Explaining the Development of Social Policy: Social Policy Preferences and Political Institution

선호와 정치제도를 중심으로 한 사회정책 발달이론의 모색

  • Received : 2009.06.09
  • Accepted : 2009.08.14
  • Published : 2009.11.30


This paper presents a formal model of social policy development. The model shows that the development of social policy depends both on the social policy preferences of voters and on the political institution which mediates the preferences of voters. In the direct democracy, median voter's social policy preference is critical because he is Condorcet winner in a pairwise vote. But in the representative democracy, political parties design social policy to win the support of a majority of voters. Hence, the political institution like electoral rule may affect social policy outcome. The model presented in this paper contrasts 3 alternative constitutional features and investigates how they affect social policy outcome. In result, this papers emphasizes that policy preferences of voters and political institution may be key variables to explain social policy development and divergence among welfare regimes.


social policy preferences;political institutions;electoral rule;welfare regime


Supported by : 한국학술진흥재단