Godel's Theorem and Mind as Turing Machine

튜링 기계로서의 마음과 괴델의 정리

  • 선우환 (프런스턴대학교 철학과)
  • Published : 1995.09.01

Abstract

According to a well-known argument (so-called the Godelian argument) proposed by Lucas. Godel's theorem refutes the thesis of mechanism. that is, the thesis that human cognitive system is no more than a Turing machine. The main aim of this paper is to show that this argument is not successful. However. I also argue that many pre-existing objections (by Benacerraf, Slezak. Boyer. Hofstadter etc.) to Gooelian argument are not satisfactory. either. Using Tarski's theorem. I then strengthen what I caII the consistency objection to Godelian argument. In my dilemma objection obtained. Godelian argument doesn't work because the argument has a false premise if we have the concept of global truth and the argument cannot be stated if not.