Sorites Paradox and Supervaluationism

더미의 역설과 초평가주의

  • Received : 2013.04.07
  • Accepted : 2013.05.31
  • Published : 2013.06.30


The purpose of this paper is to show that Williamson's counterexamples and Fara's paradox do not conclusively refute supervaluationism. I will achieve this purpose on the basis of local validity. In general, people regard supervaluational validity as global validity. And D-introduction, which is premise of Williamson's counterexamples and Fara's paradox, is justified only if we assume global validity. But it cannot correctly grasp supervaluational semantics, especially semantic character of D-operator. So I will show that validity of supervaluationism is local and define global validity by local validity. Strategy of this paper is to protect supervaluationism against Williamson's counterexamples and Fara's paradox by minimal modification of supervaluationism and to prove that supervaluational logic is not revisionary and weak for solving the sorites paradox.


Supported by : 한국연구재단