systemic level, there is no clear pattern of change in how new politicians were introduced into the LDP from the 1972 to 1983 elections.

Conclusion

This analysis was motivated by Chandra’s claims that the model described in *Elite Incorporation in Multiethnic Societies* is applicable to ethnically homogenous societies. Thus, adhering to the ‘most dissimilar’ notion of comparison, this article tested the assertion in the homogenous case of Japan under the LDP. Confirmation of Chandra’s model would have required that high levels of competition be associated with high levels of new politician inclusion, in a non-hierarchical setting (SNTV, MMD inter-faction competition). Additionally, low levels of competition would have been associated with low levels of new politician inclusion in a more hierarchical structure (the LDP’s reformed system). The findings of this study are inconsistent with the expectations of Chandra’s model. The study does not find a significant difference between the numbers of new candidates introduced into the LDP during the high competition year (1972) versus the low competition year (1983). Thus, the study tentatively rejects Chandra’s model as it applies to the Japanese case.

However, further tests on Japan itself can account for challenges faced by candidates in multimember districts due to the Public Offices Election Law, as well as the effects of candidates’ inheriting constituency level support bases (*koenkai*) from family members. Also, such tests should take into account elections held after the 1993 period when the LDP lost its dominance. Nevertheless, in the absence of further testing and empirical evidence from other ethnically homogenous societies, Chandra’s assertion fails to be applicable.

Perhaps Chandra’s model still applies to ethnically homogenous and underdeveloped states. Thus, Japan may have reached a critical overall level of modernization where the integration of new individuals within the LDP does not reflect differential modernization rates. If this is the case, evidence from Taiwan (which also employed SNTV for legislative elections) may be a more appropriate test. However, by testing Chandra’s argument based on a single case study, this article’s analysis does suggest that there is cause for future investigation on other ethnically homogenous societies.

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6 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer from the *Journal of Contemporary Eastern Asia* for these insights.
References


